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This thesis comprises three empirical studies, which investigate the 
influential factors of financial markets and their participants’ behaviour. These 
studies can be read independently. 
Using a sample of European banks, the first study, “Corruption culture 
and bank short-termism”, provides evidence that country-level corruption is 
strongly associated with short-termism (a behaviour that focuses on short-
term benefits at the expense of long-term shareholders’ wealth growth). To 
measure short-termism, I construct a multi-dimensional index which 
combines earnings management, tail risk, and short-term debt ratio. I show 
that banks headquartered in countries that are more corrupt behave more 
short-sightedly than banks headquartered in countries that are less corrupt. I 
further demonstrate that foreign shareholders act as a channel through which 
corruption is imported. For banks located in countries with a lower than 
average corruption level, having more shareholdings by investors domiciled 
in countries that are more corrupt leads to more short-termism. This study 
highlights the link between bank short-termism and corruption of both 
headquartered countries and foreign shareholders. 
The second study, “Macroeconomic and political uncertainty and cross 
sectional return dispersion around the world”, examines whether return 
dispersion (the cross sectional variation in stock returns) could be used to 
measure the macroeconomic and political uncertainty of international 
financial markets. I show that return dispersion is able to capture 
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uncertainties including local and global business cycles, international political 
instability, market general uncertainties, international country risk, and 
economic policy uncertainty. Stocks that are more sensitive to return 
dispersion have higher returns. Moreover, I compare return dispersion with 
another commonly used uncertainty measure: implied volatility. I find that 
they capture different aspects of uncertainty. This study aims to provide a 
simple and easy-to-use measure of uncertainty for both academic purposes 
and professional practice.  
The third study, “The performance of asset allocation strategies across 
datasets and over time”, evaluates the ex-ante performance of various 
commonly used asset allocation strategies including equal weighting, mean 
variance weighting, risk parity weighting, minimum variance weighting, equal 
risk contribution weighting, and maximum diversification weighting. The 
results show that there are no statistically significant differences between 
asset allocation strategies if the portfolios are based on country or industry 
indices. If the portfolios are formed of stocks or multi-asset classes, then the 
differences between strategies are large; however, none of the strategies can 
consistently outperform the others over time. I also identify that the 
implementation of the mean variance rule leads to wide fluctuation in risk 
shifting, which is undesirable for investors. Last but not least, I illustrate how 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
Financial markets are essential for a country’s economic development, 
because mature and properly-functioning financial markets raise and allocate 
capital for the economy. They connect participants through activities that 
include the forming of healthy banking systems, operating corporations, 
institutional trading, personal wealth management etc. This thesis aims to 
enhance the understanding of international financial markets from different 
perspectives. The first chapter considers the perspective of financial 
intermediaries, namely banks. The other two chapters consider the 
perspective of investors. These three studies can be read independently, 
however, all three studies revolve round the influential factors that can affect 
financial markets and their participants’ behaviour.  
In the first study, I analyse an influential factor that affects financial market 
intermediaries’ myopic behaviour: corruption culture. The myopic behaviour of 
financial institutions has been cited as a major cause of the 2008 financial crisis 
(Dallas, 2011), yet it has been difficult to measure this behaviour in the banking 
sector. Previous studies have different interpretations of short-termism such 
as short-term oriented investment horizons (e.g. Bushee, 1998; Laux, 2012), 
earnings management under market pressure (e.g. Bird, Ertan, Karolyi, and 
Ruchti, 2017; Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal, 2005; Houston, Lev, and Tucker, 
2010), and executive compensation designed to focus on short-term 
performance (Fahlenbrach and Stulz, 2011; Gopalan et al., 2014; Kolasinski 
and Yang, 2018). Those studies show that short-termism has many facets. In 
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order to capture as many actions that may be interpreted as short-termism, 
this study creates a multidimensional index that combines earnings 
management, tail risk, and short-term debt ratio. 
After computing this novel measure of bank short-termism, I test whether 
national level corruption culture is related to it. Although corruption is found to 
significantly influence corporate cash holding and leverage (Smith, 2016), 
misconduct (Liu, 2016), and tax avoidance (DeBacker, Heim, and Tran, 2015), 
there is no documented evidence to link it with bank myopic behaviour. Thus, 
I test the impact of corruption on the overall measure of short-termism on a 
sample of public banks in Europe. I use the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) 
to measure the corruption level of bank-headquartered country. I find that 
banks are more myopic if they are headquartered in countries with a relatively 
high degree of corruption. To mitigate potential endogeneity concerns, I use 
an instrumental variable approach where the instrument is the distance 
between a bank’s headquartered country and the least corrupt country in 
Europe, which is Denmark. The results are robust to the two-stage least square 
regressions using this instrument. In addition, I test whether corruption as an 
inherent human cognition would influence bank short-termism under 
uncertainty. I find that the effect of corruption on short-termism is stronger 
during periods of higher economic policy uncertainty.  
I further test if corruption could influence a bank’s short-termism through 
its foreign shareholders. I find that, for banks headquartered in relatively clean 
countries (with a corruption value lower than average), having a higher 
percentage of shareholdings held by foreign shareholders, who are domiciled 
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in countries with higher corruption level, is associated with more short-termism. 
In contrast, having more shares held by foreign shareholders who are 
domiciled in countries that are less corrupt than a bank’s headquartered 
country does not curb short-termism. Overall, these results indicate that 
corruption culture could influence banks’ myopic behaviour through their 
headquartered countries and foreign shareholders.  
In the second study, I link the financial markets with macroeconomic and 
political uncertainties. I show that the cross-sectional return dispersion is a 
good measure for uncertainty, and it can be easily obtained at any time. In 
contrast, the commonly used National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) 
business cycle data and International Crisis Behaviour (ICB) crisis data are not 
updated monthly not to mention daily. Previous literature has shown that return 
dispersion is associated with unemployment (Loungani, Rush, and Tave, 
1990), business cycle (Loungani, Rush, and Tave, 1991), and the state of the 
aggregate economy (Gomes, Kogan, and Zhang, 2003). Therefore, it is natural 
to link it with uncertainties that could influence returns of securities traded in 
financial markets. I compute return dispersion in 18 countries using the 
standard deviation of the fifty largest market capitalisation stocks’ returns in 
each country. I find that return dispersion is significantly higher during local 
recessions and global recessions raise return dispersion even more. Return 
dispersion is also to capture political crises in all but one of the countries I test. 
When I count articles containing words related to uncertainty in Bloomberg and 
employ it as a proxy for general uncertainty, return dispersion is higher in 11 
out of 18 countries. Also, return dispersion is linked to the economic policy 
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uncertainty proxy developed by Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2016). Overall, 
return dispersion is a model free measure and it can systematically capture all 
sorts of political and macroeconomic uncertainties. It is particularly useful for 
practitioners as it can be obtained daily or even hourly by practitioners. 
Therefore, investors can use it as a tracer to closely track the financial market 
and regulators can use it to monitor the economy at any point of time. 
Moreover, I test whether return dispersion is linked with stock returns. I 
find that firms that are more sensitive to return dispersion offer higher returns. 
Additionally, I compare return dispersion with implied volatility. The evidence 
shows that return dispersion does a better job in measuring global business 
cycles and political crises, while, implied volatility significantly captures 
economic policy uncertainty.  
In the third study, I evaluate the performance of asset allocation strategies 
of financial market participants. I compare various asset allocation strategies 
that are commonly used including equally weighting, mean-variance weighting 
based on Markowitz model, risk parity based on variance, risk parity based on 
volatility, minimum variance weighting, equal risk contribution weighting 
developed by Qian (2006), and maximum diversification strategy created by 
Choueifaty and Coignard (2008). I construct portfolios using four different 
datasets including five country indices, ten US industries, individual US stocks 
and multi-assets with bonds and stocks. I employ the rolling-sample approach 
and estimate the out-of-sample performance for each strategy.  
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I use the Sharpe ratio and alphas from asset pricing models to measure 
performance. I find that none of the strategies is statistically different from the 
equally weighted portfolio for country- and industry-based portfolios. For stock- 
and multi-assets-based portfolios, there are differences between strategies; 
however, none of the strategies can consistently outperform the others in the 
long-term. Furthermore, I compare the risk factor loadings of those strategies 
in order to estimate the time varying risk exposures associated with the 
strategies. I find that the mean variance weighting strategy has the largest 
fluctuation in risk loadings, which implies high risk shifting towards market, size, 
value, and momentum factors. Last but not least, I find that no strategy can 
outperform the others consistently and across all datasets. This study provides 
guidance in portfolio construction for both academic research and professional 
practice.  
In summary, the structure of this thesis is as follows. Chapter 2 looks into 
the impact of corruption culture on bank short-termism. In Chapter 3, I illustrate 
the link between the cross-sectional return dispersion and multiple 
uncertainties. Chapter 4 runs comprehensive tests on asset allocation 
strategies. Each of those chapters contain separate motivations, research 
questions, methodologies, empirical results, and robustness tests. Chapter 5 
summarises the thesis and includes overall contributions, limitations and 































A major cause of the Financial Crisis of 2007-2008 is believed to be the 
financial sector’s focus on short-term results rather than long-term value 
creation (Dallas, 2011). The importance of understanding the determinants of 
short-termism has been recognized in the literature. According to Edmans 
(2009, p. 2), “many academics and practitioners believe that myopia is a first-
order problem faced by the modern firms”. Given the importance of this issue, 
previous literature has suggested several factors that influence short termism, 
such as CEO equity vesting (Edmans, Fang, and Lewellen, 2013), board 
effectiveness (Gonzalez and André, 2014), institutional investors (Bushee, 
1998), stock liquidity (Chen, Rhee, Veeraraghavan, and Zolotoy, 2015), and 
corporate governance (Cornett, McNutt, and Tehranian, 2009). Yet the impact 
of corruption culture as a driver of short termism has not received much 
academic attention.  
In this chapter, I provide two sets of evidence that suggest corruption is 
strongly associated with short-termism in the banking sector. In the first part, I 
show a significant positive relationship between short-termism and domestic 
corruption which is the level of corruption in the country where the bank is 
headquartered. In the second part, I show an asymmetrical impact of foreign 
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corruption on short-termism where foreign corruption is the level of corruption 
in banks’ foreign institutional shareholders’ domiciled countries. Banks 
headquartered in less corrupt countries behave more myopically if they have 
larger numbers of shareholders from more corrupt countries. However, having 
larger numbers of shareholders from less corrupt countries does not reduce 
the level of myopia for banks with higher than average domestic corruption.   
 Myopic behaviour can be defined as types of firm behaviour that inflate 
current profits at the expense of long-term benefits (Stein 1988, 1989). It is 
difficult to come up with direct empirical measures of myopia as it is hard to 
observe the time horizon firms have in mind when making corporate decisions. 
Moreover, previous literature interprets various corporate actions as evidence 
of myopia. These corporate actions mainly fall into three categories. First, 
cutting investments that would provide long-term growth or setting high hurdle 
rates for accepting investment projects can be interpreted as myopic behaviour 
(Bushee, 1998; Laux, 2012). Second, attempts to maximize short-term profits 
due to pressure from capital markets can be considered as myopic behaviour 
as well (Houston, Lev, and Tucker, 2010; Bird, Ertan, Karolyi, and Ruchti, 
2017). In particular, due to the pressure exerted by transient investors, 
including institutional shareholders, firms might be tempted to manipulate 
earnings to meet or beat current period market expectations even if that comes 
at the expense of long-term stability. Third, executive compensation designed 
to focus on short-term performance is taken as evidence of short-termism 
(Fahlenbrach and Stulz, 2011; Gopalan et al., 2014; Kolasinski and Yang, 
2018). This is because short-term oriented compensation structures can give 
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perverse incentives to executives, leading them to make myopic decisions. 
Overall, previous studies tend to focus on a single facet of myopia and their 
sample selection procedures are often affected by their choice of the proxy for 
short-termism (for instance, firms with detailed compensation information only, 
firms with analyst coverage only, or firms with long-term investment figures 
only).  
In order to capture different facets of myopia simultaneously, I build a 
multidimensional index of myopia. However, the above mentioned three 
categories of corporate actions are not completely applicable for banks. Banks 
do not report R&D costs as their long-term investment. Also, executive 
compensation data for European banks is limited. Therefore, my 
multidimensional myopia index is designed particularly for banks which 
includes earnings management, tail risk, and short-term debt ratio. This 
approach is similar in nature to the one adopted by Bernile, Bhagwat, and 
Yonker (2018) who incorporate six dimensions of board characteristics to 
establish a multidimensional index of diversity as they want to combine the 
effects of different sources of board diversity. I use the same method as them, 
such that I first standardize each dimension and, then, add them up.  
The first dimension of the index is earnings management. Myopic 
managers would have an incentive to manage earnings in order to meet short-
term targets, worrying the stock price might drop sharply if they fail to meet a 
target. Earnings management is widely accepted as a symptom of myopia in 
the literature (for instance, Cheng and Warfield, 2005; Bird et al., 2017; 
Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006). I classify banks as being short-termist if 
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they either meet or beat analyst forecast consensus by less than two cents. 
Second, I choose tail risk as another dimension of myopia. One of the causes 
of the Financial Crisis of 2007-2008 was the excessive tail risk undertaken at 
the expense of long-term outcomes in the banking industry (Ellul and Yerramilli, 
2013). Managers may be willing to take on tail risks to boost performance in 
the short run but this can cause significant damage to the institutions when 
such risks materialise. Tail risk is calculated as the negative of the average 
return on the bank’s stock over the 5% worst return days of each year. Third, 
I use bank short-term debt ratio as another dimension of short-termism. Banks 
are considered to be myopic if they depend disproportionately on short-term 
wholesale funding and are not concerned about whether they could meet long-
term demands. Diamond and Rajan (2009) point out that one of the reasons 
for the recent financial crisis is the heavy focus upon short-term debt. Short-
term funds incur short-term management through a natural chain of incentives 
which is very harmful for the long-term stability of financial system (Barton, 
2011). The aim for this multidimensional index is to combine all major aspects 
of bank characteristics that constitute short-termism as none of these aspects 
would fully capture short termism when examined separately.  
Using the multidimensional myopic index, I analyse myopic behaviour in 
the banking industry using a sample of listed European banks over the period 
running from 1998 to 2016. I show that there are significant cross-country 
differences in bank myopic behaviour. The myopia index comprises various of 
signs that might reveal short-termism. Moreover, I find that there is no 
significant correlation among the three components of the myopia index, 
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supporting the view that short termism is multidimensional and that focusing 
on each dimension individually would not capture the full extent of myopic 
behaviour1. For example, we would fail to detect a large number of short-term 
oriented banks if we only focused on meeting or beating analyst forecasts.   
Short-termism may be influenced by corruption in two ways. First, 
societies with high levels of corruption are glutted with high levels of 
uncertainty, which makes short-term profit maximizing a better choice over 
speculating on an unanticipated future (The World Bank, 2014). Firms can find 
it difficult to focus on long-term strategies in such societies. Previous studies 
have shown that corruption impedes firm innovation (Huang and Yuan, 2016) 
and long-term growth (Fisman and Svensson, 2007). Second, corruption 
affects myopic behaviour through culture as behaviour is cultivated by the 
biological predisposition and shared metrics of value in the surrounding 
environment. In a corrupted environment, firms would have strong incentives 
to knowingly ignore the long-term consequences of their actions since the cost 
of violating social norms is low. For instance, a more corrupt environment is 
associated with a higher likelihood of corporate misconduct (Liu, 2016), greater 
agency problems and more self-dealing actions (Dass, Nanda, and Xiao, 
2018). 
                                                          
1 The myopia index is constructed follow the method of Bernile, Bhagwat, and Yonker (2018) who 
create a multidimensional measure of board diversity and explore the impact of diversity on 
corporate risk taking. They sum up the normalized values of six board characteristics including 
gender, breadth of board experience, age, ethnicity, education, and expertise. Those components 
are weakly correlated and some of them even negatively correlated. They argue that diversity can 
come from different aspects that are not correlated with each other.  
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This study explores the impact of corruption on short termism using a 
sample of European banks, since the European economy is heavily bank-
oriented (García-Kuhnert, Marchica, and Mura, 2015). It is useful to 
understand the function of informal institution, such as corruption culture, 
behind the European banking system. Most importantly, empirical research on 
the myopic behaviour of banking sector has been limited mainly due to 
difficulties in capturing this type of behaviour. I aim to provide new insights on 
factors that contribute to myopic behaviour in the banking industry.  
I use the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) to measure corruption and 
assign corruption levels to banks based on their headquartered locations. My 
baseline test shows that the level of corruption in a country is positively 
associated with the extent of short-termism exhibited by that country’s banks. 
For instance, A bank headquartered in Italy (a country with a relatively high 
level of CPI) is, on average, 0.75 higher in myopic behaviour (which is 44% of 
a standard deviation), compared to a similar bank headquartered in the UK (a 
country with a relatively low level of CPI). Bank headquartered corruption 
values also raise up all three dimensions of the myopic index.   
In the analysis, I acknowledge the possibility of an endogenous 
relationship between short termism and corruption. I rule out reverse causality 
since a bank’s behaviour is unlikely to induce a change in the culture of 
corruption at the country level. However, self-selection bias is a concern as 
banks themselves can select the country they wish to locate their headquarters 
in. Also, I investigate whether my results are driven by unobserved country 
time-invariant factors that are correlated with corruption culture. I adopt an 
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instrumental variable approach to tackle potentially omitted variables bias. I 
use the geographic distance between Denmark (the cleanest country in 
Europe in terms of corruption) and a bank’s headquartered country as my 
instrumental variable. As Hofstede (2001) suggests that geography is one of 
the key determinants of cultural differences across countries, the instrument is 
relevant to the corruption culture. To visualize this instrument, I have drawn a 
heatmap in Figure 2-1 where corruption level increases from green to red. It is 
clear that the countries nearer to Denmark are greener (cleaner) than the 
countries located further away. This instrument satisfies the exclusion 
restriction as the geographic distance between a bank’s domiciled country and 
Denmark is unlikely to have any direct impact on the behaviour of the bank. 
Additionally, the distance between two countries is not likely to be influenced 
by other omitted variables such as regulations or economic status. Using this 
instrument in a two-stage least squares (2SLS) regressions, I find significant 
and consistent support for the view that a higher domestic corruption norm 
leads to bank short-termism.  
I further investigate whether the effect of domestic corruption on myopic 
behaviour is stronger during periods of high economic policy uncertainty (EPU). 
Clark (2011) shows that uncertainty amplifies myopia since myopia is 
considered to be a good tactic in response to unexpected events, but there is 
a large difference in the levels of myopia under uncertainty owing to agents’ 
skills and judgement. It is therefore, interesting to test whether corruption, as 
an inherent human cognition would influence the myopic behaviour under 
uncertainty. I employ the monthly European EPU index developed by Baker, 
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Bloom, and Davis (2016) as a measure of uncertainty. I then compute the 
average annual EPU and take the natural logarithm. I find that in line with my 
intuition, the effect of domestic corruption on bank short-termism is stronger 
during periods of high-uncertainty compared with the effect during periods of 
low-uncertainty.  
Additionally, I conduct robustness checks to see whether the effect of 
domestic corruption on the myopic behaviour of the bank holds. My results are 
robust when using alternative measures of corruption, when removing of large 
banks from the sample, when utilising different ways of constructing the 
myopia index, and when using alternative measures of both earnings 
management and risk-taking.   
 
Figure 2-1 Corruption Levels in European Countries 
This figure illustrates the level of corruption of European countries. Countries in red 
have the highest corruption scores, countries in yellow have medium level of 




In the next part of this study, I explore whether the degree of corruption in 
the countries where foreign shareholders of a bank are located would also be 
a determinant of the bank’s short-termism. Previous literature shows that 
shareholders play a prominent role in influencing corporate behaviour either 
directly by engaging in bank decision-making or indirectly by trading their 
shares. However, there are two opposing views regarding the effect of foreign 
shareholders on myopic behaviour. One school of thought says that foreign 
shareholders only care about short-term profits rather than the long-term 
prospects of the firm; reference is made to foreign investors being like locusts 
that strip companies bare (e.g. Brennan and Cao, 1997; Borensztein and 
Gelos, 2003). The other view suggests that foreign institutional investors are 
more effective monitors than domestic investors, and this is because foreign 
investors have fewer social ties with the firms they monitor (e.g. Aggarwal, Erel, 
Ferreira, and Matos, 2011; Ferreira and Matos, 2008; Gillan and Starks, 2003).  
To test the influence of foreign corruption on short-termism, I divide banks 
into two groups, banks with higher than average domestic corruption values 
and banks with lower than average domestic corruption values. The reason is 
that the incentive for an individual to engage in unethical behaviour is 
influenced by the perceived activities of the environment. Dong, Dulleck, and 
Torgler (2012) refer to this behaviour as “conditional corruption” and provide 
evidence on how the contagious nature of corruption depends on the 
corruption levels of other individuals in a society. In my case, the willingness 
for foreign shareholders to engage in corrupt practices depends largely on the 
level of corruption of the country where the investees are domiciled. I find that, 
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in terms of corruption, foreign shareholders only have effect on banks with 
lower than average domestic corruption values and the effect is positive. I 
further test if this positive effect is due to shareholders, who come from 
countries with higher corruption values (than the banks’ headquartered 
countries), importing their corruption norms to banks, because prior studies 
have shown that culture can be imported by shareholders. For instance, 
Schein (1992) argues that foreign investors often use their home countries’ 
culture as a tool to integrate and control the overseas firms in which they invest. 
Adding to that, DeBacker, Heim, and Tran (2015) suggest that shareholder 
culture can be transmitted to the company as a whole through socialization, 
education, selection of employees, and the provision of incentives. So, for 
each bank, I sum up the percentage of shareholdings of investors from 
countries with a higher degree of corruption than the country where the bank 
is headquartered. The results are asymmetric; for banks with lower than 
average domestic corruption values, more shareholdings from institutions 
domiciled in countries with higher corruption values is associated with more 
myopic behaviour. In contrast, for banks with higher than average domestic 
corruption values, more shareholdings from institutions domiciled in countries 
with lower corruption values does not remit short-termism. These asymmetrical 
results might be explained by the contagious nature of corruption as 
documented in the literature (see for instance, Goel and Nelson, 2007; Dong, 
Dulleck and Torgler, 2012).  
This research contributes to the literature in a number of ways. First, I 
contribute to the banking literature by studying the myopic behaviour of the 
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banking sector where the main challenge is measurement. I capture all 
perspectives that may reveal myopic behaviour and combine them. By doing 
this, I add to our understanding of myopia in a systematic way. Previous 
studies mainly focus on a single dimension of short-termism and, thus, do not 
capture the full extent of myopic behaviour. For instance, myopic banks may 
not be meeting-and-beating analyst forecasts, but they may be taking high 
levels of tail risk or having high ratios of short-term debt.  
Second, I contribute to the literature that examines the impact of corruption 
on various corporate activities. It is important to study the roles informal 
institutions, namely corruption culture, play in bank behaviour as regulators 
and academics have become more aware of the importance of having a 
healthy culture. To that end, in a recent speech, the president of Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York, John Williams, even emphasized the role of 
enhancing a healthy banking culture (Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 
2018). While a growing body of literature shows that national culture has an 
impact on economic growth (King and Levine, 1993; Kwok and Tadesse, 2006), 
individuals’ perceptions (Tabellini, 2010) and corporate governance (Licht, 
Goldschmidt, and Schwartz, 2005; Stulz and Williamson, 2003), the natural 
link between corruption and corporate behaviour has been understudied. 
Complementing these earlier studies, I identify both ‘domestic culture’ and the 
‘foreign culture’ as having a significant impact on myopic behaviour.  
Third, I add to the literature on the role of foreign shareholders by providing 
evidence that foreign shareholders import their own countries’ corruption 
culture to the banks they invest in. I provide supporting evidence that foreign 
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shareholders act as channels to import their own countries’ corruption culture. 
Even though banks are considered to be highly regulated, their shareholders’ 
corruption norms could still influence bank decision-making. This research has 
wide implications for banks’ supervisors and regulators. It is vital to take into 
account the corruption culture when making incentive scheme in order to curb 
short-termism.    
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 
summarizes earlier studies in the literature. In section 2.3, I provide the details 
of short-termism measurement, corruption measurement and data description. 
Section 2.4 presents the effect of domestic corruption on short-termism. I show 
the results during the European Economic Policy Uncertainty period in section 
2.5. I conduct several robustness tests in section 2.6. Section 2.7 provides 
evidence on bank foreign shareholders’ corruption. Section 2.8 concludes.  
2.2 Literature review and hypothesis development 
The focus of this chapter is at the intersection of three strands of literature: 
myopic behaviour, corruption culture, and corporate ownership. Bank myopic 
behaviour can be influenced by corruption culture at three levels: country level 
(regulations, laws, and economic development), firm level (ownership and 
compensation practices), and individual level (managers and employees) (Li, 
Griffin, Yue, and Zhao, 2013). In this study, I examine the first two levels. 
Specifically, I examine the influence of country corruption culture and 
shareholders corruption culture.  
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2.2.1 Measures and determinants of short-termism  
Short-termism is a situation where firms focus on short-term results rather 
than long-term value creation. This problem exists prevalently. Short-termism 
is shown to exist around the world and has been documented in the literature 
for a long time. Jacobs (1991) and Porter (1991) show that US companies are 
obsessed on high short-term profits rather than long-term interests of 
shareholders. Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005) find that 78% of 
executives would sacrifice long-term value to meet earnings targets. Dichev, 
Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2013) report that 20% of firms manage 
earnings in an attempt to influence stock prices and to avoid adverse 
compensation and career concerns. The excessive focus on short-term 
earnings results in detriment of long-term shareholder value (Krehmeyer, 
Orsagh, and Schacht, 2006) and causes a misallocation of resources. It is also 
thought to be one of the reasons behind the recent financial crisis (Bair, 2011). 
Therefore, it is essential to measure short-termism and understand the drivers 
behind it.  
It is hard to quantify short-termism as it cannot be observed directly. Thus, 
previous studies have different interpretations of short-termism which can be 
categorized into three sorts. First, previous studies consider a firm’s decision 
to cut long-term investments or forgo long-term projects as a symptom of 
myopia as they think such an action is used to boost current period earnings. 
For instance, Bushee (1998) measures myopia using an indicator variable that 
is equal to one if a firm reduces R&D expenditure relative to the prior year, and 
zero otherwise. However, this proxy would not work for financial firms, as 
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banks do not record R&D expenses. Sampson and Shi (2016) use the market 
discount rate as a measure of short-termism as firms may adopt higher hurdle 
rates to forgo profitable long-term investments. 
 The second interpretation of short-termism is the capital market pressure 
from transient institutional shareholders under which, firms would manage 
earnings in order to meet current period benchmarks. In other words, earnings 
management, is used to measure managers’ tendencies of misleading the 
focus of shareholders towards a short-term performance measure. Houston et 
al. (2010) consider quarterly earnings guidance as an action that would induce 
managerial myopia and they examine the causes as well as consequences of 
such guidance cessation. Bird et al. (2017) investigate how myopia spillovers 
from banks to corporate sectors using meet-or-beat analyst forecasts as the 
measure for bank short-termism. However, earnings management is not 
considered to be a clean measure of myopia. Managers could manipulate 
earnings because of other factors such as seasoned equity offerings (Cohen 
and Zarowin, 2010), audit quality (Becker, DeFond, Jiambalvo, and 
Subramanyam, 1998), and audit committee governance practices (Bédard, 
Chtourou, and Courteau, 2004) instead of being short-termist. Earnings 
management is one of the symptoms of short-termism but not a 
comprehensive measure of it.  
Third, the structure of executive compensation is also a commonly used 
proxy for myopia. The executive compensation that is not properly designed to 
align the long-term benefit of shareholders is considered to be an incentive of 
corporate short-termism. In particular, Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) use the 
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ratio of cash bonus to base salary as a measure of managerial myopia but they 
find no evidence that myopia leads to worse performance during the financial 
crisis. In contrast, Kolasinski and Yang (2018) use equity duration as the 
measure of managerial myopia and they suggest that myopia leads to worse 
performance during the crisis. Although myopia is convinced to be the cause 
of the crisis by prominent policy makers, using executive compensation as a 
measure of myopia in the empirical tests would come out contradictory results. 
Besides, Mauboussin and Callahan (2015) criticize the use of executive 
compensation as the measure of short-termism. They argue that nowadays 
firms are equipped with more long-term focused compensation, more 
independent board of directors, and higher diversified governance committees, 
short-termism is still a big issue. Unfortunately, in this study, the access to data 
on CEO remuneration information varies across countries. I fail to incorporate 
executive compensation into the multidimensional myopia index due to the 
barrier of finding compensation data for European banks.  
Besides the mainstream measures above, there are also several 
alternative measures. Brochet, Loumioti, and Serafeim (2012) take a different 
approach and measure short termism based on the usage of words that are 
likely to reflect short-termist thinking in firm conference call transcripts. 
Furthermore, firm risk-taking has also been used as a proxy for managerial 
myopia (Gonzalez and André, 2014), however, myopia is not risk per se. 
Overall, there need a comprehensive measure of myopia tailored for the 
banking sector.  
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There are many papers which examine the causes of managerial myopia. 
Narayanan (1985) finds that managers have incentives to boost short-term 
earnings that sacrifice long-term earnings. The incentive for suboptimal 
decisions is inversely related to managers’ experience, the duration of their 
contract and the risk-taking of the firm. Stein (1988) shows that managers may 
choose to reduce the likelihood of a takeover at an unfavourable price by 
inflating current earnings. Von Thadden (1995) suggests that myopia is a 
behaviour caused by the fear of early project termination by outside investors. 
Bolton, Scheinkman, and Xiong (2006) show that executive compensation may 
focus on short-term performance in order to urge managers pursue stock price 
growth. Gümbel (2005) shows that investors may want managers to trade on 
short-term information in part because performance observations under long-
term informed trading are contaminated by noise in stock prices.  
Besides firm-level factors, myopic behaviour is likely to be affected by 
country-level culture. Previous studies show that national culture has a large 
impact on managerial behaviour and decision making through its effects on 
individual perceptions (Tabellini, 2010), economic choices and individuals’ 
behaviour (Chui, Titman, and Wei, 2010; Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales, 
2006). To be specific, national culture is shown to have a significant impact on 
various activities that is linked to myopia, such as, innovation and R&D 
development (Taylor and Wilson, 2012), earnings smoothing and earnings 
management (Kanagaretnam, Lim, and Lobo,2011), earnings discretion (Han, 
Kang, Salter, and Yoo, 2010), risk-taking (Mihet, 2013), and corporate 
behaviour standards (Griffin, Guedhami, Kwok, Li, and Shao, 2015). 
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2.2.2 How corruption influences bank myopic behaviour  
Corruption is the fraudulent conduct by powerful parties for personal gains. 
There are two competing hypotheses regarding the effect of political corruption 
on the real economy. The ‘sanding wheel hypothesis’ argues that corruption 
distorts investment and causes a misallocation of resources as it imposes an 
extortionary tax (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993; Murphy et al., 1991, 1993). Most 
previous empirical evidence supports the sanding wheel hypothesis. For 
instance, on the macroeconomic level, corruption is shown to have a negative 
effect on economic growth (Mauro, 1995), governmental expenditures (Mauro, 
1998), efficiency of credit allocation (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine, 2006), 
and credit risk (Butler, Fauver, and Mortal, 2009). On the corporate level, 
corruption is shown to have negative effect on multinational firm investment 
(Wei, 2000), firms’ foreign investment (Zhao, Kim, and Du, 2003; Cuervo-
Cazurra, 2006), firm growth (Fisman and Svensson, 2007), and firm innovation 
(Huang and Yuan, 2016; Ellis, Smith, and White, 2015). Alternatively, the 
‘greasing wheel hypothesis’ suggests that corruption increases efficiency by 
cutting through bureaucratic ties since firms may benefit from smoothing the 
regulatory process (Leff, 1964; Leys, 1965). Heo, Hou and Park (2017) find 
that corruption is positively linked with firm innovation in developed countries. 
In summary, previous literature observes relationships between corruption and 
corporate behaviour but there are disagreements concerning the signs of 
these relationships.  
In this study, I hypothesize that corruption exacerbates myopia. There 
might be two channels where corruption exert its effect, uncertainty and culture. 
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First, corruption leads to uncertainty (Shleifer and Vishiny, 1993; Mauro, 1995) 
and uncertainty makes firms less likely to be long-term oriented since it is 
harder to speculate an uncertain future. Consequently, firms tend to focus on 
short-term gains and care less about the unpredictable future. As a result, firms’ 
long-term activities such as innovation and investment are impeded (Huang 
and Yuan, 2016; Ellis, Smith, and White, 2015). As the distortion of long-term 
investment is interpreted as one of the evidences of short-termism, corrupt 
environment is likely to affect firms' choice of time horizon.  
Second, corruption culture creates an environment that amplifies myopia. 
Myopia is a human trait and can be amplified by the characteristics of the 
environment (Clark, 2011). In a corrupted environment, people are more 
tolerant about corporate misconduct. In fact, myopia is considered as the “fast 
route to unethical business behaviour” (Ethical Leadership, 2016). Thus, once 
corruption is widely accepted in a society, concerns about the long-term 
consequences of unethical behaviour grow smaller. For instance, Parsons, 
Sulaeman, and Titman (2014) show that a firm’s likelihood of engaging in 
misconduct is related to the misconduct rates of firms in the same locale and 
that the relation is likely driven by social interactions among neighbouring firms. 
Lourenço, Rathke, Santana, and Branco (2018), who utilise data from 33 
countries worldwide, find that the perceived level of corruption in an emerging 
country is related to stronger incentives for firms to manipulate earnings. Liu 
(2016) demonstrates that corruption is associated with several types of 
corporate misconduct including earnings management, accounting fraud, 
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option backdating, and opportunistic insider trading. Based on the above 
arguments, I hypothesize the following:  
H1. Banks headquartered in countries with higher corruption levels are more 
likely to be short-termist.  
I further link the effect of corruption on bank short-termism to the degree 
of economic policy uncertainty. With the increase in uncertainty, firms seeking 
favours from government could not ensure that they would actually obtain 
those favours eventually. Thus, firms are more likely to “wait-and-see” during 
high uncertainty periods as long-term results are less foreseeable at such 
times (Arif, Marshall, and Yohn, 2016). Previous literature has shown how 
uncertainty affects corporate behaviour that are considered to be myopic such 
as earnings management (Stein and Wang, 2016) and cutting investments 
(Gulen and Ion 2015). In particular, Campos, Lien, and Pradhan (1999) argue 
that corruption has a less negative impact on investment when corruption 
induced uncertainty is lower. Thus, the second hypothesis is: 
H2. Banks headquartered in countries with higher corruption levels are more 
likely to be short-termist during periods of greater Economic Policy Uncertain.  
2.2.3 The impact of shareholders on firm short-termism  
Besides country social norms, firm-level governance also plays an 
essential role in curbing myopic behaviour. Shareholders are considered to act 
as a channel for promoting better governance directly through voting rights and 
indirectly through trading on shares (Aggarwal, Erel, Ferreira, and Matos, 
2011). I expect shareholders to have impact on short-termism since they play 
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an important role in curbing the agency problem. For instance, Florackis (2008) 
shows that managerial ownership and ownership concentration mitigate 
agency costs for UK listed firms. Shareholders have the incentives to monitor 
and discipline managers to ensure that the firms’ strategies are in line with 
long-term value maximization (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). Shareholders are 
also shown to influence firm long-term investment (Bushee, 1998) and 
innovation output (Aghion, Van Reenen, and Zingales, 2013). 
Moreover, there are reasons to expect that cultural values of foreign 
shareholders are imported to the corporations they invest in. Peters and Austin 
(1985) suggest that owners are able to influence the ethical standards of their 
employees. Schneider (1988) suggests that culture can be used as a tool for 
owners to exert control over overseas firms in which they invest. Bushee (1998) 
shows that firms dominated with myopic shareholders are more likely to cut 
long-term investment to meet short-term earnings targets. Bolton, Scheinkman, 
and Wei (2005) find that more long-term-oriented shareholders are less likely 
to encourage short-termist strategies taken by top managers. In a recent paper, 
DeBacker et al. (2015) find that shareholders import their corruption culture to 
US firms. Shareholders from more corrupted countries invade more tax in the 
US. Based on the above studies, I infer that shareholders’ corruption culture is 
associated with bank short-termism.  
Then it is natural to raise up two questions. Would corrupted foreign 
shareholders corrupt the banks they invested in? Would clean shareholders 
restrain the banks they invested in if the bank is already located in a corrupted 
environment? The conjecture for those questions is that corruption corrupts. 
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For the first question, corrupted foreign shareholders would contaminate the 
bank they invested in as corruption is highly contagious. Dong, Dulleck and 
Torgler (2012) show the contagious nature of corruption using both micro and 
macro level international data. Goel and Neilson (2007) provide evidence of 
the contaminating effect of corruption using state-level US data. For the 
second question, as the surrounding environment is tolerant towards unethical 
activities, it would be hard to stand out and survive being the only honest player 
in the system. Thus, I hypothesize the following: 
H3a. Banks that have a lower than average domestic corruption level, and that 
have more shareholdings by foreign institutions that are domiciled in countries 
with higher corruption levels, are more likely to be short-termist. 
H3b. For banks that have a higher than average domestic corruption level, and 
that have more shareholdings by foreign institutions domiciled in countries with 
lower corruption levels, their level of short-termism is not likely to be affected. 
 
2.3 Data and summary statistics 
2.3.1 Sample construction 
The sample comprises all financial firms in the European countries 
between the fiscal years of 1998 and 2016. I select all firms that are classified 
in the financial sector according to Global Industry Classification Standard 
(GICS). Accounting data and stock prices are collected from Datastream. 
Furthermore, I utilize the Thomson Reuters ownership database to get 
shareholders’ information for each bank. Finally, I use the unadjusted detail file 
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in the Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System (I/B/E/S) to get analyst forecast 
figures.  
2.3.2 Measures of bank short-termism  
To measure the level of bank short-termism, I construct an index based 
on different aspects of bank characteristics. I choose those aspects based on 
previous literature and data availability. For each bank-year, I combine three 
characteristics: the meet-or-beat analyst forecast, tail risk, and short-term 
funding.  
First, I use meet-or-beat analyst forecast (beat_analyst) as a proxy for 
earnings management. Beat_analyst is an indicator variable that equals one if 
a bank’s actual earnings-per-share either meets or beats the I/B/E/S analyst 
consensus forecast by less than two cents (Bird et al., 2017). I use the 
unadjusted detail file in I/B/E/S as previous studies concerns on rounding 
errors in adjusted estimates (Cheong and Thomas, 2011; Diether, Malloy, and 
Scherbina, 2002). I follow Fang, Huang, and Karpoff (2016) and drop 
observations if the firm has less than three analysts in a given year. I calculate 
the mean analyst forecast estimated earnings per share (EPS) that are issued 
within 90 days of the fiscal year-end and before the earnings announcement. 
If the difference between the mean value of analyst forecast EPS and actual 
EPS is less than 2 cents, I classify that bank-year as myopic. In the sample, 




Second, I use tail risk (Tail_risk) as an indicator that captures another 
aspect of short-termism. I calculate tail risk as the negative value of the mean 
return on the bank’s stock over the 5% worst return days of each year. As tail 
risk implies events with a low probability to happen, myopic managers that only 
focus on short-term conditions might neglect it. Ellul and Yerramilli (2013) point 
out that managers and traders in the financial industry are willing to take tail 
risk in order to boost their short-term performance although it might induce 
devastating damage if such risk materializes.  Thus, tail risk captures bank 
myopia from a risk standpoint of view. A higher tail risk indicates that banks 
are more likely to be behaving myopically.  
Third, I use bank short-term debt (Stfund) to capture another dimension of 
short-termism. The structure of debt maturity has a large impact on a firm’s 
behaviour (Custódio, Ferreira, and Laureano, 2013). Short-term debt is an 
important component in bank financing policy and it implies the institutional 
environment in which the investors are expected to enforce repayment 
(Diamond and Rajan, 2000). If banks rely more on short-term funding such as 
money market funding, they are more likely to have short-term strategies. 
Those banks assume that they can keep borrowing at the short-term rates, 
failing to take long term perspectives or consider any long-term demands. 
These types of activities may hurt long-term stability. I calculate Stfund as the 
ratio of short-term loans to total liabilities. A higher value indicates the banks 
are more myopic.   
I normalise each component by its mean and standard deviation. I 
construct my myopia index by summing up all three components: 
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𝑀𝑦𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑎 = 𝑆𝑇𝐷(𝐵𝑒𝑎𝑡 𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡) + 𝑆𝑇𝐷(𝑇𝑎𝑖𝑙 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘) + 𝑆𝑇𝐷(𝑆𝑡𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑)                  (2.1) 
where STD(Beat analyst), STD(Tail risk), and STD(Stfund) are the normalised 
values of beat_analyst, Tail_risk, and Stfund respectively. 
Panel A of Table 2-1 presents the correlations between the components 
of the myopia index. The average correlation between a component and the 
myopia index is around 0.6. However, the correlations between the component 
are quite low. This suggests that these components indeed capture different 
aspects of myopic behaviour in banks. 
To further illustrate the importance of having a composite measure of 
short-termism instead of solely focusing on single aspect, I show how 
differently banks are categorized based on each component of myopia. I first 
divide bank-year observations into two groups, one group of observations 
meet-or-beat analyst forecast consensus (Beat_analyst=1) and the other 
group does not (Beat_analyst=0). Then I categorize bank-year observations 
into three groups (high, medium, and low) based on their tail risk and short-
term fund. Panel B of Table 2-1 reports the number of observations fall into 
each group. For instance, only 20 observations meet-or-beat analyst forecast 
consensus, have high tail risk, and have high ratio of short-term debt at the 
same time. However, 154 observations do not meet analyst forecast but have 
high tail risk and high ratio of short-term debt. This means that if we only focus 
on the earnings management aspect of myopia, we would miss a large number 




Table 2-1 Measure of Bank Short-termism 
The table shows the characteristics of myopia index and its components. Panel A 
reports the correlation between each components of myopia index. Panel B reports 
bank-year observations in each group. I divide observations into two groups based 
on whether they meet-or-beat analyst forecast (Beat_analyst=1) or not 
(Beat_analyst=0). I construct three groups (high, medium, low) based on tail risk 
(Tail_risk). I form three groups (high, medium, low) on the ratio of short-term debt 
divided total liability (Stfund).  
 
Panel A. Correlation between each components of myopia index        
  Myopia  Beat_analyst Tail_risk Stfund 
Myopia  1        
Beat_analyst  0.576  1      
Tail_risk  0.637  0.007  1    
Stfund  0.604  -0.022  0.168  1  
          
Panel B. Number of observations in each group  
Beat_analyst=1 Beat_analyst=0 
high Tail_risk & high Stfund 20 high Tail_risk & high Stfund 154 
high Tail_risk & low Stfund 11 high Tail_risk & low Stfund 82 
low Tail_risk & high Stfund 2 low Tail_risk & high Stfund 98 
low Tail_risk & low Stfund 7 low Tail_risk & low Stfund 96 
 
2.3.3 Corruption measure 
I use the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) created by Transparency 
International as the primary measure of corruption as it is widely accepted and 
has been used in previous studies (e.g. (Barth, Lin, Lin, and Song, 2009; 
Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 2002; Fisman, 2001). 
Transparency International is an anti-corruption organization that evaluates 
the level of public sector corruption based on surveys collected by reputable 
institutions. It publishes CPI every year for 180 countries. The CPI is a 
composite index that gives a single value for each country every year. The 
level of corruption has been seen to change only slightly throughout years.  
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I follow DeBacker et al. (2015) and reverse the scale of CPI for ease of 
interpretation. I calculate the average CPI from year 2012 to year 20162. Then 
I subtract the CPI from 100 to obtain the corruption measure. Therefore, the 
higher the value of CPI in a country, the higher the level of corruption in that 
country.    
Table 2-2 presents the list of countries in the sample together with their 
levels of short-termism and corruption. Based on the CPI, Russia is the country 
with the highest level of corruption in the sample. On average, banks 
headquartered in Russia are more likely to meet-or-beat analyst forecasts and 
have higher tail risk, however, the level of short term funding is lower than 
median level. On the contrary, Denmark is the least corrupt country in the 
sample. Banks headquartered in Denmark have much lower probabilities of 
beating analyst forecasts and have lower tail risk. The average proportion of 








                                                          
2 I start from year 2012 as the Corruption Perception Index has a scale from 0 to 10 before 2012. 
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Table 2-2 Mean Values of Myopia and Corruption in European Countries 
This table reports the average myopic measure (Myopia), meet-or-beat analyst 
forecast (Beat_analyst), tail risk (Tail_risk), short-term debt out of total debt (Stfund), 
and corruption culture (Corruption) in each country. Obs is the total number of 




analyst Tail_risk Stfund Corruption Obs. 
Austria 0.402 0.067 0.040 0.201 28 60 
Belgium 0.739 0.067 0.070 0.211 24 34 
Croatia 
  
0.041 0.048 52 9 
Czech Republic -1.498 0.000 0.039 0.053 48 6 
Denmark -0.002 0.039 0.043 0.147 9 147 
Finland 1.125 0.250 0.062 0.178 11 18 
France 0.436 0.060 0.038 0.316 30 172 
Germany 0.319 0.196 0.047 0.156 20 87 
Greece 2.672 0.140 0.098 0.268 58 66 
Hungary -0.650 0.000 0.053 0.104 48 16 
Ireland 1.947 0.118 0.081 0.243 27 36 
Italy 0.582 0.174 0.045 0.213 56 302 
Netherlands -0.074 0.000 0.043 0.109 16 17 
Norway -1.017 0.000 0.039 0.117 14 208 
Poland -0.413 0.087 0.048 0.108 39 119 
Portugal 0.455 0.212 0.051 0.162 37 33 
Romania -0.706 0.000 0.048 0.101 55 10 
Russia 0.253 0.167 0.074 0.170 72 54 
Slovakia 
  
0.074 0.069 51 27 
Spain 0.786 0.184 0.045 0.243 40 97 
Sweden 0.507 0.061 0.044 0.270 12 66 
Switzerland -0.269 0.064 0.032 0.109 14 286 
UK -0.249 0.018 0.052 0.149 22 119 
 
2.3.4 Descriptive statistics  
Based on previous studies, I control for various bank characteristics that 
might drive short-termism. I control for firm size (SIZE) and the square of size 
(SIZE2). SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets. Banks may have a 
stronger incentive to behave myopically as they grow larger.  However, once 
they reach a certain size, they would become more likely to be scrutinized by 
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regulators and to be subjected to stock market monitoring. Thus, I expect a 
nonlinear effect of firm size on short-termism. I control for the growth prospects 
of the banks by using the market-to-book ratio (MB), which is defined as the 
market value of equity divided by the total book value of equity. I control for 
firm performance by using return on assets (ROA), which is defined as the ratio 
of net income plus interest expenses to total assets. Firms with better 
performance have more investment opportunities and face a higher cost of 
reducing investment for short-term projects. I control for the total amount of 
loans divided by total assets (LOAN) and the amount of non-performing loans 
divided by total assets (NPL) as Beatty, Ke, and Petroni (2002) suggest that 
bank loans may affect nondiscretionary changes in earnings. Additionally, I 
include equity-to-assets ratio (LEV) and deposit-to-assets ratio (DEPOSIT). To 
take in to account for the shareholders’ effect on myopia, I include total 
percentage institutional ownership (TOTALOS). In addition, I control for 
competition among banks within a country using a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
(HHI) of deposits among banks headquartered in the country during the year.  
Moreover, I include a bunch of institutional environment measures in bank 
headquartered countries in the models. As national economic development is 
linked to the quality of institutions and is likely to affect firm behaviour, I control 
for the national logarithm of gross domestic product per capita (LNGDP). I 
include the creditor rights (CR) index developed by La Porta, Lopez‐de‐Silanes, 
Shleifer, and Vishny (1997) and updated in Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer 
(2007). I control for the law enforcement index (Enforce) which measures the 
degree to which the law is fairly and effectively enforced in a country. It ranges 
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from 0 to 10 and higher values suggesting stronger enforcement. I control for 
the transparency of bank financial statement practices (Transp). I control for 
the restrictiveness of banking activities including securities market activities, 
insurance activities, and real estate activities (Act_res). I control for the capital 
stringency index (String) which measures whether the capital requirement 
reflects certain risk elements and deducts certain market value losses from 
capital before minimum capital adequacy is determined. Higher values indicate 
greater capital stringency. I present summary statistics in Table 2-2. All 




Table 2-3 Summary Statistics 
This table reports summary statistics for bank short-termism measures, corruption measure, bank-level variables, and country-level 
variables. I report statistics across the whole panel from 1998 to 2016. Variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels.  
 Mean Std. Dev. Min. 25th Pctl.  Median 75th Pctl. Max. Range Obs. 
Short-termism measures:         
Myopia 0.150 1.720 -2.708 -1.100 -0.160 0.864 9.001 11.710 1223 
Beat_analyst 0.088 0.284 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1233 
Tail_risk 0.047 0.031 0.005 0.027 0.039 0.057 0.178 0.173 1980 
Stfund 0.177 0.134 0.000 0.074 0.150 0.249 0.630 0.630 1976 
Corruption measure:         
Domestic 
corruption 30.452 17.963 9.200 14.200 27.400 40.000 71.800 62.600 1989 
Bank-level variables:         
SIZE 17.200 2.076 12.331 15.876 16.887 18.703 21.617 9.286 1989 
MB 1.338 0.890 0.091 0.701 1.156 1.757 4.742 4.650 1989 
ROA 1.013 0.901 -3.010 0.590 0.970 1.470 3.740 6.750 1989 
LOAN 0.685 0.172 0.177 0.597 0.709 0.821 0.934 0.757 1989 
LEV 0.071 0.040 0.007 0.043 0.062 0.090 0.253 0.245 1989 
DEPOSIT 0.516 0.176 0.076 0.391 0.523 0.643 0.862 0.786 1989 
NPL 0.047 0.084 0.000 0.008 0.020 0.051 0.677 0.677 1989 
TOTALOS 0.329 0.314 0.000 0.000 0.241 0.613 1.000 1.000 1989 
Country-level variables:         
HHI 0.415 0.205 0.136 0.268 0.351 0.533 1.000 0.864 1989 
LNGDP 10.512 0.608 7.650 10.239 10.612 10.914 11.543 3.893 1989 
CR 1.789 1.013 0.000 1.000 2.000 2.000 4.000 4.000 1989 
Transp 5.216 0.705 2.400 5.000 5.000 6.000 6.000 3.600 1989 
String 4.276 1.788 1.000 2.400 5.000 6.000 7.000 6.000 1989 
Actres 6.721 1.617 3.000 6.000 7.000 8.000 9.000 6.000 1989 
Enforce 5.537 1.318 3.330 4.130 5.960 6.370 7.750 4.420 1989 
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2.4 Bank short-termism and headquartered corruption culture 
2.4.1 Empirical design 
To study the relation between a bank’s short-termism and the level of 
corruption of its headquartered country, I run the following panel regression 
model:  
𝑀𝑦𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑎𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗 + 𝛽2𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 +
                            𝛽3𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑗 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝐸 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡                                         (2.2)       
where i denotes the bank, j denotes the country where the bank is 
headquartered, and t denotes the year. The dependent variable 𝑀𝑦𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑎𝑖,𝑗.𝑡 is 
the multidimensional index of short termism. I also test each of the three 
components of the index in turn as dependent variables including meet-or-beat 
analyst forecast, tail risk, and short-term fund. Meet-or-beat analyst forecast 
regression uses probit estimation, as it is a binary variable. Tail risk and short-
term funding use ordinary least square (OLS) estimations. The standard errors 
are clustered at the bank level to control for potential within firm correlation of 
the residuals.    
The variable of interest, 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗  is the level of CPI of the country 
where the bank is located. I control for bank specific characteristics including 
firm size, market-to-book ratio, ROA, total loans, and leverage. I also control 
for non-performing loans, total deposit, total percentage of institutional 
ownership and HHI in models (5) to (8) of Table 2-4.  For country 
characteristics, I control for GDP per capita, creditor rights, financial statement 
practices, capital stringency, bank activity restrictions, and law enforcement. I 
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include year dummies to control for macroeconomic status that could influence 
a firm’s behaviour. I estimate the model on a panel of 23 European countries 
from 1998 to 2016.  
2.4.2 Baseline results 
I present the baseline results in Table 2-4. Model (1) to (4) include only 
basic control variables while model (5) to (8) include the full set of control 
variables. The coefficients on the corruption variable are positive and 
statistically significant at the 5% level or lower. In models (1) and (5), the 
dependent variable is the myopia index. The results are consistent with the 
first hypothesis that a bank’s myopic behaviour is positively related to the level 
of corruption in the bank’s home country.   
In model (1), I examine the relationship between the myopia index and 
domestic corruption. One standard deviation (17.963) increase in bank 
headquartered corruption culture is associated with a 0.51 unit increase in the 
level of myopia index, which is equivalent to 30% of the standard deviation of 
the index values. In model (5), the myopia index is still the dependent variable 
and I include additional control variables, but the explanatory power of 
domestic corruption remains robust. One standard deviation increase in 
domestic corruption raises bank short-termism by 0.40 (23% of the standard 
deviation of the index).  
In model (2) I focus on the earnings management component of the 
myopia index. Beat_analyst is a binary variable that is equal to one if the bank-
year beats analyst consensus forecast by no more than two cents. I report 
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marginal effects of the probit model. The coefficient on domestic corruption is 
0.0018. A one standard deviation (17.963) increase in domestic corruption 
raises the probability of earnings management by 3.23%, which is 36.74% of 
the mean value of beat analyst forecast rate of 8.8%. The coefficient gets 
slightly larger in model (6) when I include additional firm characteristics. This 
effect is comparable to the effect of other variables related to culture such as 
individualism and uncertainty avoidance which are associated with 7.26% 
increase and 11.93% decrease in the probability of earnings management 
(measured by meet-or-beat prior year’s earnings) for a one standard deviation 
increase in the culture measure according to Kanagaretnam et al. (2011). 
Models (3) and (7) test the relation between corruption and tail risk. The 
coefficient of domestic corruption is 0.03% and significant at the 5% level in 
model (3). In terms of economic significance, a one standard deviation 
increase in corruption (17.963) raises the tail risk by 0.55%, which is 11.62% 
of the mean value of tail risk (0.047). Corruption seems to have a bigger effect 
on tail risk than the other social norm, namely religiosity, as Adhikari and 
Agrawal (2016) find that a one standard deviation increase in US county 
religiosity reduces tail risk by 0.15%.   
Models (4) and (8) provide results on the ratio of bank short-term debt over 
total liabilities. The coefficient of domestic corruption is 0.34% in model (4). It 
goes down almost by half after controlling additional bank characteristics in 
model (8) but remains significant at the 1% level.  According to the coefficient 
of corruption in model (8), ceteris paribus, the short-term funding ratio of a 
bank headquartered in Italy (whose CPI is 56) would be higher by 7.48% 
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compared to a bank headquartered in Switzerland (whose CPI is 14). This 
effect is very strong as it is 55.82% of the standard deviation of short-term 




Table 2-4 Bank Short-termism and Headquartered Corruption Culture 
This table reports estimations of OLS regressions of short-termism on corruption culture from 1998 to 2016. The dependent variables 
are Myopia index (Myopia) and its components (Beat_analyst, Tail_risk, and Stfund). The main independent variable is the corruption 
culture of bank headquartered countries (Country Corruption). All regressions include year fixed effects, and standard errors are clustered 
at bank-level. In parentheses are the standard errors and the asterisks indicate a 10%(*), 5%(**), and 1%(***) level of statistical 
significance. Numbers in column (3), (4), (7), and (8) are in percentage.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Myopia Beat_ 
analyst 
Tail_risk Stfund Myopia Beat_ 
analyst 
Tail_risk Stfund 
Domestic 0.0285*** 0.00179* 0.0304** 0.342*** 0.0221** 0.00192** 0.0194* 0.178*** 
Corruption (0.0107) (0.00100) (0.0144) (0.0775) (0.00912) (0.000886) (0.0110) (0.0512) 
SIZE 0.0770 0.0112* 0.00439 1.187** 1.479*** 0.0650 -2.958*** 14.886*** 
 (0.0594) (0.00647) (0.0746) (0.540) (0.542) (0.0603) (0.791) (3.422) 
MB -0.175* 0.0173 -0.199 -1.373** 0.0551 0.00449 0.0300 0.111 
 (0.102) (0.0142) (0.134) (0.656) (0.101) (0.0111) (0.115) (0.539) 
ROA -0.314*** -0.00519 -1.01*** -0.504 -0.38*** -0.00355 -0.769*** -1.587*** 
 (0.0830) (0.0133) (0.192) (0.549) (0.0816) (0.00829) (0.156) (0.512) 
LOAN -0.570 0.0734 -1.496** -9.877 -0.238 0.0844 -0.594 -7.306* 
 (0.738) (0.0665) (0.629) (6.781) (0.591) (0.0670) (0.666) (3.983) 
LEV -4.065 0.193 -2.438 7.390 -3.117 0.190 -3.605 -7.611 
 (2.511) (0.348) (5.462) (18.363) (2.395) (0.267) (4.120) (14.491) 
SIZE2     -0.04*** -0.00126 0.0840*** -0.46*** 
     (0.0159) (0.00168) (0.0228) (0.102) 
NPL     4.237*** -0.120* 11.020*** 5.137 
     (1.347) (0.0627) (1.823) (4.635) 
DEPOSIT     -3.55*** 0.105 -1.673** -50.295*** 
     (0.552) (0.0817) (0.729) (4.015) 
       (continued next page) 
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TOTALOS     -0.115 0.0779** -0.467 -2.806 
     (0.336) (0.0341) (0.398) (1.796) 
         
HHI     0.372 0.0510 1.542*** -1.629 
     (0.484) (0.0453) (0.536) (2.356) 
         
LNGDP 0.0823 0.00925 -0.679* 4.559** 0.0308 0.0273 -0.360 0.0749 
 (0.254) (0.0214) (0.407) (1.872) (0.228) (0.0195) (0.319) (1.643) 
         
CR -0.220* -.00810 0.131 -3.045*** -0.180 -0.0109 0.0149 -1.915*** 
 (0.121) (0.0118) (0.148) (0.861) (0.114) (0.0103) (0.146) (0.592) 
         
Transp 0.352** 0.0138 -0.0224 3.599*** 0.140 0.0256 -0.343 1.288 
 (0.158) (0.0168) (0.288) (1.134) (0.137) (0.0169) (0.213) (0.923) 
         
String -0.124 0.00123 -0.235* -1.513** -0.122 0.00307 -0.203* -1.447*** 
 (0.0898) (0.00735) (0.133) (0.642) (0.0796) (0.00633) (0.107) (0.505) 
         
Actres -0.203** -0.00148 -0.280* -1.712*** -0.26*** 0.000062 -0.246** -2.442*** 
 (0.0986) (0.00648) (0.144) (0.640) (0.0843) (0.00574) (0.120) (0.496) 
         
Enforce 0.119 -0.00274 0.277 3.763*** 0.0907 -0.00757 0.0299 2.195*** 
 (0.149) (0.0175) (0.201) (1.050) (0.158) (0.0145) (0.197) (0.785) 
         
Constant -0.971 -9.68*** 15.294*** -57.612*** -9.299* -18.53*** 39.735*** -58.032* 
 (2.482) (2.459) (4.361) (20.392) (4.930) (5.702) (8.151) (33.691) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 1223 1233 1980 1976 1223 1233 1980 1976 
Adj R-sq 0.30 0.09 0.38 0.21 0.39 0.12 0.47 0.52 
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2.4.3 Instrumental variable  
The baseline analysis does not take into consideration potential 
endogeneity issues. The purpose of this section is to address these issues. I 
can rule out reverse causality as a concern because the behaviour of a bank 
is unlikely to change the country-level corruption culture. I investigate whether 
the relationship I document between domestic corruption and myopic 
behaviour by banks is driven by an omitted variables bias. In particular, an 
endogenous relationship might exist between these two variables due to 
unobserved factors included in the disturbance term that are correlated with 
domestic corruption.  
I address the endogeneity issue by using an instrumental variable 
approach. The instrument is the geographic distance between a bank’s 
headquartered country and Denmark (which has the lowest value of CPI in the 
sample). This instrument satisfies the exogeneity condition as the distance 
between two countries is unlikely to have any direct effect on economic or 
behaviour outcomes. The instrument also satisfies the relevance condition as 
Hofstede (2001) points out that geography is one of the key determinants of 
culture differences across countries. The use of this instrument is similar in 
spirit to Kwok and Tadesse (2006) and Li et al. (2013) who use the continent 
a country belongs to as an instrumental variable for various dimensions of 
culture including uncertainty avoidance, individualism and harmony3.  
                                                          
3 Li et al. (2013) focus on 35 countries located in different continents. We cannot use continent as the 
instrumental variable as we only focus on European countries.  
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The first stage results (Panel A of Table 2-5) confirm that the geographic 
distance is highly related to the domestic corruption. The instrumental variable 
has a positive sign as expected and is strongly significant at the 1% level. A 
bank whose headquarters is geographically close to Denmark is expected 
have a lower degree of domestic corruption than a bank whose headquarters 
is located far away from Denmark. The F-statistics for the weak instrument test 
suggests that the null hypothesis of a weak instrument is comfortably rejected 
at the conventional levels of significance. I report the results of the second 
stage regressions in panel B of Table 2-5. The effect of domestic corruption 
on short-termism remains significant. The two-stage estimates are larger in 













Table 2-5 Bank Short-termism and Headquartered Corruption Culture: 
Instrumental Variable 
The table shows the regression results of using an instrumental variable (IV). Distance is the 
IV which is computed as the distance between Denmark (the cleanest country in terms of 
corruption) and bank headquartered country. Panel A reports the first stage results. Panel B 
reports the second stage results. All regressions include year dummies and standard errors 
are corrected for bank-level clustering. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Myopia Beat_analyst Tail_risk Stfund 
Panel A. First stage results  
Distance 23.265*** 23.268*** 22.642*** 22.558*** 
 (2.251) (2.218) (1.649) (1.657) 
IV F statistic 106.85 106.922 188.435 185.35 
Panel B. Second stage results 
     
Domestic 0.0461*** 0.0289*** 0.000466*** 0.00286*** 
corruption (0.0103) (0.00971) (0.000174) (0.000764) 
SIZE 1.434*** 0.537 -0.0314*** 0.141*** 
 (0.538) (0.536) (0.00785) (0.0335) 
SIZE2 -0.0415*** -0.00985 0.000890*** -0.00437*** 
 (0.0157) (0.0151) (0.000226) (0.000999) 
MB 0.0869 0.0604 0.000509 0.00195 
 (0.0933) (0.105) (0.00115) (0.00514) 
ROA -0.374*** -0.0374 -0.00736*** -0.0145*** 
 (0.0771) (0.0728) (0.00151) (0.00500) 
LOAN -0.380 0.704 -0.00701 -0.0772* 
 (0.593) (0.665) (0.00678) (0.0399) 
LEV -2.556 2.393 -0.0358 -0.0744 
 (2.257) (2.084) (0.0404) (0.144) 
NPL 3.649*** -1.421** 0.106*** 0.0345 
 (1.331) (0.637) (0.0178) (0.0446) 
DEPOSIT -3.506*** 1.049 -0.0142* -0.493*** 
 (0.565) (0.714) (0.00734) (0.0418) 
TOTALOS -0.107 0.714** -0.00415 -0.0259 
 (0.331) (0.286) (0.00397) (0.0174) 
HHI 0.381 0.463 0.0162*** -0.0132 
 (0.537) (0.442) (0.00570) (0.0257) 
LNGDP 0.378 0.441** 0.000906 0.0187 
 (0.235) (0.220) (0.00405) (0.0211) 
CR -0.191* -0.106 -0.000343 -0.0211*** 
 (0.113) (0.105) (0.00146) (0.00603) 
Transp 0.210 0.253* -0.00209 0.0182** 
 (0.137) (0.148) (0.00202) (0.00797) 
String -0.187** -0.0101 -0.00284** -0.0177*** 
 (0.0875) (0.0672) (0.00124) (0.00597) 
Actres -0.347*** -0.0364 -0.00367*** -0.0292*** 
 (0.0841) (0.0589) (0.00134) (0.00556) 
Enforce 0.282* 0.0187 0.00244 0.0305*** 
 (0.149) (0.134) (0.00220) (0.00803) 
Constant -13.54** -20.53*** 0.352*** -0.760** 
 (5.344) (5.702) (0.0860) (0.379) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 1223 1233 1980 1976 
R-sq 0.37  0.47 0.51 
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2.5 Corruption during economic policy uncertainty 
Recent studies show that culture could exert different effects on corporate 
decision making during different periods. For instance, CEO culture affects firm 
performance during periods of high competition (Nguyen, Hagendorff, and 
Eshraghi, 2017). Banks located in more religious US counties take less risk 
during the financial crisis period (Adhikari and Agrawal, 2016). Kanagaretnam, 
Lim, and Lobo (2013) show that individualism (uncertainty avoidance) is 
positively (negatively) associated with bank failure during the financial crisis.  
In this section, I test the effect of corruption on bank short-termism during 
periods of economic policy uncertainty (EPU). By using a comprehensive 
European Economic Policy Uncertainty (EPU) index provided by Baker, Bloom 
and Davis (2016), I am able to precisely measure market uncertainty in Europe. 
To generate an annual uncertainty measure, I compute the average 
uncertainty during a year based on the monthly index and I take a nature 
logarithm of the annual value. 
 I test whether the effect of domestic corruption on bank short term various 
across periods of high versus low economic policy uncertainty. Specifically, I 
separate the sample into two periods, one with high EPU level and the other 
with low EPU level.  In both samples, I estimate OLS regressions using the 
same model as in the regression specification (2). Table 2-6 presents the 
results for banks during different uncertainty period. During the low EPU period, 
domestic corruption does not have a significant effect on the overall level of 
bank short-termism. On the contrary, domestic corruption has a significant 
positive effect on short-termism during high EPU period. One standard 
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deviation increase in bank headquartered country corruption level would 
increase myopic level by 0.64, which is 37% of the standard deviation of 
myopia index. 
I further show results using instrumental variable in Table 2-7. Corruption 
has significant effect on short-termism during both low and high EPU, while 
the effect is stronger during high EPU. A one standard deviation increase in 
corruption level raises 73% myopia standard deviation during high EPU 
contrast to 29% during low EPU period. These findings can be interpreted as 
evidence that banks are more likely to focus on strategies with immediate 
benefits during financial market instability and a corrupt environment 





Table 2-6 Bank Short-termism during European Economic Policy Uncertainty Periods 
This table reports estimates of regressions of short-termism measures (Myopia, Beat_analyst, Tail_risk, and Stfund) on bank 
headquartered country corruption values during different economic policy uncertainty period. Column 1 to 4 report results during low 
uncertainty periods and column 5 to 8 report results during high uncertainty periods. All regressions include year dummies. Standard 
errors are clustered at bank-level and are shown in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
  Low Economic Policy Uncertainty Period   High Economic Policy Uncertainty Period 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Myopia 
Beat_ 
analyst Tail_risk Stfund  Myopia 
Beat_ 
analyst Tail_risk Stfund 
          
Domestic 0.0110 0.0015*** 0.000111 0.00117*  0.0354** 0.00117 0.000333 0.00213*** 
corruption (0.00743) (0.000595) (0.000103) (0.000597) (0.0148) (0.00139) (0.000233) (0.000701) 
SIZE 0.844 -0.0367 -0.0257*** 0.0947**  1.729*** 0.316*** -0.0402*** 0.178*** 
 (0.735) (0.0489) (0.00745) (0.0368)  (0.642) (0.120) (0.0127) (0.0410) 
SIZE2 -0.0223 0.00137 0.000770*** -0.00291*** -0.0523*** -0.00796** 0.00110*** -0.00556*** 
 (0.0212) (0.00139) (0.000215) (0.00107)  (0.0185) (0.00331) (0.000363) (0.00121) 
MB 0.106 -0.00107 0.00146 0.00537  0.169 0.0113 -0.00347* 0.00636 
 (0.0847) (0.00714) (0.00110) (0.00575)  (0.211) (0.0245) (0.00190) (0.00756) 
ROA -0.241*** 0.00303 -0.00467*** -0.00937  -0.301*** 0.0132 -0.00770*** -0.0193*** 
 (0.0746) (0.00844) (0.00152) (0.00718)  (0.0962) (0.0113) (0.00227) (0.00615) 
LOAN -0.361 0.0785 -0.00663 -0.0880*  -0.491 0.0176 -0.00633 -0.0656 
 (0.689) (0.0484) (0.00669) (0.0486)  (0.648) (0.101) (0.00884) (0.0518) 
LEV 0.717 0.355** 0.0314 -0.409**  -10.21*** -1.112** -0.112* 0.204 
 (2.437) (0.139) (0.0387) (0.168)  (3.053) (0.527) (0.0663) (0.187) 
NPL -1.746 -0.350 -0.00475 -0.207**  4.447*** -0.0222 0.117*** 0.0594 
 (1.376) (0.234) (0.0218) (0.0948)  (1.545) (0.0945) (0.0212) (0.0498) 
DEPOSIT -3.611*** 0.0849 -0.0220*** -0.470***  -3.202*** 0.165 -0.00326 -0.521*** 
 (0.723) (0.0677) (0.00719) (0.0530)  (0.660) (0.111) (0.00931) (0.0444) 
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TOTALOS 0.00358 0.0503** -0.00235 -0.0114  -0.348 0.0539 -0.00484 -0.0393* 
 (0.404) (0.0230) (0.00411) (0.0203)  (0.419) (0.0495) (0.00543) (0.0206) 
HHI 0.595 0.0700** 0.0123** -0.00980  0.549 -0.0381 0.0185** -0.0222 
 (0.510) (0.0304) (0.00501) (0.0252)  (0.561) (0.0688) (0.00799) (0.0305) 
LNGDP 0.110 0.0249 -0.00679** 0.00794  -0.0127 -0.0141 0.000423 -0.0115 
 (0.204) (0.0172) (0.00308) (0.0206)  (0.290) (0.0343) (0.00487) (0.0167) 
CR -0.0457 -0.00101 0.00199 -0.00774  -0.404*** -0.0177 -0.00306 -0.0293*** 
 (0.120) (0.00712) (0.00140) (0.00599)  (0.140) (0.0155) (0.00195) (0.00748) 
Transp 0.0633 0.0158** -0.00737*** 0.00755  0.233 0.0182 -0.000837 0.0182** 
 (0.134) (0.00778) (0.00223) (0.0130)  (0.189) (0.0240) (0.00304) (0.00911) 
String -0.164** 0.000243 -0.00154* -0.0194*** -0.0821 0.00683 -0.00338* -0.00658 
 (0.0649) (0.00335) (0.000804) (0.00631)  (0.107) (0.00889) (0.00190) (0.00486) 
Act_res -0.147** 0.00166 -0.000994 -0.0180*** -0.379*** 0.000957 -0.00429* -0.0265*** 
 (0.0711) (0.00329) (0.000816) (0.00581)  (0.119) (0.00914) (0.00220) (0.00541) 
Enforce 0.0845 -0.00553 0.000547 0.0199**  0.0334 -0.00498 -0.000196 0.0182** 
 (0.161) (0.00730) (0.00177) (0.00998)  (0.185) (0.0206) (0.00296) (0.00818) 
          
Constant -5.720 -11.46 0.388*** -0.218  -10.19* -24.51*** 0.461*** -0.774** 
 (6.689) (8.129) (0.0823) (0.408)  (6.024) (9.068) (0.117) (0.374) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 649.00 649.00 1040.00 1042.00  574.00 584.00 940.00 934.00 








Table 2-7 Bank Short-termism during European Economic Policy Uncertainty Periods: Instrumental Variable 
This table reports results using instrumental variable in the regressions of short-termism measures (Myopia, Beat_analyst, Tail_risk, 
and Stfund) on bank headquartered country corruption values during low (model 1-4) and low (model 5-8) economic policy uncertainty 
period. The instrumental variable is the geographic distance between bank headquartered country and the least corrupt country in 
Europe. All regressions include year dummies. Standard errors are clustered at bank-level.  
  Low Economic Policy Uncertainty Period   High Economic Policy Uncertainty Period 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Myopia 
Beat_ 
analyst Tail_risk Stfund  Myopia 
Beat_ 
analyst Tail_risk Stfund 
Domestic 0.0282** 0.0391*** 0.000132 0.00307*** 0.0707*** 0.0156 0.000904*** 0.00261** 
corruption (0.0112) (0.0120) (0.000154) (0.000988) (0.0169) (0.0143) (0.000329) (0.00106) 
SIZE 0.786 -0.621 -0.0259*** 0.0815**  1.631** 2.210** -0.0440*** 0.174*** 
 (0.719) (0.859) (0.00734) (0.0369)  (0.638) (0.929) (0.0131) (0.0408) 
SIZE2 -0.0209 0.0233 0.000774*** -0.00254** -0.0498*** -0.0555** 0.00120*** -0.00546*** 
 (0.0207) (0.0247) (0.000211) (0.00108)  (0.0183) (0.0256) (0.000374) (0.00120) 
MB 0.105 -0.0131 0.00147 0.00602  0.244 0.0994 -0.00252 0.00719 
 (0.0825) (0.128) (0.00109) (0.00557)  (0.165) (0.178) (0.00190) (0.00744) 
ROA -0.231*** 0.0690 -0.00464*** -0.00668  -0.282*** 0.0947 -0.00704*** -0.0187*** 
 (0.0767) (0.146) (0.00149) (0.00701)  (0.0978) (0.0847) (0.00220) (0.00610) 
LOAN -0.426 1.322 -0.00670 -0.0940*  -0.697 0.102 -0.00874 -0.0676 
 (0.681) (0.962) (0.00656) (0.0488)  (0.661) (0.764) (0.00934) (0.0513) 
LEV 1.152 6.886** 0.0314 -0.408**  -9.334*** -7.787** -0.114* 0.203 
 (2.310) (2.678) (0.0380) (0.171)  (2.851) (3.940) (0.0649) (0.185) 
NPL -2.018 -5.633 -0.00426 -0.163**  3.095** -0.417 0.0996*** 0.0450 
 (1.387) (3.840) (0.0218) (0.0817)  (1.545) (0.822) (0.0219) (0.0546) 
DEPOSIT -3.631*** 1.557 -0.0218*** -0.458***  -3.109*** 1.271 0.00166 -0.517*** 
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 (0.722) (1.044) (0.00707) (0.0542)  (0.682) (0.841) (0.00971) (0.0438) 
TOTALOS -0.00296 0.884** -0.00228 -0.00594  -0.378 0.398 -0.00461 -0.0390* 
 (0.381) (0.357) (0.00407) (0.0191)  (0.443) (0.375) (0.00551) (0.0203) 
HHI_C 0.588 1.247** 0.0123** -0.00742  0.647 -0.279 0.0211** -0.0201 
 (0.536) (0.570) (0.00492) (0.0300)  (0.653) (0.528) (0.00900) (0.0308) 
LNGDP 0.303 0.610* -0.00643 0.0399  0.559 0.0218 0.00998 -0.00346 
 (0.230) (0.323) (0.00397) (0.0280)  (0.350) (0.335) (0.00627) (0.0223) 
CR -0.0368 0.00502 0.00196 -0.0104  -0.455*** -0.142 -0.00415** -0.0302*** 
 (0.118) (0.129) (0.00137) (0.00634)  (0.148) (0.122) (0.00206) (0.00737) 
Transp -0.00728 0.237 -0.00732*** 0.0124  0.436** 0.164 0.00278 0.0212** 
 (0.156) (0.147) (0.00209) (0.0116)  (0.187) (0.188) (0.00312) (0.00931) 
String -0.200*** -0.0261 -0.00159* -0.0242*** -0.188 0.0260 -0.00522** -0.00811 
 (0.0720) (0.0697) (0.000936) (0.00780)  (0.126) (0.0806) (0.00207) (0.00583) 
Actres -0.199*** 0.00162 -0.00108 -0.0260*** -0.522*** -0.0205 -0.00679*** -0.0286*** 
 (0.0749) (0.0605) (0.000972) (0.00685)  (0.124) (0.0850) (0.00235) (0.00661) 
Enforce 0.225 0.000852 0.000725 0.0358*** 0.261 0.00561 0.00350 0.0214** 
 (0.168) (0.142) (0.00195) (0.0108)  (0.189) (0.167) (0.00318) (0.00889) 
          
constant -7.408 -14.05* 0.384*** -0.517  -17.25*** -24.66*** 0.360*** -0.858** 
 (6.936) (7.957) (0.0834) (0.468)  (6.685) (8.923) (0.122) (0.395) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 649 649 1,040 1,042  574 584 940 934 





2.6 Robustness tests 
I conduct a battery of tests to investigate whether the relationship between 
domestic corruption and bank myopia documented in the baseline results is 
robust. In particular, I investigate if the main results still hold using an 
alternative measure of corruption, removing large banks, and employing 
alternative measures of short-termism. Table 2-8 summarises these results. 
2.6.1 Alternative corruption measure 
First, I use an alternative measure for domestic corruptions. I employ the 
“control of corruption indicator” in the World Governance Indicators computed 
by the World Bank as the new measure of corruption which aggregates various 
surveys of firms, residents, and experts all over the world. The higher the value, 
the stronger control for corruption, the lower the corruption norms in the society. 
Panel A of Table 2-8 reports the results for the new measure of corruption. The 
coefficient for the alternative corruption measure (controlcorruption) is 
negative and significant which indicates that a strong control of corruption (less 








Table 2-8 Robustness Tests 
This table shows the coefficient of bank headquartered country corruption from alternative specifications of the regressions of Myopia, 
Beat_analyst, Tail_risk, and Stfund. Columns 1 to 4 show OLS regression results and columns 5 to 8 show 2SLS regression results 
using instrumental variable. Panel A demonstrates results using the World Governance Indicator as an alternative measure of bank 
headquartered country corruption. Panel B shows the results after removing big banks each year in each country. Panel C shows the 
results of using different composites of myopia index.  All regressions include bank-level control variables (size, square-root of size, 
market-to-book ratio, ROA, total loans out of total assets, total deposits out of total assets, total equity divided by total debt, non-
performing loans out of total loans, and total large institutional shareholdings), bank headquartered country-level control variables 
(Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of deposits, logarithm of GDP, Transparency, stringency, activity restrictiveness, and law enforcement), 
and year dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the bank-level and are reported in parentheses.  
 
Panel A: Alternative corruption measure 
 OLS  IV 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Myopia Beat_ 
analyst 
Tail_risk Stfund  Myopia Beat_ 
analyst 
Tail_risk Stfund 
          
control -0.507** -0.372* -0.00474* -0.0383***  -1.230*** -0.793*** -0.0123*** -0.0770*** 
corruption (0.226) (0.194) (0.00281) (0.0122)  (0.291) (0.258) (0.00465) (0.0217) 
          
Bank-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 1159.00 1169.00 1874.00 1870.00  1159.00 1169.00 1874.00 1870.00 
Adj R-sq 0.40 0.12 0.48 0.51  0.37 0.15 0.47 0.50 
 
 




(Table 2-8 continued.) 
Panel B: remove large banks 
 OLS  IV 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Myopia Beat_ 
analyst 
Tail_risk Stfund  Myopia Beat_ 
analyst 
Tail_risk Stfund 
          
Country  0.031*** 0.0204** 0.00030** 0.0021***  0.053*** 0.0281*** 0.00056*** 0.0030*** 
corruption (0.0102) (0.00821) (0.000142) (0.000649)  (0.00887) (0.00931) (0.000195) (0.000582) 
Bank-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 1035.00 997.00 1618.00 1611.00  1035.00 997.00 1618.00 1611.00 
Adj R-sq 0.43 0.15 0.49 0.54  0.42  0.48 0.53 
          
Panel C: Alternative short termism measures 
 OLS  IV 
 (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6)  








Country 0.0148** 0.0340*** 0.0243**   0.0286*** 0.0517*** 0.0479***  
corruption (0.00619) (0.0116) (0.00985)   (0.00557) (0.0131) (0.00874)  
          
Bank-level controls Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes  
Country-level controls Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes  
Year FE Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes  
Obs 1035.00 1029.00 1035.00   1035.00 1029.00 1035.00  
Adj R-sq 0.60 0.49 0.41   0.59 0.49 0.40  
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2.6.2 Remove large banks 
Second, I remove the largest banks in the sample. This test is to remove 
the influence of “too-big-to-fail” banks.  Those banks are more likely to be 
short-termism as they believe they would be bailed out by the government if 
the long-term consequence realized. Therefore, I remove the largest bank in 
each country every year. In total, I drop 366 observations (almost 30% of the 
sample). Panel B of Table 2-8 shows that the results do not change. In fact, 
the effect of corruption on bank short-termism becomes even slightly stronger. 
The results are not driven by very large banks in each country.  
2.6.3 Alternative measure for short-termism  
Third, I use an alternative method to aggregate different components of 
the bank short-termism measure. Instead of just summing up the standardized 
value of meet-or-beat analyst forecast, tail risk, and short-term debt ratio, I 
employ factor analysis on those three components. I extract the first principle 
component (pca) and use it as an alternative measure for short-termism. I 
report ordinary least square (OLS) results in column (1) of Panel C of Table 
2-8 and instrumental variable results in column (4). The results are similar to 
the main results. 
2.6.4 Alternative measure for earnings management  
Fourth, I use an alternative measure for earnings management. Instead of 
using meet-or-beat analyst consensus forecast, I use discretionary loan loss 
provisions as the proxy for earnings management. I estimate discretionary 
LLPs following Bushman and Williams (2012):  
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𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑖𝑡𝑗 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝐸𝑏𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑗 + 𝛾2∆𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖𝑡+1,𝑗 + 𝛾3∆𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖𝑡,𝑗 + 𝛾4∆𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖𝑡−1,𝑗
+ 𝛾5∆𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖𝑡−2,𝑗 + 𝛾6𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡−1,𝑗 + 𝛾7𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡−1,𝑗 + 𝛾8%∆𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡𝑗
+ 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡𝑗                             (2.3) 
𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑖𝑡𝑗 is the loan loss provision scaled by lagged total loans for bank i, in 
country j, for year t. 𝐸𝑏𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑗 is earnings before loan loss provisions and taxes 
for period t scaled by lagged total loans. ∆𝑁𝑃𝐿 is the change in non-performing 
loans scaled by lagged total assets. 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡−1,𝑗  is the book value of equity 
divided by lagged total assets. 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡−1,𝑗 is the natural logarithm of total assets. 
%∆𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡𝑗  is the percentage change in GDP per capital to control for 
macroeconomic status. I also include country dummies to account for any 
time-invariant country characteristics that could influence loan loss 
provisioning and year dummies to capture changes in loan loss provisioning 
over time. I report the results in Appendix 2.  
The absolute value of the residuals (ALLP) are the proxy for short-termism. 
The higher the value, more likelihood of myopic behaviour. I then replace meat-
or-beat analyst forecast with standardized ALLP. The myopia (ALLP) in Panel 
C of Table 2-8 is computed as below: 
𝑀𝑦𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑎(𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑃) = 𝑆𝑇𝐷(𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑃) + 𝑆𝑇𝐷(𝑇𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘) + 𝑆𝑇𝐷(𝑆𝑡𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑)                     (2.4) 
I report the results for ordinary least squares in model (2) of panel C and 
the results for instrumental variable (which is the geographic distance between 
bank headquartered country and Denmark) in column (5). The results are 
consistent with the main results.  
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2.6.5 Alternative risk measure 
Next, I use an alternative measure for tail risk. Similar to tail risk, I wish to 
have a measure that captures the probability of returns falling below a disaster 
level with the consideration of general market condition. Thus, I employ the 
downside risk as an alternative. It measures the sensitivity of investors to 
downside losses relative to upside gains. Follow Ang, Chen, and Xing (2006), 
I compute downside risk as market betas over periods when the excess market 
return is below its mean:  
𝛽− =
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑟𝑖, 𝑟𝑚|𝑟𝑚 < 𝜇𝑚)
𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑟𝑚|𝑟𝑚 < 𝜇𝑚)
                                                                                               (2.5) 
where 𝑟𝑖 is bank i’s excess return, 𝑟𝑚 is the market (the major stock index) 
excess return of bank i’s domiciled country, 𝜇𝑚 is the average market excess 
return every year. I standardize downside risk and replace tail risk with it: 
𝑀𝑦𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑎(𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘)
= 𝑆𝑇𝐷(𝐵𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡) + 𝑆𝑇𝐷(𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘) + 𝑆𝑇𝐷(𝑆𝑡𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑)         (2.6) 
Column (3) and (6) of Panel C of Table 2-8 show the results for OLS and 
instrumental variable respectively. The results hold for a risk measure that 
controls market factor.  
2.7 Bank short-termism and foreign shareholders’ corruption   
The findings that domestic corruption is significantly and positively 
associated with bank short-termism is consistent with the first hypothesis. I 
further investigate whether ‘foreign corruption’, which is the degree of 
corruption in countries where foreign shareholders are based could also 
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influences bank short-termism. I focus on foreign shareholders as they are a 
potential channel to import corruption culture from outside to the bank 
headquartered country. I only consider large foreign institutional investors that 
hold at least 5% of the bank’s shares. I do this to reduce the noise caused by 
small shareholders who are likely to invest for diversification proposes and who 
would not have a significant influence on the behaviour of banks they invest in 
as a result. I collect institutional ownership data from the Thomson Reuters 
13F ownership database.  
2.7.1 Foreign shareholders 
Previous studies focus on two hypotheses on the effect of foreign 
shareholders on non-financial firm myopic behaviour. One hypothesis states 
that foreign shareholders are “locusts” that only search for short-run profits and 
care little about the long-term prospects of the firm. The other hypothesis 
proposes an opposite view, suggesting that foreign shareholders foster long-
term investment as they are more effective monitors than domestic 
shareholders and bring in better governance. To my best knowledge, there is 
little evidence on the effect of shareholders in the banking sector.  
I propose that foreign shareholders from different culture backgrounds 
may have different effects on the behaviour of their investees. For instance, 
the US has a higher corruption score than Norway but a lower corruption score 
than Italy. The effect of a US shareholder on a Norwegian bank should be 
different from its effect on an Italian bank. Therefore, I divide banks into two 
groups based on their level of corruption. One group contains banks 
headquartered in countries with lower than average corruption values. Those 
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countries are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, 
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK. The other group 
contains banks that are headquartered in countries with higher than average 
corruption values. Those countries include Croatia, Czech Republic, France, 
Greece, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, and 
Spain.   
I report summary statistics of institutional ownership in Table 2-9. TOTOS 
is the total percentage ownership computed by summing up the shareholdings 
of all large institutional investors (with at least 5% shareholding) divided by the 
stock’s total market capitalization. FOROS presents the total foreign ownership 
percentage calculated by summing up the shareholdings of all institutions 
domiciled outside bank headquartered country divided by the bank’s market 
capitalization. On average, the total percentage of institutional ownership is 47% 
and the average total foreign ownership is 30%, which is more than half of the 
total ownership. In the sample, Slovakia has a very high proportion of 
ownership by foreign institutional investors, amounting to 90%. In contrast, I 
find very low foreign institutional ownership in Norway (10%), France (9%), 
and Finland (8%). I observe that banks headquartered in countries with lower 
than average corruption values have less foreign ownership and this may due 
to more restrictive policies in those countries. For instance, Finland has some 
tax policies that may make it unattractive to foreign investors.   
In Column (3) of Table 2-9, FOROS_corrupt represents the total 
percentage shareholdings by foreign institutions (with at least 5% shareholding) 
domiciled in countries with higher corruption value than bank-headquartered 
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countries as a fraction of market capitalization. For banks headquartered in 
area with high corruption norms (Czech Republic, France, Greece, Hungary, 
Romania, Russia, and Spain), they rarely have any shareholders from 
countries that have higher corruption values than their headquartered 
countries. FOROS_clean represents the holdings by foreign institutions (with 
at least 5% shareholding) domiciled in countries with lower corruption value 
than bank-headquartered countries as a fraction of market capitalization. 
There is a concern of the offsetting effect of having both corrupt and clean 
shareholders. However, those statistics make it clear that banks 
headquartered in corrupt (clean) countries, they rarely have foreign 
shareholders domiciled in even more corrupt (clean) countries. The offsetting 
effect is tiny and should not affect the results.   
To further illustrate the effect of large foreign shareholders, instead of 
computing percentage shareholdings as a percentage of market capitalization, 
I compute shareholdings as a percentage of large institutional investors in 
column (5) and (6). SH_corrupt represents the total percentage ownership held 
by shareholders from countries with higher corruption values than bank-
headquartered countries out of total percentage shareholdings by large 
shareholders (at least 5% shareholdings). For instance, on average only 68% 
shares of banks in Austria are held by large institutional investors, 36% of 
shares are held by foreign investors from countries with higher corruption 
scores than Austria. SH_clean represents the ownership by institutions 
domiciled in countries with lower than bank headquartered countries as a 
fraction of large institutional investors (both domestic and foreign).   
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Table 2-9 Summary Statistics of European Bank Shareholders 
The table reports summary statistics of average bank ownership by each country. I 
only consider large shareholders with at least 5% shareholdings. TOTOS is the total 
ownership. FOROS is the total foreign ownership. FOROS_corrupt is the percentage 
ownership by shareholders from countries with higher corruption values than bank 
headquartered country divided by market capitalization. FOROS_clean is the 
percentage ownership by shareholders from countries with lower corruption values 
than bank headquartered country divided by market capitalization. SH_corrupt is 
computed as the total ownership by shareholders from countries with higher 
corruption values than bank headquartered country divided by total ownership of large 
shareholders (TOTOS). SH_clean is computed as the total ownership by 
shareholders from countries with lower corruption values than bank headquartered 
country divided by total ownership of large shareholders (TOTOS). 
 









Banks headquartered in countries with corruption score lower than average 
Austria 67.76% 25.82% 25.01% 0.83% 35.72% 1.24% 
Belgium 46.03% 10.29% 8.50% 1.79% 17.94% 3.89% 
Denmark 30.73% 11.05% 7.72% 0.00% 36.76% 0.00% 
Finland 59.07% 7.96% 7.96% 0.00% 13.48% 0.00% 
Germany 49.59% 32.51% 32.23% 0.28% 61.52% 2.71% 
Ireland 19.41% 14.62% 0.00% 14.62% 0.00% 84.19% 
Netherlands 46.75% 13.52% 13.52% 0.00% 37.18% 0.00% 
Norway 33.50% 9.55% 2.23% 7.32% 10.64% 30.27% 
Sweden 30.72% 18.02% 0.42% 17.60% 1.80% 59.80% 
Switzerland 49.38% 42.35% 33.43% 0.00% 74.44% 0.00% 
UK 22.43% 14.97% 10.86% 4.46% 60.55% 22.07% 
Total 38.55% 21.46% 15.94% 3.36% 43.94% 15.65% 
Banks headquartered in countries with corruption score higher than average 
Croatia 61.68% 61.68% 48.36% 15.06% 49.87% 51.91% 
Czech Republic 60.36% 59.62% 0.00% 59.62% 0.00% 98.51% 
France 24.61% 8.62% 0.61% 8.05% 2.17% 41.67% 
Greece 30.90% 30.90% 0.00% 30.90% 0.00% 100.00% 
Hungary 43.55% 20.43% 0.00% 20.43% 0.00% 46.78% 
Italy 29.61% 11.93% 0.00% 11.93% 0.00% 53.01% 
Poland 69.61% 62.73% 14.32% 48.59% 22.68% 66.27% 
Portugal 61.12% 53.42% 45.16% 8.38% 73.73% 15.86% 
Romania 50.54% 45.66% 0.00% 45.66% 0.00% 90.85% 
Russia 70.48% 32.14% 0.00% 32.14% 0.00% 41.94% 
Slovakia 90.27% 90.27% 37.12% 53.15% 38.46% 61.54% 
Spain 31.78% 10.75% 0.79% 10.52% 6.46% 45.34% 




As the banking-sector is highly regulated and closely monitored compared 
with the other sectors, I am not sure about whether foreign shareholders would 
have any effect on the behaviour of banks. Therefore, I first test the effect of 
foreign shareholders on bank short-termism as specified in equation (2.7):  
𝑀𝑦𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑎𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑂𝑆𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
+ 𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝐸 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝐸 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡                      (2.7) 
I control for the same bank characteristics ( 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 ) as in 
equation (2.2) which includes size, the quadratic form of size , market-to-book 
ratio, ROA, total loans, leverage, total deposits, non-performing loans, total 
shareholders’ ownership, HHI, and logarithm of GDP. I include year fixed 
effects to control for any time-specific factors. I also control for country fixed 
effects so that the results are not driven by country-level time-invariant factors. 
By doing so, the corruption level of bank headquartered country will not be a 
factor that would influence the results here. 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑂𝑆𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 is the total percentage 
ownership by foreign large shareholders (with at least 5% shareholding) out of 
market capitalization. The results in Table 2-10 show that foreign shareholders 
induce short-termism in banks headquartered in countries with lower than 
average corruption values but not in banks headquartered in countries with 
higher than average corruption values.  
For banks headquartered in relatively clean countries, one standard 
deviation (0.18) increase in the percentage of foreign shareholding would 
increase bank myopic level by 0.32, which is 20% standard deviation of the 
myopic index. The effect of foreign shareholders on short-termism only shows 
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up on the multidimensional myopia index but not on its components. The 
reason might be that each dimension is only one facet of myopia and no single 
dimension alone can fully capture the effect of foreign shareholders. Bernile, 
Bhagwat, and Yonker (2018) create a multidimensional measure of board 
diversity where they utilize the same method as the myopia index. They test 
the impact of diversity on corporate risk-taking and find that higher values in 
multidimensional diversity index lead to lower stock return volatility. Similar to 
the non-significant results of all components of the myopia index, Bernile, 
Bhagwat, and Yonker (2018) find that no single component of the diversity 
index has any impact on firm risk-taking. Only use the combined index could 
board diversity reveals its effect. They suggest that only the combined effect 
of different aspects of board diversity could influence corporate decision-
making. This logic verifies the use of a multidimensional index when it is 
agnostic about which aspects would matter. The combined effect increases 
the probability of capturing different sources of short-termism.     
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Table 2-10 Bank Short-termism and Foreign Shareholders 
This table shows estimations of panel regression of myopia measure (Myopia) and its components (Beat_analyst, Tail_risk, and Stfund) 
on foreign shareholding. The main independent variable (FOROS) is ownership by institutions domiciled in countries outside bank-
headquartered countries. Column 1-4 reports results for banks headquartered in countries with lower than average corruption values and 
column 5 to 8 reports results for banks headquartered in countries with higher than average corruption values. All regressions include 
bank headquartered country and year dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the bank-level. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels.  
 
  Bank headquartered in clean countries   Bank headquartered in corrupt countries 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Myopia 
Beat_ 
analyst Tail_risk Stfund  Myopia 
Beat_ 
analyst Tail_risk Stfund 
          
FOROS 1.803** 0.183* 0.0199 0.00349  -0.670 -0.135 -0.00216 -0.0405 
 (0.792) (0.106) (0.0123) (0.0338)  (0.621) (0.102) (0.00589) (0.0329) 
SIZE 0.0779 -0.0815 -0.00508 0.0871*** 0.832 -0.128 -0.0361*** 0.227*** 
 (0.600) (0.173) (0.00767) (0.0300)  (0.809) (0.131) (0.0120) (0.0858) 
SIZE2 -0.00522 0.00241 0.000146 -0.00266*** -0.0207 0..00509 0.00107*** -0.00703*** 
 (0.0178) (0.00472) (0.000232) (0.000957) (0.0224) (0.00361) (0.000335) (0.00243) 
MB -0.0569 0.00624 -0.00418*** 0.00550  0.0808 0.00538 -0.000275 0.00933 
 (0.0925) (0.0209) (0.00147) (0.00576)  (0.148) (0.0266) (0.00138) (0.00699) 
ROA -0.278*** 0.0177 -0.0105*** -0.0112**  -0.215*** 0.00975 -0.00589*** -0.0105 
 (0.0830) (0.0164) (0.00161) (0.00475)  (0.0726) (0.0191) (0.00190) (0.00638) 
LOAN -1.374 -0.0753 -0.00879 -0.0764  0.464 0.725*** -0.00203 -0.0893 
 (0.906) (0.101) (0.00703) (0.0576)  (0.743) (0.205) (0.00831) (0.0666) 
LEV -0.539 0.0383 0.123*** -0.299***  -8.112*** 0.212 -0.0572 -0.178 
 (1.786) (0.428) (0.0335) (0.110)  (2.594) (0.904) (0.0441) (0.250) 
DEPOSIT -3.622*** 0.148 -0.0291*** -0.466***  -4.014*** 0.178 -0.0343*** -0.547*** 
 (0.773) (0.0967) (0.0109) (0.0417)  (0.808) (0.140) (0.00691) (0.0716) 
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NPL 2.149 -0.802 0.139*** -0.0519  2.382* -0.213 0.0763*** -0.0292 
 (3.087) (0.508) (0.0360) (0.110)  (1.315) (0.130) (0.0183) (0.0438) 
TOTALOS 0.360 0.0969 -0.00913* 0.0124  0.533 0.220*** 0.000612 -0.00176 
 (0.377) (0.0638) (0.00521) (0.0176)  (0.378) (0.0738) (0.00442) (0.0356) 
HHI -0.327 0.0127 0.00570 -0.0718*** -0.664 -0.0231 -0.0177** 0.0378 
 (0.513) (0.119) (0.00517) (0.0266)  (1.022) (0.179) (0.00723) (0.0583) 
LNGDP 1.030 0.0692 0.0177* 0.0568  -1.253 0.0247 -0.0328** 0.0385 
 (0.634) (0.189) (0.00914) (0.0469)  (0.948) (0.254) (0.0130) (0.0409) 
Constant -5.751 -6.853 -0.0693 -0.652  7.022 -6.707 0.702*** -1.646* 
 (6.935) (20.64) (0.101) (0.538)  (11.52) (16.190) (0.168) (0.852) 
          
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 666 440 1,071 1,065  557 526 909 911 












2.7.2 Corrupt foreign shareholders  
I continue the investigation on the effect of different types of foreign 
shareholders on bank myopic behaviour. I conjecture that the positive 
relationship (that I found in Table 2-10) between foreign shareholdings and 
bank myopic behaviour in countries with higher than average corruption value 
is driven by foreign shareholders from countries that are more corrupt relative 
to the country where the bank is headquartered. If so, I would expect that for 
banks with higher percentage shareholdings from countries with corruption 
value higher than its headquartered countries behave more myopically. I only 
conduct tests on banks that are headquartered in countries with lower than 
average corruption values. The reason is that in 8 out of 12 countries with 
higher than average corruption scores, banks rarely have any foreign investors 
domiciled in countries with even higher corruption values than their 
headquartered countries. 
Panel A of Table 2-11 reports the results for banks headquartered in 
countries with lower than average corruption level. I use the same bank-level 
control variables as in equation (2.2). I include bank headquartered country 
and year fixed effects in all regressions. I show that one standard deviation 
(0.13) increase in percentage shareholdings from countries that are more 
corrupt than the country where the bank is located increases bank short-
termism by 0.13 standard deviation. This is consistent with the expectation that 
corruption corrupts and foreign shareholders are acting as the channel. These 
results justify the use of a multidimensional myopic index as it is the only 
measure that captures the effect. Using the myopia index increases the 
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probability that myopia is captured, since the manifestation of myopia may 
have various facets. If I only focus on individual dimension of myopia, I would 
not find any effect.4   
Furthermore, I test if shareholders located in countries that are less corrupt 
relative to the country where the bank is headquartered bring in their culture, 
such that such foreign shareholders curb the short-termism of banks 
headquartered in countries with higher than average corruption values. I 
compute the total shareholding by institutions domiciled in countries with 
smaller corruption values than bank headquartered countries (FOROS_clean). 
I only focus on banks that are headquartered in countries with higher than 
average corruption values as the rest of banks (headquartered in countries 
with lower than average corruption values) rarely have shareholders from 
countries with even lower corruption values. In Panel B of Table 2-11, the 
results show that a higher percentage of clean foreign shareholders have no 






                                                          
4 We have less observations when using meet-or-beat analyst forecast rather than myopia index as the 
dependent variable. The reason is that many observations drop when dependent variable is a 
categorical variable. For instance, in year 2000, all our observations have Beat_analyst values equal to 
zero. Once we use year fixed effect, observations drops for year 2000. 
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Table 2-11 Bank Short-termism and Foreign Shareholders' Corruption Culture 
Panel A of the table focus on banks headquartered in countries with lower than 
average corruption values. I report estimates of regressions of bank short-termism 
index (Myopia) and its components (Beat_analyst, Tail_risk, and Stfund) on 
ownership by shareholders from countries that have higher corruption values than 
bank-headquartered countries (FOROS_corupt). Panel B of the table focus on 
banks headquartered in countries with higher than average corruption values. I 
report estimates of regressions of myopia (Myopia, Beat_analyst, Tail_risk, Stfund) 
on ownership by shareholders from countries that have lower corruption values than 
bank-headquartered countries (FOROS_clean). Firm control variables are the same 
as in Table 2-10. All regressions include bank headquartered country and year 
dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the bank level and are reported in 
parentheses. *, ** indicate significance at the 10% and 5% levels.  
Panel A: foreign shareholders from countries with corruption values higher 
than bank headquartered countries     
 Bank headquartered in clean countries  
      
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  
 Myopia Beat_analyst Tail_risk Stfund  
FOROS_corrupt 1.723** -0.001 0.023 0.010  
 (0.829) (0.063) (0.015) (0.041)  
      
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Obs 666 440 1,071 1,065  
Adj R-sq 0.510 0.213 0.532 0.600   
      
Panel B: foreign shareholders from countries with corruption values lower than 
bank headquartered countries     
 Bank headquartered in corrupt countries  
      
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  
 Myopia Beat_analyst Tail_risk Stfund  
FOROS_clean 0.605 0.132 -0.003 -0.005  
 (0.472) (0.134) (0.007) (0.026)  
      
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Obs 557 526 909 911  









Notwithstanding the large body of literature studying myopia in 
nonfinancial firms, the research that focuses on the measurement and the 
determinants of myopic behaviour in the banking sector is limited. In this study, 
I construct a multidimensional myopia index tailored for the banking sector to 
capture all aspects that could possibly reveal short-term oriented behaviour. I 
use this index to explore whether corruption has an influence on bank short-
termism. I investigate this relationship using a large sample of European banks 
over the period running from 1998 to 2016.    
The empirical results show that banks headquartered in relatively more 
corrupt countries behave in a more myopic way than those headquarted in 
relatively less corrupt countries. This effect is reflected in earnings 
management, tail risk-taking, and short-term debt ratio. The effect of corruption 
becomes even stronger during high economic uncertain period. I further show 
that not only the domestic corruption contributes to bank short-termism, but 
also the corruption culture of foreign shareholders matter. This study is subject 
to the limitation that the corruption measure is time-invariant. I assume that the 
country corruption level remains unchanged during the sample period. Also, 
although I have taken several steps to alleviate endogeneity concerns in the 
first part of the study, a lack of a valid instrument for the results on shareholders’ 
corruption culture may not indicate causal relations.   
Overall, the results provide evidence on the unexplored effect that informal 
institutions have on bank behaviour. This study offers important implications 
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for European bank legislators on curbing bank short-termism as corruption 




Appendix 2-1 Variable Definitions 
Variables Definitions 
Bank Short-termism 
Myopia  The sum of standardized meet-or-beat analyst forecast, tail risk, and short-term debt ratio 
Beat_analyst  
Indicator variable that equals 1 if bank either meet or beat analyst forecast consensus earnings per share by 2 
cents, 0 otherwise. 
Tail_risk  the negative value of mean return on the bank's stock over the 5% worst return days of each year 
Stfund  short-term borrowing divided by total liability 
   
Corruption measures 
Country Corruption Corruption perception index 
Shareholder 
corruption weighted shareholders' corruption 
control_corruption world governance indicators 
   
Bank-level controls 
SIZE  Nature logarithm of total assets. Source: Worldscope 
SIZE2  square root of size 
MB  market-to-book ratio 
ROA  return on assets 
LOANS  Ratio of total loans to total assets. Source: Worldscope 
LEV  Equity-to-assets ratio 
DEPOSIT  Ratio of total deposits divided by total assets 





Log of annual gross domestic product (GDP) per capita. Source: World Bank's World Development Indicators 
database 
CR  Creditor rights developed by La Porta et al. (1998) and updated in Djankov, Mcliesh, and Shleifer (2007). 
Transp  Measure of the transparency of bank financial statement practices. Source: Barth et al. (2006) 
String  Capital Stringency Index measures the regulatory approach to assessing the degree of capital at risk in a bank.  
Actres  
It measures the extent to which banks are allowed by the regulator to engage in securities market activities, 
insurance activities, and real estate activities.  









Appendix 2-2 Calculation of earnings smoothing through loan loss provisions 
The table reports OLS regression estimates of loan loss provisions (LLP) on 
earnings before provisions and tax (EBLLP), forward and lagged term of changes in 
non-performing loans (ΔNPL), lagged capital (CAP𝑡−1), lagged total 
assets (𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡−1), and changes in GDP per capita (ΔGDP𝑡). I include country 
and year dummies. Results are in percentage  
 




















Country FE YES 
Year FE YES 
N 1317 

































Chapter 3 Macroeconomic and Political Uncertainty 






The financial crisis of 2008 made it clear that investors and regulators lack 
a simple and easy measure to capture macroeconomic and political 
uncertainty, let alone that one would be able to capture uncertainty in real-time. 
As a consequence, the number of papers trying to link different volatility 
measures to uncertainty has been growing (see for instance Jurado, 
Ludvigson, and Ng (2015), Cesa-Bianchi, JPesaran, Rebucci (2014), and the 
papers within).  
The goal is a simple one. Can I find a measure that might capture 
uncertainty and can also be easily calculated in real time? Preferably, one that 
is simple to measure, simple to understand, useful to academics and which 
would give investors, financial regulators and other stakeholders a feel in real 
time for the level of uncertainty as perceived by financial markets. I am not 
looking for the perfect ex post uncertainty measure but a risk measure, just like 
duration for bonds, that could be a first proxy of uncertainty implied by prices 
set by market participants with their perception of risk in real time. 
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Of course, stock return volatility itself does not qualify because it cannot 
be observed in real time. Moreover, as Diebold and Yilmaz (2008) put it: “There 
are few studies attempting to link underlying macroeconomic fundamentals to 
stock return volatility, and the studies that do exist have been largely 
unsuccessful. P.4)” Implied volatility might be another candidate as it is traded 
directly. However, it is only available in a limited number of countries.5    
An increasing number of studies suggest that cross sectional return 
dispersion, which is the cross-sectional standard deviation of stock returns, 
might be able to fill this gap and fulfil a role as a proxy for uncertainty. For 
instance, for US data return dispersion is associated with subsequent 
unemployment (Loungani, Rush, and Tave, 1990), the future business cycle 
(Loungani, Rush, and Tave, 1991), the state of the aggregate economy 
(Gomes, Kogan, and Zhang, 2003), and future stock market volatility (Stivers, 
2003). Apart from this empirical evidence, it also intuitively seems a good 
measure for uncertainty. When there is good (bad) macroeconomic news on 
the general economy all stocks will go up (down) together and thus, return 
dispersion will be low. However, it will be high when the future is uncertain as 
some stocks may go up while others go down. Unfortunately, international 
evidence is scarce and even for the US we lack evidence on how well cross-
sectional dispersion is linked to many variables that might capture uncertainty.  
This chapter intends to fill this gap and investigate the usefulness of cross 
sectional dispersion as a simple and real time measure of uncertainty that does 
                                                          
5 Of course, one could extract implied volatilities from option prices, but apart from arbitrary model 
choices, this would be harder to understand.  
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not require a large amount of data. I embark on a comprehensive endeavour 
using a set of international data to verify whether return dispersion correlates 
with a broad set of alternative uncertainty proxies (which are hard to measure 
in real time). Essentially, I consider any international available uncertainty 
measures I can get my hands on. More specifically, I link return dispersion at 
a monthly level to different aspects of uncertainty including (local and 
international) business cycles, political crises, country risk, uncertainty 
measured by use of the words ‘risk’, ‘uncertainty’ and ‘uncertainties’ in the 
media, and uncertainty that relates to fiscal, regulatory and monetary policies 
(that is economic policy uncertainty). The tests rely on monthly data as these 
other measures are often at best available at the monthly level or precisely 
determined with the benefit of hindsight years later, like the international 
political crisis data I use. Use of monthly stock dispersion allows for a long 
sample starting in 1986. However, cross sectional return dispersion itself can 
of course be measured at higher frequencies. I consider cross-country data to 
test how robust is the return dispersion measure worldwide. I compute monthly 
return dispersion series of individual countries using the 50 largest market 
capitalization stocks in 18 respective countries. The focus on the fifty largest 
market capitalization stocks makes this measure even simpler and gives 
similar results to measures which include all stocks. Using the fifty largest 
stocks also assure that the series can easily be constructed and replicated for 
practical purposes. Last but not least, it is well-known (Lo and MacKinlay, 1990) 
that small stocks lag stocks of larger firms, hence focusing on the largest fifty 
stocks purges delayed trading effects of smaller stocks. I then link return 
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dispersion to the cross section of stock returns in each country, asking the 
question whether stocks that are more sensitive to (changes in 6 ) return 
dispersion offer higher returns. For a limited number of countries where direct 
implied volatility data are available I compare both measures.  
Based on general asset pricing models, return dispersion changes if asset 
pricing factors move, factor loadings vary or idiosyncratic volatility fluctuates 
(e.g., de Silva et al. 2001).  Therefore, there are concerns that return dispersion 
may change when there is no change in uncertainty of the economy (also see 
the discussion in Jurado et al. 2015). First, return dispersion will vary over time 
if idiosyncratic or firm-specific risk varies over time. However, Herskovic et al. 
(2016) show that residual return volatility has effectively the same common 
factor structure as total return volatility, which implies fluctuation of 
idiosyncratic volatilities is systematic.  Second, return dispersion will change if 
loadings are time-varying. Although Lewellen and Nagel (2006) find that betas 
vary over time with variables commonly used to measure business conditions 
such as term spread, they document that constant betas have similar 
explanatory power for the cross section of stock returns as time-varying betas, 
which suggests time-varying betas are unlikely to be an important driver of 
variation of return dispersion over time. Third, investors’ sentiment may cause 
asset market fluctuations, whereby alters return dispersion. Nevertheless, 
sentiment (such as that discussed by Baker and Wurgler (2006)) tends to move 
                                                          
6 We measure changes as the residuals from an AR(1) process estimated for the levels.  
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stocks in similar directions. Taken together, fluctuation of return dispersion 
likely reflects variation of uncertainty of the economy over time. 
Overall, the results suggest that return dispersion captures different kinds 
of macroeconomic and political uncertainty well. The latter is especially 
reassuring as recent studies on rare disasters and international political crises 
show that political uncertainty may be an important risk factor (see for instance, 
Berkman, Jacobsen and Lee, 2011). Furthermore, return dispersion (either 
measured in changes or levels) is strongly linked to cross-sectional stock 
returns in all countries. Stocks with higher sensitivities to return dispersion 
have higher average returns. I compare the return dispersion measure with 
implied volatility and find both measures respond differently to the proxies for 
different types of uncertainty. Return dispersion has a higher correlation with 
political uncertainty whereas, implied volatility seems stronger related to 
economic uncertainty. However, and somewhat surprisingly, I find no evidence 
that (levels or changes in) implied volatility correlate with the cross section of 
stock returns.  
In the empirical analysis, I focus on five aspects of uncertainty. First, I test 
whether return dispersion correlates with contractions and expansions of local 
and global business cycles using the business cycle data from Fushing, Chen, 
Berge, and Jordà (2010). The results confirm that in 11 out of 18 countries, 
return dispersion is significantly higher during local contractions.  However, 
once I include the global business cycle, results are stronger than for the local 
business cycle (even though on average a local business cycle effect persists). 
Return dispersion is significantly higher during global recessions in 13 
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countries. On average global recessions raise return dispersion by almost 50% 
(compared to expansions, assuming no local contractions) suggesting that 
international uncertainty might be more important than local uncertainty. To 
the best of my knowledge, this is a new finding.  
Second, I test whether return dispersion captures international political 
instability after controlling for business cycle effects. I use International Crisis 
Behaviour (ICB) database that counts the number of crises starting in a month, 
ongoing in a month and ending in a month. This database includes rare 
disasters in various types such as military incidents, diplomatic conflicts, 
economic pressures, and cultural problems. According to the rare disaster risk 
literature (see among others Barro (2006), Gabaix (2012), Rietz (1988), 
Wachter (2013)), stock market returns correlate strongly with changes in 
international crisis risk. One would expect that the start of a crisis may resolve 
uncertainty or increase it. However, one would expect ongoing crises, plausibly 
reflecting severity of issues and implications, likely to be associated with higher 
uncertainty, hence higher return dispersion. I test this hypothesis and find that 
international political uncertainty is an important contributing factor to return 
dispersion. The evidence for crises starts is indeed mixed although 
significantly positive when I pool the data, suggesting that the changed 
probability of a crisis raises uncertainty. During international political crises, 
return dispersion is statistically significantly in all but one of the countries I 
consider.  
Third, I assume that when general market uncertainty—regardless of the 
type of uncertainty or the reason for it—is higher, there are more media stories 
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mentioning words such as ‘uncertainty’ and ‘risk’. I consider this as general 
uncertainty captured by the media, and I test if return dispersion is higher 
during general uncertainty. Even though this may be a crude test, results 
suggest that return dispersion is significant and positively related to the 
number of news articles with these words being used in Bloomberg. After 
controlling for business cycles and international political crises effects, return 
dispersion is significantly higher in 11 out of 18 countries during months where 
there are more news articles with words like ‘uncertainty’ and ‘risk’. 
Fourth, return dispersion seems linked to country risk based on the widely 
used International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) data. This data set provides 
political, financial and economic risk ratings. Again, after controlling for the 
aforementioned factors, the composite ICRG rating (as a proxy for each 
country’s business and investment status) decreases return dispersion 
significantly in a number of countries.  
Fifth, I consider uncertainty that relates to fiscal, regulatory and monetary 
policies. Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2016) construct an US economic policy 
uncertainty index which is computed by counting the number of articles with 
policy related keywords in the leading newspapers. They further developed a 
global economic policy uncertainty index and several indices for other 
countries.7 I test if return dispersion is associated with both local and global 
economic policy uncertainty. Cross sectional return dispersion increases 
                                                          
7 The general media uncertainty measure captures all kinds of uncertainties such as firm operational 
uncertainty, environmental policy uncertainty, supply uncertainty etc. Whereas the index developed 
by Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2016) only focuses on uncertainties related to economic policies. The 
correlations between those two measures in all countries are not very high. For instance, the US 
economic policy uncertainty and media general uncertainty has a correlation of 0.57.   
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significantly during periods with high local economic policy uncertainty in 
Australia, Italy, Japan and US but not in France, Germany, Ireland, 
Netherlands, Spain and Sweden. Global economic policy uncertainty has 
strong and positive effect on return dispersion in seven out of eleven 
countries.8 
As return dispersion seems to capture different aspects of international 
uncertainty, return dispersion might be able to explain the cross-section of 
stock returns. If so, stocks that are more sensitive to return dispersion should 
offer higher returns. Jiang (2010) builds a model that includes return dispersion 
directly in the pricing kernel. Chichernea, Holder, and Petkevich (2015) use 
Jiang’s (2010) model to test the relation between return dispersion and the 
cross-sectional expected returns. Following those two papers and extending 
their US evidence, the results indicate a strong positive relation between high 
sensitive return dispersion stocks and stock returns in 18 countries, regardless 
whether I look at levels or changes in dispersion. The difference between 
stocks with the high sensitivity to return dispersion and the portfolios with low 
sensitivity to return dispersion is substantial (around 5% on average a month 
regardless whether I control for sensitivity to the market and other factors or 
not). The result holds for all 18 countries. Results are also highly significant 
                                                          
8 We also employ several economic forecast variables as proxies of uncertainty in the US. We find that 
the forecast dispersion of personal consumption expenditure, real non-residential investment growth, 
term spread and AAA ranked government bond yield are significantly and positively related to return 
dispersion. The forecast dispersion of personal consumption expenditure for current quarter accounts 
for more than one third of the variation in return dispersion. As we only have the economic forecast 
dispersion for the US market (data from the survey of professional forecasters provided by the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Philadelphia), we do not include those results in our main findings. For the US we also 
find a strong relation between macro uncertainty and financial uncertainty variables made available 
by Jurado, Ludvigson, and Ng (2015)   
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with an average t-value for the difference between the high-return dispersion 
portfolios minus the low return dispersion portfolios of 10.69, controlling for 
four risk factors (market, size, value and momentum). These t-values suggest 
that return dispersion easily passes the thresholds to account for datamining 
recently suggested by Harvey, Liu, and Zhu (2014).9   
Finally, I compare return dispersion with the implied volatility in seven 
countries for which implied volatility data are available. Implied volatility is 
comparable to return dispersion as this measure can also be observed in real 
time and at any frequency unlike many other risk measures and has also been 
considered in the literature (for instance, Beber and Brandt (2009) and Baker 
et al. (2016)). The results show that implied volatility also captures uncertainty 
associated with business cycles, political crises, general market uncertainty, 
country risk, and economic policy. However, both measures are associated 
differently with these uncertainty measures. Return dispersion tends to 
strongly reflect global business cycles and world crisis risk. It does so even 
after controlling for implied volatility. Implied volatility significantly captures the 
global economic policy uncertainty in all six countries (for which I have 
economic policy and implied volatility data) but return dispersion does not.  
This chapter makes the following contributions to the existing literature. 
First, I find that using international evidence in 18 countries that cross sectional 
return dispersion correlates strongly with (new) measures of general, macro 
and political proxies of uncertainty. Second, I link return dispersion to all sorts 
                                                          
9 They argue that many previously documented factors may not pass statistical significance tests 
once we take data mining into account and that we should use t-values cut-offs of 3 or higher. 
100 
 
of proxies of macroeconomic and political uncertainty that have not been 
considered in the literature before. For instance, establishing a link between 
the international political crisis and return dispersion, provides further empirical 
support for theoretical models that allow for time-varying rare disaster risk 
(Barro, 2006; Gabaix, 2012; Rietz, 1988; Wachter, 2013). The evidence 
indicates that cross sectional return dispersion differs from implied volatility as 
it captures political uncertainty better. Implied volatility seems to perform better 
capturing economic uncertainty. Third, I propose return dispersion to be a very 
useful measure for uncertainty especially for practitioners. Investors can track 
the financial market by observing return dispersion at any point of time and 
make decisions based on the levels of it. Four, I also consider international 
cross-sectional evidence and find that cross sectional return dispersion (both 
levels and changes) correlate with the cross section of returns internationally 
whereas, surprisingly, implied volatility (both levels and changes) does not.  
In sum, the international comparison indicates that cross sectional return 
dispersion (based on a limited number of 50 stocks) is useful, simple and a 
real time proxy to gauge uncertainty in several countries. While it may not be 
perfect, it is easy to calculate and may be valuable to investors and regulators 
who continuously monitor financial markets and different economies.   
3.2 A short literature review 
The financial crisis during 2007-2008 period and its subsequent prolonged 
recovery brings the topic of macroeconomic uncertainty back to the table. The 
literature suggests several proxies of uncertainty and among these, volatility is 
the most popular one. However, Gorman, Sapra, and Weigand (2010) suggest 
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that the cross-sectional variation of equity returns may be a more relevant way 
to measure risk rather than time-series volatility. Jiang’s (2010) results are 
consistent with the notion that return dispersion can be considered to be a 
macro state variable which can be used to capture the risk contained in both 
business cycle fluctuations and macroeconomic restructuring.  
3.2.1 Measuring macroeconomic uncertainty  
Knight (1921) distinguishes uncertainty from risk and defines uncertainty 
as a situation of not having ability to forecast the existing or future outcomes. 
The literature provides ample evidence of the negative effects that policy 
uncertainty has on the economy. For instance, economic policy uncertainty 
affects stock prices (Pastor and Veronesi, 2012), economic activities (Baker, 
Bloom, and Davis, 2013). Bloom, Floetotto, Jaimovich, Saporta-Eksten, and 
Terry (2012) find that uncertainty is strongly countercyclical at both the 
aggregate and the industry-level. They find that uncertainty shocks drive 
business cycles. 
Therefore, it is important to measure uncertainty. Stock market volatility is 
a traditional measure that is commonly used. However, in a recent work, Cesa-
Bianchi et al. (2014) explore the role of volatility on measuring economic 
uncertainty over 33 countries. They find that volatility significantly leads 
business cycles. However, volatility shocks have no or little direct effect on real 
GDP. They suggest that volatility might be more a result rather than a cause 
of economic uncertainty.  
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Baker et al. (2016) develop a relatively new measure of economic policy 
uncertainty (EPU). They count the frequency of articles that refer to economy 
uncertainty and use it to build a news-based EPU index. Baker et al. (2016) 
test their EPU index and find that it captures policy related economic 
uncertainty well over time. Other studies propose other proxies of EPU (e.g., 
Baker et al., 2013; Bali et al., 2016; Wang et al., 2015). Baker and Bloom (2013) 
list five proxies for uncertainty including stock index volatility, the cross-firm 
stock returns spread, bond yields volatility, exchange rate volatility and GDP 
forecast disagreement. Bali and Zhou (2016) consider the market variance risk 
premium (VRP) as a proxy for economic uncertainty. They find that the 
variance risk premium is strongly correlated with all the other sets of proxies 
including conditional variance of US output growth, the conditional variance of 
Chicago Fed National Activity Index (CFNAI), extreme downside risk in time-
series and in cross-sectional financial firms’ returns, the credit default swap 
(CDS) index, and the aggregate measure of investors’ disagreement. 
Additionally, Wang, Zhang, Diao, and Wu (2015) use the changes in 23 
commodity prices to predict EPU. Bekaert, Engstrom, and Xing (2009) 
measure economic uncertainty by the conditional volatility of dividend growth. 
Last but not least, Jurado, Ludvigson, and Ng (2015) suggest several 
promising new measures of uncertainty based on aggregated volatility of 
individual macro-economic and financial series in the US.  
3.2.2 Return dispersion  
In the literature, there is an increasing focus on the cross sectional return 
dispersion as a measure of uncertainty. Theoretically, Christie and Huang 
103 
 
(1995) find that, return dispersion will increase during market stress according 
to the rational asset pricing models, as individual assets have different 
sensitivities to market returns. In the US market, they find that return dispersion 
is higher during periods of large return changes. Recently, Angelidis, Sakkas, 
and Tessaromatis (2015) show that return dispersion is able to predict the 
business cycles, business conditions and unemployment rates. A higher world 
dispersion over the last three months indicates a higher probability that the 
economy is currently in recession. 
The literature suggests that return dispersion is closely linked to 
macroeconomic uncertainty. Loungani et al. (1990) find that return dispersion 
predicts high unemployment rates. A higher cross-industry dispersion in stock 
price growth leads to higher unemployment. This evidence conforms to the 
sectoral shifts hypothesis that higher dispersion of inter-sectoral shifts leads to 
higher unemployment by raising the required labour reallocation. Gomes et al. 
(2003) and Zhang (2005) formally establish the theoretical link between return 
dispersion and the state of the aggregate economy. Gomes et al. (2003) 
present a general equilibrium model where the conditional capital asset pricing 
model holds, where firm betas vary with the market state, and where firm betas 
are related to a firm’s size and book-to-market ratio. Given that firm betas 
cannot be measured perfectly in practice, a firm’s size and book-to-market 
ratio are likely to contain incremental information about the cross-sectional 
variation in mean returns, their model suggests that return dispersion may 
contain incremental information about the current state of the economy, 
beyond market-level returns. Zhang (2005) extends Gomes, Kogan and 
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Zhang’s (2003) framework and features costly reversibility of capital 
investment, the countercyclical price of risk, and variation in the level of growth 
options across firms. His framework predicts that some seemingly idiosyncratic 
risk variables, for example, the average stock return variance, can affect firm-
level systematic risk and expected returns because they can be used in 
predicting the future evolution of the output price. Zhang (2005) suggests that 
the market’s cross-sectional stock return volatility may be positively related to 
the future industry cost of capital, based on simulation data.  
Empirically, Loungani et al. (1991) find that return dispersion is associated 
with the business cycle. Jiang (2010) illustrates that time-varying return 
dispersion is able to capture economic restructuring, uncertainty shocks and 
business cycles. Jiang (2010) shows that periods during major technology 
shocks result in extremely high return dispersion. Grobys and Kolari (2015) 
use return dispersion to test whether changes in economic states would 
influence asset pricing anomalies. Last but not least, Bekaert and Harvey 
(2000) use return dispersion as a control variable for stock market integration. 
They suggest that when an economy becomes more developed, reliance on 
particular sectors would decrease and thus, increase cross sectional return 
dispersion. 
3.2.3 Return dispersion and the cross section of returns 
Jiang (2010) considers return dispersion as a risk factor that plays an 
essential role in capturing the cross-sectional variation in expected returns. 
Stocks which are more sensitive to return dispersion tend to have higher 
returns. Demirer and Jategaonkar (2013) expand Jiang’s (2010) study and 
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illustrate a systematic conditional relation between return dispersion and cross 
section of stock returns. Generally speaking, the higher the sensitivity of a 
stock to return dispersion, the higher its average return is. However, the 
premium on return dispersion disappears when the market faces large losses. 
Chen, Demirer, and Jategaonkar (2015) extend Jiang’s (2010) work and find 
similar evidence in the Chinese market. Chang, Cheng, and Khorana (2000) 
examine the relationship between equity return dispersions and market returns 
internationally. They find that the return dispersions increase linearly in the US, 
Japan and Hong Kong when the prices move extremely high or low. However, 
in the South Korea and Taiwan, they find smaller return dispersion during 
periods of extreme price movements. In this chapter, I extend international 
evidence to 18 countries and all of them suggesting that more return dispersion 
sensitive stocks generate higher returns.  
Return dispersion also seems related to asset pricing factors. Conrad and 
Kaul (1998) find that the profitability of a momentum strategy can be attributed 
to return dispersion. Bhootra (2011) confirms their result that return dispersion 
is a potential source of momentum profit. Connolly and Stivers (2003) link 
return dispersion with return momentum and reversal. Weeks with extremely 
high (low) dispersion are followed by a momentum (reversal) in weekly equity-
index returns. Stivers and Sun (2010) suggest that return dispersion is 
positively related to subsequent value premiums and negatively related to 
subsequent momentum premiums. These intertemporal relations remain 
strong even after controlling for a wide range of state variables include the 
dividend yield, the default yield spread, the term yield spread and the short-
106 
 
term treasury yield. Kim (2012) expands their results and shows that return 
dispersion has predictive power for the value premium in emerging countries 
but not in developed countries. Chichernea et al. (2015) find that return 
dispersion provides a risk-based explanation to accrual and investment 
anomalies. After 2008, low accrual and low-investment portfolios seem to get 
a high risk premium as a compensation for the increased risk as measured by 
return dispersion.  
3.2.4 Return dispersion and other risk measures 
According to Jiang (2010) return dispersion relates to two dimensions of 
risk. One is related to business cycles and the other is related to fundamental 
economic restructuring. Return dispersion seems to be a better risk factor than 
time-series volatility (Gorman et al., 2010) (Jiang, 2010). Stivers (2003) and 
Connolly and Stivers (2006) show that return dispersion conveys information 
about future volatility, and Stivers (2003) shows that firm return dispersion is 
positively related to future market volatility in the US. Connolly and Stivers 
(2006) suggest that return dispersion is positively associated with both firm-
level and portfolio-level future return volatilities. Angelidis et al. (2015) find that 
return dispersion is a good predictor of changes in market volatility. There is a 
positive and significant relation between world return dispersion and world 
market volatility. Gomes et al. (2003) confirm their results by showing that 
return dispersion has significant explanatory power for future aggregate return 
volatility even after controlling for the market returns.  
Return dispersion is also related to idiosyncratic volatility. For instance, 
Garcia, Mantilla-Garcia, and Martellini (2014) use the cross-sectional variation 
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of stock returns as a measure of aggregate idiosyncratic volatility. Garcia et al. 
(2014) suggest that return dispersion is a consistent and asymptotically 
efficient proxy for idiosyncratic volatility. Additionally, de Silva, Sapra, and 
Thorley (2001) indicate that return dispersion is a function of stocks’ cross-
sectional variation in their sensitivity to market changes and the general level 
of idiosyncratic risk. Bloom (2014) shows graphically that five uncertainty 
measures, namely cross-firm daily stock return dispersion, stock index daily 
returns volatility, sovereign bond yields daily volatility, exchange rate daily 
volatility and GDP forecast disagreement, have similar negative relations with 
annual GDP growth for 60 developing and developed countries over the period 
1970 to 2012. Overall, there lacks a comparison between return dispersion 
and implied volatility.  
3.3 Data 
I obtain the return data from Compustat Global for all countries except for 
the US where I use Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) stock return 
files. As noted before return dispersion is simply the cross sectional standard 




∑ (𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑀,𝑡)2
𝑛
𝑖=1                                                                              (3.1)                                                                                                            
where 𝑅𝐷𝑡 is the return dispersion at time t, N is the number of stocks 
included, 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the return of individual stock i at time t, and 𝑅𝑀,𝑡 is the mean 
return of those N stocks at time t.10  
                                                          
10 Note, that we assume for simplicity no predictability in the underlying variables. As noted by 
Jurado, Ludvigson, and Ng (2015) as an uncertainty measure it could be improved upon by taking the 
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Although it is desirable to have a long series and a large number of 
countries, I am constrained by the quality of the data. Thus I restrict my 
analysis to countries for which I can find reliable business cycle data and for 
which I can obtain a considerable degree of dispersion. I use the international 
business cycle data derived by Fushing et al. (2010). An advantage is that their 
methodology also allows for the creation of global business cycles, so I can 
test whether the source of uncertainty may be global or local. As a result, the 
data period for all the countries starts from January 1986 to December 2013.  
These criteria lead to return dispersions and business cycles jointly for 18 
countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. For some countries, 
longer series are possible based on the constituents of the main indices in 
those countries and I use these as a robustness test in the analysis (I report 
those results in the Appendix C) This set consists of market indices for seven 
countries: Australia, Finland, France, Germany, Japan, Switzerland and the 
United States. These time series have at least 300 return dispersion 
observations based on all constituents of the main indices in these countries. 
I consider returns at a monthly frequency as these tend to be less noisy than 
high frequency data and many of the other variables are only available at 
                                                          
predictability of the mean returns into account but that would open a discussion which variables to 
use as predictors and deviate from our requirement that the measure should be simple and easy to 
understand.   
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monthly frequency but return dispersion can of course be measured at higher 
frequencies.   
The first thing I want to establish is whether the return dispersion of the 50 
largest (market capitalization) stocks might be a good proxy for the more 
general market. Table 3-1 compares the basic characteristics for the full 
market return dispersion and return dispersion of the 50 largest firms. The last 
column contains the correlations between these two measures in each country. 
Generally, correlations tend to be very high ranging from 0.56 to 0.98. (I do not 
have a full return dispersion index for Ireland). Using the US stock market as 
an example, Figure 3-1 shows that cross sectional return dispersion of all 
available stocks and cross sectional return dispersion of the top 50 stocks are 
closely linked.11 They peak at almost the same time all the way through with 
only a difference in magnitude. Unfortunately, it is hard to say which one would 
be the most accurate measure. As noted in the introduction, it is well-known 
(Lo and MacKinlay, 1990) that small stocks lag stocks of larger firms. If the full 
market is made up of a large number of stocks this may cause return 
dispersion of the full index to respond with a delay and essentially introduce 
noise. Still, differences are small and I focus on the return dispersion (𝑅𝐷𝑡) of 
50 largest firms (N=50) in every country.12 The advantage is that these series 
are relatively easy to replicate. This is not only useful from an academic point 
of view but might also make its use easier for practitioners to implement these 
                                                          
11 The US market could be a conservative benchmark as Bekaert and Harvey (2000) suggest that 
return dispersion of the top 50 stocks will be less representative of all stocks for more developed 
markets than for less developed markets.  
12 Connolly and Stivers (2003) also use large-firm portfolio (largest size-based decile portfolio) in 
calculating return dispersion as small firms add disruption because of high idiosyncratic volatility. 
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measures. Hence, from now on the analysis focuses on the cross-sectional 
return dispersion measure for the 50 largest stocks.  
For the return dispersion of 50 largest stocks the mean values of the return 
dispersion series range from 5.68 percent to 10.61 percent and the median 
values are a bit lower from 5.12 percent to 9.21 percent. The US market has 
the lowest mean and median return dispersion. All the distributions show 
positive skewness and are leptokurtic. I reject the null hypothesis that return 
dispersion series follow normal distribution for all countries.  
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Table 3-1 Descriptive Statistics 
This table reports the basic statistics (mean, median, max, min, standard deviation, skewness and kurtosis) of return dispersion made 
by 50 largest market capitalization stocks (RD 50) and return dispersion of all stocks (RD all). The return dispersion is calculated as the 
cross-sectional standard deviation of stock returns at time t. Both return dispersion series are computed from January 1986 to December 
2013. I report the correlation between those two measures in the last column. The mean, median, maximum and minimum values are in 
percentage.  
 
Mean Median Max Min Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Obs 
Corre

































Australia 7.16 11.39 6.27 10.79 30.10 32.22 1.96 5.27 0.03 0.03 3.51 1.76 19.80 8.93 336 300 0.56 
Austria 8.57 7.94 7.78 7.01 33.53 28.18 2.25 3.33 0.04 0.04 2.34 2.20 11.56 9.73 336 253 0.65 
Belgium  6.86 6.77 6.13 5.70 28.59 36.86 1.82 1.85 0.03 0.04 2.32 3.06 11.92 19.24 336 276 0.84 
Denmark 8.14 7.80 7.30 6.77 41.11 26.66 3.93 2.99 0.04 0.04 3.54 2.15 25.05 9.37 336 290 0.76 
Finland 8.92 8.50 8.07 7.64 27.70 56.37 3.15 1.63 0.03 0.05 1.51 4.05 6.68 33.48 336 308 0.81 
France  6.80 6.77 6.11 6.12 20.21 19.15 1.44 2.64 0.03 0.03 1.86 1.88 8.29 7.73 336 312 0.93 
Germany 6.97 6.48 6.16 5.73 26.48 28.46 1.40 2.69 0.03 0.03 2.21 2.43 10.75 12.80 336 305 0.91 
Ireland 10.61 - 9.21 - 41.04 - 3.56 - 0.05 - 1.96 - 8.37 - 336 0 - 
Italy 7.43 7.02 6.77 6.41 44.83 17.66 3.31 3.22 0.03 0.03 5.02 1.28 53.08 4.73 336 196 0.58 
Japan 7.43 7.98 6.58 7.53 25.35 17.60 2.98 3.24 0.03 0.03 1.89 0.79 7.80 3.60 336 336 0.78 
Netherlands 7.65 8.93 6.64 6.99 40.13 58.21 1.59 2.65 0.04 0.06 3.18 3.52 20.04 22.61 336 238 0.70 
Norway 9.96 11.24 8.91 9.81 42.86 38.06 1.71 4.47 0.04 0.06 2.54 2.21 14.82 9.05 336 158 0.84 
New 
Zealand 
9.10 6.73 7.91 6.09 32.80 20.67 2.60 3.55 
0.04 
0.03 
2.09 2.32 9.37 10.85 336 
126 
0.83 
Spain 7.85 7.23 6.84 6.39 65.08 26.84 1.43 2.71 0.05 0.03 6.31 1.85 73.13 9.33 336 300 0.72 
Sweden 7.49 6.91 6.89 6.04 23.48 20.79 1.80 3.02 0.03 0.03 1.56 2.08 6.95 8.41 336 93 0.84 
              (continued next page) 
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(Table 3-1 continued)                 
Switzerland 6.80 6.41 6.11 5.75 36.60 18.41 1.89 1.94 0.03 0.03 3.79 1.58 30.53 6.26 336 306 0.76 
UK 6.66 7.47 5.84 6.33 21.00 19.73 1.34 4.06 0.03 0.03 1.84 2.03 7.26 7.36 336 67 0.98 
US 5.68 8.59 5.12 7.72 24.57 22.85 2.09 4.79 0.02 0.03 2.56 1.70 13.86 6.37 336 330 0.79 
 
Figure 3-1 Return Dispersion of All Stocks Versus Return Dispersion of the Largest 50 Stocks in the US 
Figure 3-1 plots two return dispersion indices in the US stock market. The dashed line (RDUSA) is the return dispersion made by all 











3.4 Return dispersion and macro economy 
As a first eyeball test whether return dispersion is linked to 
macroeconomic uncertainty Figure 3-2 plots the monthly return dispersion of 
the US largest 50 stocks from January 1986 to December 2013. The graph 
shows how return dispersion increases during periods of macroeconomic 
news shocks, political events and stock market downturns. The shaded 
periods are NBER recessions. The US return dispersion spikes during major 
events such as the Gulf Wars and the Russian financial crisis, the Dot-com 
Bubble, the Bush Election, 9/11, Lehman brother’s bankruptcy and the 
following crisis of 2008.  
 
Figure 3-2 Return Dispersion in the US and Events 
Figure 3-2 plots the return dispersion of the largest 50 US stocks from January 1986 





3.4.1 Business cycles 
Does return dispersion vary over the business cycle in all countries as in 
the US? If so, it should be significantly higher during recessions. Based on the 
international business cycle data of Fushing et al. (2010), I create dummy 
variables for both the country specific local business cycle and the global 
business cycle (1= recession, 0 = expansion). I first regress return dispersion 
series on the country specific business cycle variable alone as shown in 
equation (3.2):  
𝑅𝐷𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐵𝐶_𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡                                                                                  (3.2)                                                                                                                    
where 𝐵𝐶_𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑡 is the dummy variable for local business cycle (1= recession, 
0 = expansion). Then I include the global business cycle 𝐵𝐶_𝑔𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑡 as well in 
the second regression (equation 3.3): 
𝑅𝐷𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐵𝐶_𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐵𝐶_𝑔𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡                                                          (3.3) 
For both regressions, the data end in September 2009 because the 
(international) business cycle data I use end in that year. Table 3-2 and 3-3 
contain these results. Considering only the local business cycle, the 
international evidence confirms to some extent the earlier US result that, the 
local business cycle is indeed important. Generally, return dispersion is higher 
during recessions. In thirteen out of eighteen countries return dispersion is 
significantly higher during recessions. However, many countries do not show 
as strong an effect as in the US where return dispersion is on average fifty 
percent higher (9.35 percent versus 6.13 percent in expansions). Also, return 
dispersion in Ireland, the Netherlands and Switzerland is more than 50 percent 
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higher during recessions. However, return dispersion in Japan is only about 10 
percent higher. On average, I find that for other countries, the difference is 
around 27 percent (9.74 percent versus 7.65 percent).  
 
Table 3-2 Return Dispersion over Local Business Cycles 
This table reports the results of the univariate regressions of 𝑅𝐷𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐵𝐶_𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑡 +
𝜀𝑡, where 𝑅𝐷𝑡 is the return dispersion of the largest 50 market capitalization stocks at 
time t. Local BC is a dummy variable that equals one if the country is in recession and 
zero otherwise. System shows the results of pooled OLS and Sur shows the results 
of seemingly unrelated regression. I use robust standard errors. Coefficients are in 
percentage.  
 
  constant t-value local BC t-value Adjusted R2 
Australia 7.26 33.43 1.50 1.76 0.01 
Austria 8.29 38.17 3.59 3.75 0.09 
Belgium  6.59 34.16 1.06 1.72 0.01 
Denmark 7.96 38.84 0.77 1.22 0.00 
Finland 8.86 40.12 3.30 6.15 0.08 
France  6.33 34.85 1.81 5.51 0.10 
Germany 6.99 41.84 2.17 1.52 0.03 
Ireland 9.42 30.35 5.10 5.49 0.14 
Italy 7.25 34.13 1.72 2.90 0.02 
Japan 7.43 31.37 0.86 1.92 0.01 
Netherlands 7.00 38.42 4.20 4.83 0.16 
Norway 10.10 37.24 2.63 2.79 0.03 
New Zealand 9.59 36.14 -0.40 -0.46 0.00 
Spain 7.47 35.84 2.24 3.62 0.05 
Sweden 7.89 38.92 -0.29 -0.73 0.00 
Switzerland 6.51 45.73 3.55 4.33 0.16 
UK 6.64 36.77 0.65 1.33 0.01 
US 6.13 39.89 3.23 5.74 0.16 
      
System   1.98 12.82  








However, things change quite dramatically once return dispersion can 
fluctuate with the global business cycle as well. Table 3-3 reports results for 
both local and global business cycles. The local business cycle is still 
significant in 12 out of 18 countries but the size of the effect becomes much 
smaller compared to including the local business cycle only. 
Given its significance level and the size of the coefficient, return dispersion 
is significantly higher (at the 10 percent level) during global recessions in 15 
out of 18 countries. The size of the effect is large. On average a global 
recession seems to raise the return dispersion by almost 50% (11.05 percent 
versus 7.52 percent in expansions, assuming no local recession) and the effect 
of return dispersion is approximately 16 percent higher on average in a local 
recession (8.69 percent versus 7.52 percent in expansions assuming no global 
recession). Interestingly, these results also hold for the US. Return dispersion 
in the US seems to be associated more with global economic conditions than 
with economic conditions in the US only. In fact, once I control for global 
recessions, the US is one of the countries where local effects are – although 
still statistically significant, substantially reduced in economic terms as shown 
by the drop in the coefficient. Of course, part of this is caused because of the 
high correlations between some local country recessions and the global 
recession dummy (correlations range from -0.01 for New Zealand to 0.82 for 
the US (I report the correlations of variables in Appendix A1)). The higher 
return dispersion is associated with the global dummy rather than the local 
dummy in almost all regressions. Pooling the data and estimate it either as a 
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seemingly unrelated regression or as a system gives similar results. The local 
business cycle is significant but the global factor seems to weigh more heavily.  
 
Table 3-3 Return Dispersion over Local and Global Business Cycles 
This table reports the coefficients estimates and t-statistics of the regression in the 
form of 𝑅𝐷𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝐵𝐶𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑔𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙 𝐵𝐶𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡, where 𝑅𝐷𝑡 is the return dispersion 
of the largest 50 market capitalization stocks at time t, 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝐵𝐶𝑡 and 𝑔𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙 𝐵𝐶𝑡 are 
the contemporaneous dummy variable for business cycle (1= recession, 0 = 
expansion) in local country and global respectively. System shows the results of 
pooled OLS and Sur shows the results of seemingly unrelated regression. I use robust 
















Australia 7.05 32.46 0.46 0.72 3.99 3.88 0.09 
Austria 8.10 36.99 2.01 2.85 5.04 4.03 0.18 
Belgium  6.31 33.44 0.17 0.41 5.72 5.54 0.22 
Denmark 7.63 35.38 0.11 0.24 6.72 4.29 0.21 
Finland 8.71 41.55 2.45 3.78 3.10 2.96 0.12 
France  6.30 35.35 1.44 4.16 2.01 3.12 0.13 
Germany 6.69 42.45 -0.13 -0.14 5.80 6.07 0.24 
Ireland 9.28 29.23 3.75 4.80 5.34 3.38 0.19 
Italy 7.18 32.89 1.20 2.01 1.42 2.58 0.02 
Japan 7.36 31.46 0.01 0.03 3.04 4.56 0.05 
Netherlands 6.97 37.79 3.76 3.55 1.47 1.33 0.17 
Norway 9.88 35.79 2.06 2.36 3.44 3.50 0.06 
New 
Zealand 9.54 34.28 -0.41 -0.47 0.68 0.96 0.00 
Spain 7.43 35.22 1.58 2.84 1.70 2.01 0.06 
Sweden 7.70 38.35 -0.74 -2.14 3.62 6.19 0.10 
Switzerland 6.51 45.65 3.04 1.98 0.98 0.59 0.16 
UK 6.51 35.81 -0.63 -2.01 5.45 6.01 0.21 
US 6.13 39.82 1.01 2.03 4.15 4.85 0.24 
        
System   0.86 6.00 3.82 19.05  





3.4.2 International political crises 
Would return dispersion also be affected by international political 
uncertainty? According to the recent literature on rare disaster risk it should be. 
This literature introduced by Rietz (1988) and made popular by Barro (2006) 
suggests that rare disaster risk may be an important factor driving the equity 
premium. Indeed, empirical evidence by Berkman et al. (2011) suggests that 
the changes in the likelihood of international political crises have a strong 
impact on stock market returns. They find that stock market returns go down 
significantly at the start of perceived international crises based on the well-
known International Crisis Behaviour (ICB) database. In this study, I also utilize 
the ICB dataset that records 476 crises from 1918 to 2015. A detailed 
discussion of the dataset can be found in Brecher and Wilkenfeld (1997) and 
they consider crisis as perceived changes in the probability of threat. Overall, 
The ICB dataset consists different types of disaster events such as military 
incidents, diplomatic conflicts, economic pressures, and cultural problems. 
Examples of crises are Panama Crisis, Israeli and Hizbullah forces in the 
Operation Accountability Crisis, North Korea Nuclear Crisis, Syria Chemical 
Weapons etc.  
While return dispersion does not necessarily increase when a crisis starts 
(all stocks may go down together), it seems likely that ongoing international 
political crises raise uncertainty that may only go down when crises end. 
Although the end of crises effects might be less clear as 1) the end of a crisis 
in the ICB database may be easier to anticipate, and 2) while the end of crisis 
may reduce uncertainty it might also fuel uncertainty about the future.  
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I test this hypothesis using the international crises variables introduced by 
Berkman et al. (2011), which I extend to December 2013. In line with their 
approach, I use the variables that denote the number of crises starting in a 
month (start), ongoing crises in a month (during) and a variable indicating the 
number of crises ending (end). I also use their World Crisis Index (also 
constructed from the ICB database) which takes into account crisis severity, 
with more serious crises getting a stronger weight.13 This may be a better 
proxy for actual perceived crisis risk. (I report the results where I just rely on 
the number of crises in the appendix A2).  
Table 3-4 presents the descriptive statistics of the world crises variables 
and world crises index (WCI). The data range from January 1986 to December 
2013. The number of ongoing crisis is 1.46 a month on average. The means 











                                                          
13 The world crises index sums up six dummy variables that capture six dimensions of the severity of 
a crisis. Each dummy variable equals 1 if the crisis started with violence, if violence is used during the 
crisis, if it is a full-scale war, if there is severe value threat, if the crisis is part of a protracted conflict, 
and if superpower is involved in the crisis. The WCI index ranges from zero to six.  
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Table 3-4 Basic Statistics of International Political Crisis Data 
This table reports the summary statistics for the international political crisis data from 
January 1986 to December 2013. Data is from the International Crisis Behaviour 
project (ICB) database. WORLD_S, WORLD_D and WORLD_E represent the 
number of world crisis starting, during and ending in a month. I also use their World 
Crisis Index (also constructed from the ICB database) which takes into account crisis 
severity, with more serious crises getting a stronger weight. WCI_Start, WCI_During 














 Mean 0.33 1.46 0.33 1.02 4.81 1.04 
 Median 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 4.00 0.00 
 Maximum 3.00 5.00 3.00 12.00 20.00 11.00 
 Minimum 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 Std. Dev. 0.57 1.11 0.61 1.98 4.01 2.02 
 Skewness 1.73 0.42 1.88 2.42 0.62 2.09 
 Kurtosis 5.98 2.67 6.32 9.85 2.75 7.11 
 Observations 336 336 336 336 336 336 
 
 
I control the effect of both local and global business cycle and add three 
variables to equation (3.3) The first variable measures the WCI of crises 
starting in that month, (𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡_𝑊𝐶𝐼𝑡) the second one the WCI for ongoing crises 
during month t (𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔_𝑊𝐶𝐼𝑡) and the last variable the WCI of crises ending 
in month t (𝐸𝑛𝑑_𝑊𝐶𝐼𝑡). 
𝑅𝐷𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐵𝐶_𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐵𝐶_𝑔𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡_𝑊𝐶𝐼𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔_𝑊𝐶𝐼𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝐸𝑛𝑑_𝑊𝐶𝐼𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡                                                                                (3.4) 
Table 3-5 shows the estimation results for international political crises. 
Return dispersion is higher during times of crises. In all but four countries the 
effect is significant. The crisis index has a mean of 4.81 per month. This means 
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that on average during international political crises return dispersion is around 
10 percent higher. There also seems to be a start of a crisis effect although 
less strong (significant in six out of the 18 countries). If I pool the data in a 
system, the overall effect also indicates significance. Crises start adds another 
two percent to return dispersion. The end of crises does not seem to add 
significantly to return dispersion.  
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Table 3-5 Return Dispersion and International Political Crises 
Table 3-5 provides the results of return dispersion regress on world crisis index with the control of business cycle in each country (𝑅𝐷𝑡 =
𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐵𝐶_𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐵𝐶_𝑔𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡_𝑊𝐶𝐼𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔_𝑊𝐶𝐼𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐸𝑛𝑑_𝑊𝐶𝐼𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 ). 𝑅𝐷𝑡  is the return dispersion of the largest 50 
market capitalization stocks in each country at time t. 𝐵𝐶_𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑡 and 𝐵𝐶_𝑔𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑡 are the dummy variables for business cycle (1= recession, 
0 = expansion) in local country and global respectively. 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡_𝑊𝐶𝐼𝑡, 𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔_𝑊𝐶𝐼𝑡 and 𝐸𝑛𝑑_𝑊𝐶𝐼𝑡 are ongoing crisis starting at month t, 
during month t and ending at month t. System shows the results of pooled OLS and Sur shows the results of seemingly unrelated 




























Australia 6.49 21.71 0.46 0.69 4.23 4.15 0.18 1.65 0.06 1.03 0.07 0.87 0.10 
Austria 8.10 22.54 2.00 2.74 5.05 4.06 -0.05 -0.54 -0.02 -0.38 0.13 0.84 0.18 
Belgium  5.93 17.68 0.21 0.50 5.85 5.64 0.07 0.81 0.04 1.10 0.06 0.71 0.22 
Denmark 6.99 28.67 0.16 0.36 6.86 4.40 0.06 0.70 0.14 3.63 -0.16 -2.41 0.24 
Finland 7.08 22.15 2.24 3.47 3.66 3.45 0.14 1.74 0.29 6.29 -0.01 -0.12 0.22 
France  5.57 28.38 1.19 3.31 2.40 3.59 0.10 1.13 0.13 3.57 0.02 0.18 0.16 
Germany 6.33 28.01 -0.19 -0.19 5.94 6.20 0.10 1.16 0.05 1.67 -0.03 -0.29 0.24 
Ireland 7.95 17.32 3.91 4.96 5.66 3.50 0.25 1.38 0.22 3.17 -0.11 -0.90 0.22 
Italy 6.79 16.47 1.01 1.69 1.59 2.69 -0.04 -0.44 0.08 1.35 0.05 0.52 0.02 
Japan 6.35 20.43 -0.04 -0.08 3.39 5.15 0.15 1.44 0.16 3.22 0.00 -0.02 0.08 
Netherland
s 6.34 19.27 3.58 3.33 1.78 1.58 0.15 1.23 0.12 2.50 -0.12 -1.08 0.18 
Norway 9.03 17.52 1.99 2.20 3.69 3.65 0.10 0.77 0.16 2.49 -0.09 -0.87 0.08 
New 
Zealand 8.00 16.11 -0.26 -0.30 1.18 1.65 0.29 1.70 0.23 4.00 -0.01 -0.13 0.05 
Spain 5.89 22.98 1.13 2.08 2.61 2.97 0.39 3.47 0.17 3.90 0.23 1.97 0.16 
123 
 
Sweden 6.02 24.49 -0.52 -1.62 4.08 6.79 0.22 1.95 0.24 6.42 0.11 1.18 0.23 
Switzerland 5.91 24.29 3.08 2.02 1.13 0.69 0.02 0.23 0.09 2.26 0.09 0.97 0.17 
UK 5.87 24.66 -0.48 -1.57 5.56 6.21 0.20 2.48 0.12 3.70 -0.19 -2.87 0.26 
US 5.33 31.70 0.89 1.79 4.47 5.24 0.00 -0.05 0.15 4.47 0.01 0.15 0.28 
 
             
System 
  








3.4.3 Uncertainty around the world 
In order to cover all kinds of uncertainty, I consider another proxy. I 
assume that the word ‘risk’ and ‘uncertainty’ will occur more frequently in 
months with higher perceived risk and uncertainty of any kind. I consider it as 
market general uncertainty which would be caused by any type of event. I then 
test whether return dispersion captures this general uncertainty. This has the 
advantage that I can use it for all 18 countries. I count the number of 
Bloomberg reports in every month that contains these two words and add in 
turn one of these two variables to the regressions. In both cases, I take the log 
as the number of news articles seems to have grown exponentially over time. 
14 I use this word count uncertainty as an explanatory variable with the control 
variable of business cycles and world crisis index as below: 
𝑅𝐷𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐵𝐶_𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐵𝐶_𝑔𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡_𝑊𝐶𝐼𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔_𝑊𝐶𝐼𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝐸𝑛𝑑_𝑊𝐶𝐼𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑑𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡                                            (3.5) 
 Table 3-6 contains the results for the word ‘Uncertainty’ (as results are 
similar for the word “risk” these are in the Appendix A3). Particularly for the US 
results are with a t-value of over 7 highly significant and of the expected sign. 
In months when the use of the word ‘uncertainty’ is high, return dispersion 
tends to dramatically increase. Maybe not surprising because Bloomberg 
originates from the US. In many other countries, I find a positive significant 
effect as well, with the exception of Australia, New Zealand and Spain where, 
                                                          
14 We also use another method of counting articles: We count the number of articles that contain 
the word “uncertain” and divide by the number of all articles. As these results are qualitatively 




the word count for uncertainty seems significantly negative. Overall the effect 
is however significantly positive. The uncertainty effect is positively significant 
in 11 out of 18 countries. 
3.4.4 International country risk 
I further include the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) risk ratings 
as a proxy for country-level uncertainty. ICRG provides rating regarding 
country’s political, economic and financial risk every month. I use the 
Composite Risk Rating which including twelve political risk components, five 
financial risk components, and five economic risk components. The data 
ranges from 65 to 96. I test if return dispersion captures the movement of 
country risk. I add the ICRG composite risk index as an uncertainty measure 
as shown in equation (6): 
𝑅𝐷𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐵𝐶_𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐵𝐶_𝑔𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡_𝑊𝐶𝐼𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔_𝑊𝐶𝐼𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝐸𝑛𝑑_𝑊𝐶𝐼𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑑𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦_𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡      (3.6) 
Table 3-7 shows the regression results. The overall effect of individual 
country risk on return dispersion seems to be negative. However, in France, 





Table 3-6 Return Dispersion and Word Count Uncertainty 
Table 3-6 reports the regression of return dispersion on word count uncertainty around the world. I count the number of Bloomberg reports in every 
month that contains the word “uncertainty” and take a log of it. I consider these word counts as proxy for uncertainty. I run the regression in the form 
of 𝑅𝐷𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙_𝐵𝐶𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑔𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙_𝐵𝐶𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐸𝑛𝑑𝑡 + 𝛽6 𝑙𝑛(𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑦)𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡  where BC is the business cycle 
dummy, Start is crisis starting in month t, During is the ongoing crisis in month t and End is the crisis ending in month t. System shows the results of 
pooled OLS and Sur shows the results of seemingly unrelated regression. I use robust standard errors. Coefficients are in percentage.  


















Australia 9.69 7.21 0.08 0.11 5.07 4.83 0.13 1.15 0.04 0.78 0.02 0.22 -0.48 -2.45 0.12 
Austria 4.90 4.09 1.95 2.72 4.36 3.46 0.01 0.07 -0.01 -0.11 0.19 1.21 0.49 2.80 0.20 
Belgium  1.60 1.22 0.70 1.55 4.73 4.57 0.15 1.78 0.06 1.49 0.14 1.63 0.64 3.91 0.27 
Denmark 2.10 2.39 0.61 1.32 5.66 3.69 0.14 1.71 0.17 4.18 -0.07 -1.15 0.72 5.72 0.28 
Finland 7.04 5.21 2.24 3.25 3.64 3.23 0.14 1.64 0.29 6.14 -0.01 -0.11 0.01 0.03 0.22 
France  3.11 3.56 1.30 3.73 1.78 2.49 0.15 1.57 0.14 3.81 0.06 0.64 0.37 2.91 0.19 
Germany 1.35 1.65 0.67 0.69 4.51 4.86 0.18 2.16 0.07 2.34 0.05 0.53 0.75 6.09 0.32 
Ireland 5.71 3.67 3.73 4.67 5.24 3.10 0.29 1.51 0.23 3.27 -0.07 -0.59 0.35 1.48 0.22 
Italy 4.29 5.26 1.30 2.24 0.91 1.31 0.00 0.04 0.08 1.52 0.09 0.92 0.38 2.60 0.04 
Japan 3.04 2.72 0.06 0.12 2.58 3.69 0.20 1.98 0.18 3.35 0.06 0.62 0.50 3.20 0.11 
Netherlands 0.86 0.71 3.47 3.49 0.62 0.52 0.24 2.08 0.14 3.20 -0.03 -0.25 0.83 4.41 0.24 
Norway 7.12 4.33 1.94 2.18 3.27 3.15 0.14 0.96 0.17 2.54 -0.06 -0.53 0.29 1.33 0.08 
New Zealand 16.65 10.35 0.07 0.09 3.14 4.17 0.15 0.87 0.20 3.76 -0.16 -1.55 -1.32 -5.78 0.19 
Spain 9.51 9.42 1.23 2.14 3.36 3.74 0.32 3.08 0.16 3.62 0.16 1.41 -0.55 -3.82 0.20 
Sweden 5.40 6.37 -0.56 -1.71 3.95 6.21 0.24 2.03 0.25 6.46 0.13 1.23 0.09 0.75 0.23 
Switzerland 1.71 1.58 2.65 1.90 0.56 0.35 0.09 1.31 0.11 2.56 0.16 1.87 0.64 4.36 0.23 
UK 1.46 1.74 0.04 0.14 4.30 4.70 0.27 3.56 0.14 4.56 -0.12 -1.81 0.65 5.25 0.33 
US 0.05 0.07 1.12 3.29 3.06 3.87 0.09 1.76 0.17 5.59 0.10 1.39 0.80 7.33 0.40 
                
System   0.89 6.30 3.64 17.43 0.16 6.41 0.15 11.75 0.04 1.50 0.30 7.37  
Sur   0.41 4.51 3.91 9.85 0.11 2.18 0.16 6.41 0.07 1.48 0.23 2.84  
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Table 3-7 Return Dispersion and International Country Risk 
Table 3-7 presents the relation between return dispersion and international country risk. I take the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) composite 
index as another measure of country-level uncertainty. I run the regression in the form of 𝑅𝐷𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐵𝐶_𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐵𝐶_𝑔𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡_𝑊𝐶𝐼𝑡 +
𝛽4𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔_𝑊𝐶𝐼𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐸𝑛𝑑_𝑊𝐶𝐼𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑑𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦_𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡. 𝐵𝐶_𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑡 and 𝐵𝐶_𝑔𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑡  are the dummy variables for business cycle (1= 
recession, 0 = expansion) in local country and global respectively. 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡_𝑊𝐶𝐼𝑡, 𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔_𝑊𝐶𝐼𝑡 and 𝐸𝑛𝑑_𝑊𝐶𝐼𝑡 are ongoing crisis starting at month t, 
during month t and ending at month t. 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑑𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑡 is the log number of the counts of Bloomberg reports in every month that contains the word 
“uncertainty”. System shows the results of pooled OLS and Sur shows the results of seemingly unrelated regression. I use robust standard errors. 
Coefficients are in percentage. 
  



















Australia 48.24 5.61 0.45 0.69 3.68 3.77 0.04 0.43 0.00 0.05 0.00 -0.04 -0.10 -0.56 -0.50 -4.81 0.17 
Austria 0.06 0.01 1.98 2.77 4.40 3.49 0.01 0.10 -0.01 -0.14 0.19 1.22 0.51 2.85 0.05 0.52 0.20 
Belgium  38.08 4.16 0.21 0.47 3.92 4.39 0.11 1.31 -0.02 -0.44 0.11 1.25 0.80 5.32 -0.45 -4.30 0.32 
Denmark 15.21 2.33 0.64 1.39 5.46 3.62 0.14 1.77 0.16 4.08 -0.07 -1.12 0.92 5.39 -0.17 -2.00 0.29 
Finland 8.63 1.13 2.25 3.24 3.63 3.19 0.15 1.65 0.29 6.04 -0.01 -0.08 0.04 0.17 -0.02 -0.21 0.22 
France  -15.56 -2.16 1.15 3.18 2.04 2.75 0.17 1.83 0.12 3.41 0.07 0.81 0.49 3.34 0.23 2.75 0.21 
Germany -10.32 -1.24 2.32 2.07 3.26 3.68 0.08 0.69 0.18 4.54 0.02 0.14 1.63 7.53 0.06 0.62 0.39 
Ireland 32.52 4.34 3.39 4.44 4.29 2.73 0.30 1.55 0.18 2.52 -0.05 -0.45 1.10 4.25 -0.38 -3.93 0.26 
Italy 3.03 0.59 1.34 2.16 0.90 1.30 0.00 0.02 0.08 1.50 0.09 0.91 0.38 2.59 0.02 0.25 0.03 
Japan -3.68 -0.57 0.11 0.25 2.64 3.74 0.21 2.02 0.19 3.54 0.06 0.66 0.60 3.46 0.07 1.04 0.11 
Netherlands -30.10 -2.78 2.75 3.08 0.67 0.56 0.21 1.89 0.14 3.33 -0.04 -0.41 1.09 4.78 0.34 2.97 0.26 
Norway 4.22 0.39 1.93 2.16 3.31 3.20 0.14 0.94 0.18 2.58 -0.06 -0.53 0.24 0.88 0.04 0.27 0.08 
NZ 50.14 4.33 0.43 0.54 2.19 2.87 0.09 0.51 0.16 3.08 -0.17 -1.65 -1.69 -6.30 -0.38 -2.98 0.22 
Spain 21.98 3.68 1.06 1.87 3.02 3.73 0.32 2.99 0.15 3.42 0.16 1.38 -0.36 -2.23 -0.18 -2.17 0.21 
Sweden 19.87 3.72 -0.64 -1.90 3.96 6.51 0.24 2.05 0.21 5.54 0.12 1.21 0.17 1.30 -0.17 -2.76 0.24 
Switzerland -43.27 -3.27 2.26 1.89 1.07 0.74 0.06 1.02 0.14 2.99 0.13 1.81 1.10 4.64 0.47 3.57 0.29 
UK -9.94 -1.92 -0.08 -0.25 4.62 4.78 0.28 3.68 0.14 4.75 -0.12 -1.88 0.69 5.51 0.14 2.27 0.34 
US -20.66 -5.57 1.33 4.65 2.64 3.36 0.08 1.68 0.13 4.41 0.10 1.34 1.25 9.13 0.22 5.85 0.44 
                  
System   0.88 6.23 3.70 17.59 0.16 6.29 0.15 11.93 0.04 1.51 0.29 7.03 0.05 3.84  
Sur   0.41 4.35 3.88 9.81 0.11 2.46 0.15 6.36 0.06 1.22 0.27 3.67 0.05 5.51  
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3.4.5 Economic policy uncertainty  
Policy-related uncertainties such as taxes, government spending, 
regulations, interest rate etc. have played an essential role in slowing down 
the recovery of the great depression of 2007-2009 (Baker et al., 2013). As 
return dispersion has been considered to be an economic state variable (see 
for instance Angelidis et al. (2015)), it may reflect economic policy uncertainty. 
To test this hypothesis, I employ the economic policy uncertainty (EPU) index 
developed by Baker et al. (2013). This index relies on monthly counts of 
articles in leading newspapers that references to the economic, uncertainty 
and policy.15  Baker et al. (2013) first establish their index in the US and 
evaluate its impact on the macro economy. They find that the EPU index spikes 
around major political shocks including the Gulf Wars, 9/11, presidential 
elections, financial crisis etc.  
Baker et al. (2013) also construct and EPU index for eleven countries. I 
employ the EPU index in seven countries (France, Germany, Italy, Japan, 
Spain, UK and US) which overlap with the sample of countries. Additionally, I 
include their global EPU index date back to January 1997. The global EPU 
index is a composite index reflecting 18 countries’ uncertainty. These EPU 
indices have been used in several studies as proxy of economic policy 
uncertainty (for instance, Pástor and Veronesi (2013), Wang et al. (2015), 
Antonakakis, Chatziantoniou, and Filis (2013), Karnizova and Li (2014)). The 
                                                          
15 Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2015) construct the economic policy uncertainty index based on three 
components in their early draft paper. The components include the media coverage of references to 
economic uncertainty and policy, the number of federal tax code provision set to expire, and the 
degree of disagreement among economic forecasters. But in their latest draft they only include the 
newspaper coverage frequency.  
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data are from their website (http://www.policyuncertainty.com/). France 
economic policy uncertainty fluctuated most among all seven countries. The 
standard deviation of the EPU index in France is 72.55 compared to 32.82 for 
the US. 
To test if return dispersion is influenced by macroeconomic policies, I 
again extend the previous regression to include both (the log of) local 
economic policy for each country (𝐸𝑃𝑈_𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑡) and (the log of) global economic 
policy uncertainty (equation 3.7).  
𝑅𝐷𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐵𝐶_𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐵𝐶_𝑔𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡_𝑊𝐶𝐼𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔_𝑊𝐶𝐼𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝐸𝑛𝑑_𝑊𝐶𝐼𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑑𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦_𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑡
+ 𝛽8ln (𝐸𝑃𝑈_𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙)𝑡 +𝛽9ln (𝐸𝑃𝑈_𝑔𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙)𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡                          (3.7) 
Table 3-8 shows the results. The overall effect of both country specific 
EPU and global EPU on return dispersion is statistically significant and positive. 
Return dispersion is larger during higher country specific economic policy 
uncertainty in Australia, Italy, Japan, and the US. The effect is economically 
small. For instance, 10 percent increase in economic policy uncertainty will 
raise return dispersion around 37 basis points in the US and 25 basis points in 
Japan. Global EPU has larger effect than local one. Global economic policy 
uncertainty has a statistically significant effect on return dispersion in eight out 
of eleven countries I tested. However, the effect in Australia is negative and is 




Table 3-8 Return Dispersion and Economic Policy Uncertainty 
Table 3-8 presents the characteristics of economic policy uncertainty. I show the results for the regression: 𝑅𝐷𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐵𝐶_𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑡 +
𝛽2𝐵𝐶_𝑔𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡_𝑊𝐶𝐼𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔_𝑊𝐶𝐼𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐸𝑛𝑑_𝑊𝐶𝐼𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑑𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦_𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑡 +
𝛽8ln (𝐸𝑃𝑈_𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙)𝑡  +𝛽9ln (𝐸𝑃𝑈_𝑔𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙)𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 𝑅𝐷𝑡 is the return dispersion of the largest 50 market capitalization stocks in each country at 
time t. 𝐵𝐶_𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑡 and 𝐵𝐶_𝑔𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑡 are the dummy variables for business cycle (1= recession, 0 = expansion) in local country and global 
respectively. 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡_𝑊𝐶𝐼𝑡, 𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔_𝑊𝐶𝐼𝑡 and 𝐸𝑛𝑑_𝑊𝐶𝐼𝑡 are ongoing crisis starting at month t, during month t and ending at month t. 
𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑑𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑡 is the log number of the counts of Bloomberg reports in every month that contains the word “uncertainty”. 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦_𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑡 
represents the ICRG composite risk index for each country. I include two economic policy index, one is the country specific index 
(𝐸𝑃𝑈_𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙) and the other is the global index (𝐸𝑃𝑈_𝑔𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙). System shows the results of pooled OLS and Sur shows the results of 
seemingly unrelated regression. I use robust standard errors. Coefficients are in percentage. 
 





















Australia Coeff. (%) 7.19 2.29 2.14 0.09 -0.09 0.22 0.34 -0.09 3.60 -2.48 144 0.35 
 t-Stat 0.53 1.10 2.26 0.61 -1.03 1.30 0.62 -0.58 4.06 -1.80   
France Coeff. (%) -28.61 0.49 1.12 0.06 0.29 -0.02 -0.19 0.19 -0.41 5.09 156 0.43 
 t-Stat -2.03 0.55 1.45 0.38 3.59 -0.12 -0.36 1.36 -0.83 4.72   
Germany Coeff. (%) -9.71 2.22 2.46 -0.07 0.24 0.01 -0.04 -0.11 0.59 5.21 156 0.46 
 t-Stat -0.77 1.11 2.60 -0.51 3.96 0.06 -0.09 -0.81 0.85 4.73   
Ireland Coeff. (%) -8.05 2.63 3.33 0.40 0.09 -0.01 1.02 -0.19 1.76 4.16 156 0.29 
 t-Stat -0.48 2.84 2.33 0.97 0.76 -0.03 1.29 -1.38 1.57 2.13   
Italy Coeff. (%) -2.24 1.22 0.96 -0.06 0.15 0.05 -0.82 -0.05 2.16 2.13 156 0.07 
 t-Stat -0.21 1.34 1.60 -0.47 1.37 0.20 -1.75 -0.45 2.70 1.98   
Japan Coeff. (%) -17.71 0.23 2.23 0.08 0.41 -0.09 0.71 0.16 2.49 -1.36 156 0.18 
 t-Stat -1.51 0.34 2.65 0.51 4.39 -0.67 1.04 1.61 2.51 -0.89   
Netherland Coeff. (%) 10.51 3.29 0.93 -0.07 0.02 -0.26 -1.71 -0.15 -0.74 5.71 82 0.53 
 t-Stat 0.71 1.86 0.97 -0.44 0.16 -1.92 -2.22 -0.96 -0.81 3.62   
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Spain Coeff. (%) 14.50 1.19 1.56 0.18 0.22 0.22 -1.24 -0.23 -0.85 4.92 108 0.41 
 t-Stat 1.06 1.60 1.51 0.86 2.35 1.04 -1.43 -1.76 -1.33 3.53   
Sweden Coeff. (%) 13.45 -0.51 2.70 0.08 0.18 0.15 1.24 -0.34 1.29 1.64 156 0.39 
 t-Stat 1.22 -1.16 4.55 0.55 3.17 0.78 2.03 -2.95 0.99 1.53   
UK Coeff. (%) -16.71 -0.11 2.88 0.17 0.22 -0.25 0.21 -0.02 -2.36 7.66 156 0.48 
 t-Stat -2.06 -0.23 3.37 1.31 4.28 -2.18 0.46 -0.33 -3.17 6.40   
US Coeff. (%) -39.18 1.22 1.65 0.01 0.25 0.11 0.58 0.31 3.74 -0.02 156 0.49 
 t-Stat -6.40 2.74 2.32 0.07 3.88 0.68 1.42 6.25 2.27 -0.01   
System Coeff. (%) 1.23 2.35 0.07 0.24 0.03 0.06 0.13 0.64 3.21   
 t-Stat  4.87 7.90 1.17 9.57 0.49 0.28 5.69 2.60 7.74   
Sur Coeff. (%) 0.53 2.70 0.03 0.21 0.09 -0.05 0.11 0.49 3.21   
  t-Stat  3.15 6.91 0.31 6.11 1.24 -0.19 7.13 2.87 6.31     
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3.5 Return dispersion and the cross section of returns 
As return dispersion seems to capture uncertainty well, one can easily 
relate it to returns. I consider whether returns of stocks depend on their 
sensitivity with respect to return dispersion. Jiang (2010) documents that return 
dispersion is a priced factor in the US and stocks with higher sensitivities to 
return dispersion have higher average returns. I consider not only levels but 
also changes in cross sectional return dispersion. Results for changes are 
similar (although not as strong as for the levels and I report these in the 
Appendix B). I provide evidence for 13 international stock markets, Australia, 
Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the US.16 The sample period starts from 
January 1986 to March 2014. I exclude very small firms. For each market in 
each year, I consider the 90% largest common stocks based on the market 
capitalization at the end of the previous year.17 I also identify the largest 50 
stocks by the same market capitalization measure.  
The first step is to estimate the sensitivity of individual stocks to return 
dispersion. For each market for each month for each stock with more than 15 
daily return observations, I run a time-series regression. Specifically, I regress 
the daily stock return on the mean return of the largest 50 stocks (as a proxy 
                                                          
16 We exclude five markets from this analysis because these markets have been small markets such 
that there are not enough observations in the early months for analysis. These five markets are 
Finland, Denmark, Austria, New Zealand and Ireland.  
17 We only focus on stocks that are traded in the domestic currency, which usually accounts for more 
than 90% of all stocks. 
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for the market-wide movement) and the return dispersion of the largest 50 
stocks: 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖,𝑅𝑀𝑅𝐹𝑅𝑀𝑅𝐹𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖,𝑅𝐷𝑅𝐷𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                               (3.8) 
 
where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the return of the individual stock at time t, 𝑅𝑀𝑅𝐹𝑡 is the mean 
return of the largest 50 stocks at time t and 𝑅𝐷𝑡 is the return dispersion of the 
largest 50 stocks at time t. The estimated coefficient (𝛽𝑖,𝑅𝐷) is the estimated 
sensitivity of the stock with respect to cross sectional return dispersion 
measures.  
In the second step, I form quintile portfolios based on this estimated 
coefficient 𝛽𝑖,𝑅𝐷. For each market for each month, I sort all the stocks by the 
estimated 𝛽𝑖,𝑅𝐷. Portfolio 1 consists of stocks with the smallest 20 percent 𝛽𝑖,𝑅𝐷 
whereas Portfolio 5 consists of stocks with the largest 20 percent 𝛽𝑖,𝑅𝐷.  
In the third step, I calculate monthly returns for these portfolios. For each 
market for each month for each portfolio, I calculate the monthly value-
weighted portfolio return using the monthly return, of the same month as the 
portfolio formation month, of all individual stocks constituting the portfolio 
where the weighting is the market capitalization as of the end of the previous 
month.  
In the last step, I consider whether stocks with higher sensitivities to return 
dispersion have higher average returns. I present two sets of results, one is 
the average monthly CAPM alphas and the other is the four-factor alphas. The 
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CAPM alphas are returns after controlling for the mean return of the largest 50 
stocks (𝑅𝑀𝑅𝐹𝑡, as a proxy for the “market” factor). The four-factor alphas are 
the returns after controlling for the Fama-French three factors (market, size 
and value) and the momentum factor.  
Table 3-9 reports the results for CAPM alphas and Table 3-10 reports the 
four-factor alphas. The results for raw returns are non-tabulated. I plot the 
CAPM alphas of the value weighted portfolios in Figure 3-3. Stock returns are 
positively related to their sensitivity with respect to return dispersion. The 
returns increase monotonically as their sensitivities increase, regardless 
whether I consider CAPM alphas or four-factor alphas. For all the markets, the 
average alphas of the portfolios with the smallest return dispersion sensitivities 
(Group 1) are negative except for the equal-weighted US stocks. The mean 
returns of portfolios with the largest return dispersion sensitivities (Group 5) 
are positive and also highly statistically significant. For the middle groups, 
there is generally at least one group with a mean return that is statistically 
insignificantly different from zero: for raw returns, it is usually Group 2; for 
CAPM alphas, it is usually Group 3. The differences in the mean return 
between Group 5 and Group 1 range from 4.4% to 6.4% for the raw returns. 
For the CAPM alphas, average differences range from 3.5% to 6.4%. Again t-
values for these differences indicate that the differences are highly significant. 
On average, I find a t-value of around 9 for the raw returns and approximately 
a t-value of 15 for the CAPM alphas. In short, stocks that are more sensitive to 
return dispersion generate substantially higher abnormal returns. 
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In order to test whether these results are not caused by construction, I 
conduct the Monte Carlo simulation. I generate daily random samples, 
estimate monthly return series by cumulating the daily stimulations and repeat 
the process 100 times. The detailed procedure are as follows. First, I take the 
full sample market index to estimate market index sample mean and standard 
deviation. Use those characteristics of the original market index, I generate 
simulated market return series. I use the randomly generated market index as 
the return of the market portfolio. Second, I use the original individual stock 
returns regress on the original market index according to the CAPM model in 
order to estimate constant, beta, standard deviation of error term for each stock 
over the full sample. Then I generate individual stock return series using 
simulated market return series and the estimations from CAPM model. Third, 
I use the randomly generated market index as the return of the market portfolio. 
I construct return dispersion from the randomly generated stock returns of all 
individual stocks. Forth, I cumulate the daily returns to get the monthly data. I 
calculate the return dispersion using all individual stocks. Finally, I sort equal-
weighted quintile portfolios every month based on stocks’ exposure to return 
dispersion as what I done using real data. The results of the simulated data 
are if anything go against those using the real dataset: the higher the exposure 
to return dispersion the lower return. This suggests that the methodology does 
not cause the effect I observe in the real data. These results are available on 
request from the author. 
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Table 3-9 CAPM Alphas of Portfolios Sorted by Their Sensitivity to Return Dispersion 
This table reports the CAPM alphas of portfolios sorted by their sensitivity to return dispersion. I report the monthly value-weighted 
portfolio returns in panel A and equal-weighted portfolio returns in panel B.  
               
Panel A: value weighted portfolio returns 
 Low Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 High High - Low 
  Mean t-value Mean t-value Mean t-value Mean t-value Mean t-value Mean t-value 
Australia -0.038 -11.90 -0.007 4.29 0.001 0.69 0.010 7.49 0.023 7.07 0.061 13.40 
Belgium -0.025 -7.33 -0.002 -1.37 0.001 0.76 0.009 5.59 0.021 8.40 0.046 10.87 
France -0.026 -12.28 -0.007 -5.86 0.001 0.56 0.007 6.30 0.023 13.81 0.050 18.21 
Germany -0.026 -9.14 -0.008 -5.56 -0.001 -0.97 0.007 4.94 0.024 9.07 0.050 12.87 
Italy -0.022 -11.12 -0.007 -4.70 -0.001 0.74 0.006 4.32 0.025 14.15 0.047 17.70 
Japan -0.025 -12.10 -0.001 -10.02 -0.004 -3.27 0.008 6.90 0.029 14.50 0.054 18.79 
Netherland -0.033 -11.30 -0.003 -1.34 0.002 1.15 0.008 5.17 0.025 10.99 0.058 15.69 
Norway -0.031 -9.83 -0.001 -0.28 0.003 1.24 0.015 7.25 0.033 11.24 0.064 14.85 
Spain -0.026 -9.92 -0.004 -2.25 -0.001 -0.31 0.005 2.19 0.027 11.28 0.035 14.93 
Sweden -0.035 -10.38 -0.006 -3.31 0.001 0.74 0.009 5.28 0.028 11.91 0.063 15.34 
Switzerland -0.025 -10.00 -0.003 -2.29 0.002 1.09 0.007 4.30 0.024 11.95 0.048 15.26 
UK -0.030 -10.85 -0.005 -4.51 0.000 0.11 0.006 5.60 0.021 14.94 0.052 16.52 
US -0.025 -10.80 -0.006 -5.05 0.001 0.57 0.006 5.58 0.018 8.07 0.044 13.39 
             
average -0.028  -0.005  0.000  0.008  0.025  0.052  
min -0.038  -0.008  -0.004  0.005  0.018  0.035  
max -0.022  -0.001  0.003  0.015  0.033  0.064  
median -0.026  -0.005  0.001  0.007  0.024  0.050  
(Continued on next page) 
137 
 
(Table 3-9 Continued) 
Panel B: equally weighted portfolio returns 
 Low Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 High High - Low 
  Mean t-value Mean t-value Mean t-value Mean t-value Mean t-value Mean t-value 
Australia -0.019 -4.75 -0.007 -3.50 -0.004 -2.00 -0.003 -1.50 0.006 1.50 0.025 5.00 
Belgium -0.010 -5.00 -0.001 -1.00 -0.000 0.00 0.005 5.00 0.014 7.00 0.024 8.00 
France -0.008 -4.00 -0.005 -5.00 -0.001 -1.00 0.001 1.00 0.008 4.00 0.016 5.33 
Germany -0.012 -6.00 -0.006 -6.00 -0.004 -4.00 -0.004 -4.00 -0.003 -1.50 0.009 3.00 
Italy -0.010 -5.00 -0.008 -8.00 -0.005 -5.00 -0.000 0.00 0.015 7.50 0.025 8.33 
Japan -0.004 -1.33 -0.007 -3.50 -0.004 -2.00 0.002 1.00 0.020 6.67 0.024 6.00 
Netherland -0.011 -5.50 -0.002 -2.00 0.001 1.00 0.002 2.00 0.012 6.00 0.023 7.67 
Norway -0.018 -6.00 -0.001 -0.50 0.002 1.00 0.010 5.00 0.023 7.67 0.041 10.25 
Spain -0.016 -8.00 -0.005 -2.50 -0.003 -3.00 0.003 1.50 0.019 9.50 0.035 11.67 
Sweden -0.018 -6.00 -0.007 -3.50 -0.003 -3.00 0.003 3.00 0.011 3.67 0.028 7.00 
Switzerland -0.013 -6.50 -0.003 -3.00 0.001 1.00 0.003 3.00 0.014 7.00 0.027 13.50 
UK -0.010 -3.33 -0.003 -1.50 -0.003 -3.00 -0.001 -1.00 0.004 1.33 0.014 3.50 
US -0.003 -1.00 -0.001 -0.50 0.001 0.50 0.002 1.00 0.011 3.67 0.014 3.50 
             
average -0.012  -0.004  -0.002  0.002  0.012  0.023  
min -0.019  -0.008  -0.005  -0.004  -0.003  0.009  
max -0.003  -0.001  0.002  0.010  0.023  0.041  





Table 3-10 Four-factor Alphas (in percentage) of Portfolios Sorted by Their Sensitivity to Return Dispersion 
Table 3-10 reports the four factor alphas of portfolios sorted by their sensitivity to return dispersion. The four factors are market, size, value and 
momentum factors. I report the monthly value-weighted portfolio returns in panel A and equal-weighted portfolio returns in panel B. The coefficients 
are in percentage. 
 
Panel A: value weighted portfolio returns  
 Low Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 High High - Low 
  Mean t-value Mean t-value Mean t-value Mean t-value Mean t-value Mean t-value 
Australia -3.82 -10.63 -0.86 -3.87 0.23 1.42 0.86 4.19 2.15 6.65 5.97 12.33 
Belgium -2.60 -4.83 -0.33 -1.18 0.04 0.17 0.71 2.72 1.98 4.54 4.58 6.61 
France -2.81 -7.88 -0.97 -3.92 -0.12 -0.58 0.63 2.65 2.42 7.80 5.23 11.05 
Germany -2.74 -5.63 -0.87 -3.14 -0.37 -1.59 0.61 2.40 2.45 6.62 5.19 8.49 
Italy -3.05 -7.29 -1.29 -3.96 -0.52 -1.74 0.04 0.12 2.07 5.57 5.12 9.14 
Japan -3.22 -11.00 -1.60 -8.02 -0.79 -4.29 0.21 1.12 2.07 8.35 5.30 13.79 
Netherland -3.60 -8.33 -0.62 -1.88 -0.14 -0.54 0.91 3.36 2.53 6.56 6.13 10.57 
Norway -4.28 -8.17 -1.05 -2.70 -0.36 -0.98 0.75 2.28 2.69 5.48 6.97 9.71 
Spain -3.28 -6.96 -0.69 -2.42 -0.24 -0.91 0.23 0.69 2.64 7.08 5.91 9.85 
Sweden -3.08 -6.20 -0.20 -0.58 0.56 1.75 1.03 3.02 3.60 8.10 6.68 10.02 
Switzerland -2.63 -6.28 -0.35 -1.37 0.06 0.25 0.77 2.33 2.46 5.89 5.10 8.61 
UK -3.35 -8.07 -0.64 -3.28 0.07 0.37 0.68 3.31 2.47 9.32 5.82 11.83 
US -2.38 -12.78 -0.68 -6.76 0.01 0.09 0.64 8.58 2.05 11.12 4.42 16.95 
             
average -3.14  -0.78  -0.12  0.62  2.43  5.57  
min -4.28  -1.60  -0.79  0.04  1.98  4.42  
max -2.38  -0.20  0.56  1.03  3.60  6.97  
median -3.08  -0.69  -0.12  0.68  2.45  5.30  
(Continued on next page) 
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 (Table 3-10 Continued) 
 
Panel B: equally weighted portfolio returns 
 Low Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 High High - Low 
  Mean t-value Mean t-value Mean t-value Mean t-value Mean t-value Mean t-value 
Australia -1.47 -3.71 -0.94 -4.45 -0.37 -2.10 -0.39 -1.80 0.49 1.36 1.96 3.67 
Belgium -0.85 -2.68 -0.13 -0.62 -0.10 -0.49 0.38 1.68 1.35 4.41 2.21 5.00 
France -0.66 -2.19 -0.59 -2.91 -0.38 -2.20 -0.08 -0.40 0.84 3.08 1.50 3.69 
Germany -1.02 -3.24 -0.66 -3.42 -0.63 -4.07 -0.57 -3.04 -0.41 -1.36 0.61 1.39 
Italy -1.41 -3.86 -1.32 -4.59 -0.88 -3.65 -0.66 -2.30 0.95 2.51 2.36 4.49 
Japan -1.16 -4.18 -1.32 -7.17 -1.00 -6.06 -0.51 -2.98 1.05 4.37 2.21 6.01 
Netherland -0.97 -3.15 -0.33 -1.50 -0.19 -0.92 -0.07 -0.32 1.02 3.32 2.00 4.58 
Norway -2.12 -4.21 -0.86 -2.26 -0.21 -0.60 0.37 1.09 1.78 3.51 3.90 5.46 
Spain -1.78 -4.67 -0.85 -3.32 -0.60 -2.77 -0.18 -0.71 1.44 4.15 3.22 6.25 
Sweden -1.10 -2.50 -0.41 -1.27 0.10 0.33 0.33 1.06 1.59 3.49 2.69 4.25 
Switzerland -1.05 -3.37 -0.27 -1.18 0.02 0.09 0.25 1.06 1.40 4.62 2.45 5.64 
UK -0.89 -2.92 -0.31 -1.48 -0.29 -1.51 -0.10 -0.45 0.72 2.21 1.61 3.61 
US -0.40 -2.56 -0.34 -3.20 -0.11 -1.30 0.03 0.39 1.03 6.34 1.43 6.33 
             
average -1.15  -0.64  -0.36  -0.09  1.02  2.16  
min -2.12  -1.32  -1.00  -0.66  -0.41  0.61  
max -0.40  -0.13  0.10  0.38  1.78  3.90  





Figure 3-3 Four-factor Alphas of Portfolios Sorted by Return Dispersion Betas 
Figure 3-3a: Four-factor alphas of value-weighted portfolios sorted by return dispersion betas 
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Figure 3-3b: Four-factor alphas of equal-weighted portfolios sorted by return dispersion betas 
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3.6 Return dispersion and implied volatility 
Implied volatility derived from an option contract is often used as a proxy 
for overall economic uncertainty. It is a forward-looking volatility measure that 
contains information about expected market fluctuations. In the G5 countries 
implied volatility is nowadays traded. The previous literature shows a close link 
between the implied volatility and the economic uncertainty. For instance, 
Beber and Brandt (2009) suggest that a high macroeconomic uncertainty 
period is followed lower implied bond futures volatility. Also, Stivers (2003) 
finds that the dispersion in firm returns provide incremental information about 
US market-level future volatility during period 1927 to 1995. I compare return 
dispersion with implied volatility. Just like return dispersion it is easy to observe 
in at least the five countries for which these data are available.  
3.6.1 Implied volatility and macroeconomic uncertainty  
I first compare co-movements between implied volatility and return 
dispersion visually. I obtain the implied volatility indices in G5 countries include 
CAC40 Volatility Index (France), VDAX New Volatility Index (Germany), 
NIKKEI Stock Average Volatility Index (Japan), FTSE 100 Volatility Index (UK) 
and CBOE SPX Volatility VIX (US). Figure 3-4 plots the return dispersion 
series and implied volatility index for each country. Although these two 
measures correlate, there still exists certain periods that they deviate from 





Figure 3-4 Return Dispersion and Implied Volatility 
Figure 3-4 plots the return dispersion and its contemporaneous implied volatility index for each country. The return dispersion is calculated 
using the largest 50 stock returns. The implied volatility indices I use include CAC40 Volatility Index (France), VDAX New Volatility Index 
(Germany), NIKKEI Stock Average Volatility Index (Japan), FTSE 100 Volatility Index (UK) and CBOE SPX Volatility VIX (US). 
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Table 3-11 reports the basic characteristics of the implied volatility The 
implied volatility in G5 countries indeed correlates with the corresponding 
countries’ return dispersion, but the correlation is not high. The average 
correlation is less than 0.6 especially for Japan where the correlation is only 
0.2. The first-order autocorrelations, ρ(1) shows that a high implied volatility 
this month increases the likelihood of a high implied volatility next month for all 
five countries. As the first-order autocorrelations are relatively high, I further 
test if there exist unit root by using Dicky-Fuller test. I reject the hypothesis of 
having a unit root for all series.   
 
Table 3-11 Basic Characteristics of Implied Volatility 
This table reports the summary statistics of the implied volatility series in five countries. For 
France I use the CAC40 volatility index from January 2000 to December 2013. For Germany 
I use the VDAX new volatility index from January 1992 to December 2013. For Japan I use 
the NIKKEI stock average volatility index from January 1998 to December 2013. For the UK I 
use the FTSE 100 volatility index from January 2000 to December 2013. For the US I use the 
CBOE SPX volatility vix from January 1990 to December 2013. All series are obtained from 
Datastream.   
           
 France Germany Japan UK US 
Mean 23.80 22.95 26.20 20.66 20.09 
Median 22.03 20.74 25.30 18.68 18.20 
Max 55.71 57.90 71.62 46.78 62.98 
Min 11.60 9.73 12.89 9.83 10.08 
Std. Dev.  8.88 9.50 8.13 8.07 7.76 
Skewness 1.33 1.51 2.06 1.16 1.81 
Kurtosis 4.63 5.21 10.80 4.09 8.20 
Jarque-Bera 90.70 183.94 698.49 61.39 549.76 
Probability 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Sum 4069.59 6126.43 5109.17 3533.08 5845.45 
Sum Sq. Dev 13312.19 23946.27 12760.98 10992.2 17390.56 
Correlation with RD 0.62 0.59 0.20 0.57 0.54 
ρ(1) 0.85*** 0.87*** 0.77*** 0.86*** 0.84*** 
Dicky-Fuller test -3.59*** -4.26*** -4.91*** -3.56*** -4.88*** 




The next is whether implied volatility is also a risk measure for 
macroeconomic uncertainty. Equation 3.9 shows the regression on business 
cycles, international political crisis, word count uncertainty, country risk, and 
economic policy uncertainty, similar to return dispersion but now the 
dependent variable is the implied volatility at month t (𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡).: 
𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐵𝐶_𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐵𝐶_𝑔𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡_𝑊𝐶𝐼𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔_𝑊𝐶𝐼𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝐸𝑛𝑑_𝑊𝐶𝐼𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑑𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦_𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑡
+ 𝛽8ln (𝐸𝑃𝑈_𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙)𝑡 +𝛽9ln (𝐸𝑃𝑈_𝑔𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙)𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡                          (3.9) 
Panel A of Table 3-12 has the regression results for G5 countries from 
January 2000 to December 2013 and the pooled OLS (system) and seemingly 
unrelated regression (sur) that considers these G5 countries as a system. 
Implied volatility seems to capture the uncertainty associated with these 
variables well. Implied volatility series correlate with the global business cycles 
but not local business cycles. The ongoing political crisis and country risk 
positively affects implied volatility as well in all G5 countries. However, word 
count uncertainty has a negative effect on implied volatility. Moreover, implied 
volatility series are significantly affected by the global economic policy 
uncertainty but not the local one. For instance, 10% increase in Global 
economic policy uncertainty will raise implied volatility by 2.4 units which is 
around 10% of the average implied volatility level. In fact, results for implied 
volatility seems strongly indicating that implied volatility is able to capture 




Table 3-12 Compared Implied Volatility and Return Dispersion in G5 Countries 
This table compares the results of implied volatility regress on uncertainties (Panel A) and results of return dispersion regress on 
uncertainties (Panel B). Regressions are in the form of 𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡/𝑅𝐷𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝐵𝐶𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑔𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙 𝐵𝐶𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡_𝑊𝐶𝐼𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔_𝑊𝐶𝐼𝑡 +
𝛽5𝐸𝑛𝑑_𝑊𝐶𝐼𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑑𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦_𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑡 + 𝛽8ln (𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑃𝑈)𝑡  +𝛽9ln (𝑔𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑃𝑈)𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡. 𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡 is the implied volatility indices and 
𝑅𝐷𝑡 is the return dispersion at time t in each country. 𝐵𝐶_𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑡 and 𝐵𝐶_𝑔𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑡  are the dummy variables for business cycle (1= recession, 
0 = expansion) in local country and global respectively. 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡_𝑊𝐶𝐼𝑡, 𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔_𝑊𝐶𝐼𝑡 and 𝐸𝑛𝑑_𝑊𝐶𝐼𝑡 are ongoing crisis starting at month t, 
during month t and ending at month t. 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑑𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑡 is the log number of the counts of Bloomberg reports in every month that contains 
the word “uncertainty”. 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦_𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑡 represents the ICRG composite risk index for each country. I include two economic policy index, 
one is the country specific index (𝐸𝑃𝑈_𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙) and the other is the global index (𝐸𝑃𝑈_𝑔𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙).  Our testing period is from January 2000 to 
December 2013. System shows the results of pooled OLS and Sur shows the results of seemingly unrelated regression. 
 
Panel A: Implied volatility and uncertainties in G5 countries             
  Local BC Global BC Start WCI 
during 









System           
Coeff. (%) 0.05 2.75 0.14 0.58 -0.20 -6.21 0.19 0.76 24.91 600 
t-Statistic 0.06 3.25 0.73 6.35 -1.27 -6.27 2.62 0.88 18.39  
Sur           
Coeff. (%) 0.36 3.02 0.30 0.64 -0.12 -5.63 0.16 0.38 23.32 600 
t-Statistic 1.14 2.46 0.93 4.12 -0.44 -3.31 5.77 1.17 12.57  
           
Panel B: Return dispersion and uncertainties in G5 countries      
System           
Coeff. (%) 0.23 2.56 0.14 0.41 0.01 -0.25 0.15 0.33 3.99 600 
t-Statistic 0.65 6.62 1.60 9.96 0.20 -0.56 4.49 0.84 6.44  
Sur           
Coeff. (%) 0.04 2.64 0.17 0.44 0.05 -0.59 0.14 0.69 3.84 600 
t-Statistic 0.15 5.01 1.25 6.92 0.43 -0.85 5.52 2.20 4.77  
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For ease of comparison, Panel B of Table 3-12 contains the results for 
return dispersion during the same period with G5 countries. Return dispersion 
is able to capture global business cycles, ongoing political crisis, country risk, 
local economic policy uncertainty (for seemingly unrelated regressions only), 
and global economic policy uncertainty as well.  
3.6.2 Implied volatility and cross-sectional stock returns 
As implied volatility does a good job in capturing macroeconomic 
uncertainties, a logical question to ask is whether or not the implied volatility 
also relates to the cross section of stock returns. Similarly to section 3.5. I test 
whether stocks with higher sensitivities to implied volatility produce higher 
average returns. (again I report levels and also consider changes In Appendix 
B, but the latter are similar to the level). I run the following time-series 
regression: 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖,𝑅𝑀𝑅𝐹𝑅𝑀𝑅𝐹𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖,𝑣𝑖𝑥𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                           (3.10) 
where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡  is the individual firm return, 𝑅𝑀𝑅𝐹𝑡  is the equal-weighted 
average return of the largest 50 firm and 𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡 is the implied volatility. Every 
year I use the largest 90% market capitalisation stocks (ranked at the end of 
the previous year). At the end of each month, I sort stocks into quintile 
portfolios based on the value of implied volatility risk loadings over the month. 
Panel A of Table 3-13 presents the average returns of the value-weighted 
portfolios and Panel B reports the average returns of the equal-weighted 
portfolios. For all the portfolios, I report the raw return, CAPM alphas and four-
factor (market, size, value and momentum factors) alphas. For most the 
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countries, the difference between portfolios that are most sensitive to implied 
volatility and portfolios that are least sensitive to implied volatility are 
statistically zero except for the value-weighted portfolios in the UK and the US. 
For the US, the value-weighted portfolio with stocks that have the highest 
sensitivity generates an average higher four-factor alpha of 0.66 percent than 
portfolio with stocks that have the lowest sensitivity. For the UK, the difference 
is 1.54 percent and statistically significant with a t-value of 2.52. 
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Table 3-13 Implied Volatility and Cross-sectional Stock Returns 
This table reports the average raw returns, CAPM alphas and four factor alphas for the portfolios sorted by implied volatility loadings. I run the time-
series regression using individual stock return regress on market return and implied volatility: 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖,𝑅𝑀𝑅𝐹𝑅𝑀𝑅𝐹𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖,𝑣𝑖𝑥𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡. Then I sort 
portfolios based on the implied volatility loadings. “Low” and “High” represent the portfolios that contains stocks that are most and least sensitive to 
implied volatility loadings. The results for the four factor alphas are in percentage. 
Panel A: value weighted 
 Raw average return  CAPM - alpha   4 factors - alpha (coefficient in % ) 
 Low 2 3 4 High H-L  Low 2 3 4 High H-L  Low 2 3 4 High H-L 
France                    
Coeff. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  -0.67 -0.48 -0.40 -0.17 -0.28 0.39 
t-stat -0.30 -0.17 -0.05 0.52 0.31 0.43  -0.98 -1.17 -0.78 0.64 0.11 0.82  -1.30 -1.51 -1.48 -0.58 -0.69 0.60 
Germany                    
Coeff. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01  -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01  -0.97 -0.40 -0.30 -0.25 -0.07 0.90 
t-stat -0.38 0.52 0.93 1.19 1.10 0.97  -2.18 -1.00 -0.24 0.11 0.30 1.85  -1.74 -1.25 -1.11 -0.81 -0.17 1.30 
Japan                    
Coeff. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00  -0.41 -0.77 -0.83 -0.75 -0.19 0.22 
t-stat -0.12 -1.07 -1.11 -0.81 0.54 0.46  0.96 -0.89 -1.07 -0.28 2.51 0.81  -1.16 -3.16 -3.78 -2.93 -0.55 0.44 
United Kingdom                   
Coeff. -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01  -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01  -1.34 -0.65 -0.12 -0.07 0.20 1.54 
t-stat -1.38 -0.57 0.72 0.94 0.74 1.56  -2.74 -1.95 0.68 1.28 0.70 2.73  -2.53 -2.24 -0.44 -0.31 0.66 2.52 
United States                   
Coeff. 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00  -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  -0.62 0.07 0.12 0.12 0.04 0.66 
t-stat 1.47 4.01 4.13 3.76 3.20 0.82   -1.99 1.64 1.97 1.07 -0.06 1.69   -2.85 0.70 1.76 0.94 0.26 2.55 
(Continued on next page) 
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Panel B: Equally weighted 
 Raw average return   CAPM - alpha   4 factors - alpha (coefficient in % ) 
 Low 2 3 4 High H-L  Low 2 3 4 High H-L  Low 2 3 4 High H-L 
France                    
Coeff. 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00  0.22 -0.78 -0.82 -0.76 -0.16 -0.37 
t-stat 0.63 -0.96 -1.37 -1.05 0.21 -0.37  -0.58 -2.32 -3.00 -2.37 -0.02 -0.48  0.45 -3.02 -3.78 -2.97 -0.46 -0.63 
Germany                    
Coeff. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00  -0.70 -0.85 -0.89 -0.89 -0.72 -0.02 
t-stat -0.71 -1.76 -2.34 -1.91 -0.85 -0.10  -2.08 -5.34 -6.50 -5.38 -2.51 -0.17  -1.76 -3.89 -5.17 -4.30 -1.89 -0.04 
Japan                    
Coeff. 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00  0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00  0.01 -1.19 -1.08 -0.99 0.42 0.41 
t-stat 1.43 -1.27 -1.31 0.01 2.19 0.48  2.89 -1.04 -1.13 -0.43 4.05 0.68  0.04 -5.70 -5.82 -4.76 -1.29 0.90 
United Kingdom                   
Coeff. 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00  -0.60 -0.87 -0.78 -0.72 -0.57 0.02 
t-stat -0.55 -1.37 -1.36 -1.29 -0.72 -0.04  -1.06 -2.82 -3.15 -2.81 -1.44 -0.03  -1.69 -4.21 -4.34 -3.62 -1.89 0.05 
United States                   
Coeff. 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00  0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00  0.30 -0.16 -0.23 -0.11 0.34 0.04 







Figure 3-5 Four-factor Alphas of Portfolios Sorted Based on Sensitivities to Implied Volatility 











































The difference between Figure 3-3 and Figure 3-5 is striking. I have two 
proxies that seem to capture both macroeconomic and political uncertainty. 
However, one (return dispersion) shows a strong relation with the cross section 
of returns whereas the other shows no relation whatsoever. I have done a 
number of tests but find no clear explanation what drives this difference. I have 
not been able to explain it, other than the obvious conclusion which is that the 
differences between the two measures is what they are and return dispersion 
captures the uncertainty related to the cross section of returns whereas implied 
volatility does not.  
3.6.3 A horserace between return dispersion and implied volatility 
In order to see more explicitly whether return dispersion and implied 
volatility are linked with certain types of uncertainty, I run a horse race between 
the two measures. I use each type of uncertainty as the dependent variable 
and use both return dispersion (𝑅𝐷𝑡) and implied volatility (𝐼𝑉𝑡) as explanatory 
variable (equation 3.11). 
𝑈𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑦𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑅𝐷𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑉𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡                                                                  (3.11) 
where  𝑈𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑦𝑡 is the local business cycle dummy, global business 
cycle dummy, start crises, ongoing crises, ending crises, word count 
uncertainty, international country risk, local economic policy uncertainty, and 
global economic policy uncertainty in turn. Table 3-14 contains the results for 
pooled OLS (system) and seemingly unrelated regressions (sur) on G5 
countries. The system results demonstrate that return dispersion and implied 
volatility are significantly different. With regard to political risk (political crisis 
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and country risk), return dispersion seems to be more sensitive to this type of 
risk compared to implied volatility. With respect to the uncertainty that 
computed by media coverage (word count uncertainty and economic policy 
uncertainty), implied volatility does a better job than return dispersion.  
Moreover, I test whether once I control for implied volatility, return 
dispersion is still a measure of uncertainty.  I add implied volatility as a control 
variable in equation (3.7). Panel A of Table 3-15 reports the results. The effect 
of return dispersion is reduced but not eliminated. After controlling for implied 
volatility, return dispersion is higher during global recession, political crisis and 
higher country risk period. The effect of economic policy uncertainty on return 
dispersion is eliminated. I further test if implied volatility could capture those 
uncertainties well with the control of return dispersion. Panel B of Table 3-15 
shows the regression that using implied volatility as dependent variable. It 
seems that the effect of business cycles on implied volatility is eliminated by 
return dispersion. In both tests, return dispersion is strongly and positively 
associated with implied volatility.  
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Table 3-14 Horserace between Return Dispersion and Implied Volatility in G5 Countries 
Table 3-14 shows the horserace between return dispersion (RD) and implied volatility (IV) in G5 countries. I use each uncertainty proxy 
regress on both return dispersion and implied volatility. 𝑈𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑦𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑅𝐷𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑉𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 where 𝑈𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑦𝑡 is the local business 
cycle dummy (Local BC), global business cycle dummy (Global BC), world political crisis index (Crisis), word count uncertainty, ICRG 
country risk (Country Risk) and economic policy uncertainty (EPU) in turn. I report the p-value of the null hypothesis that the coefficient 
of return dispersion equals the coefficient of implied volatility in each regression. System shows the results of pooled OLS and Sur shows 
the results of seemingly unrelated regression. 
  Local BC   Global BC   During_crisis   Word Count Uncertainty   Country Risk   local EPU   global EPU 
 Coef t-Stat  Coef t-Stat  Coef t-Stat  Coef t-Stat  Coef t-Stat  Coef t-Stat  Coef t-Stat 
System                    
RD 2.616 4.70  3.308 6.70  26.654 6.98  -1.368 -2.40  29.413 5.94  -2.755 -4.49  -1.214 -3.11 
VIX 0.005 2.18  0.006 3.30  0.020 1.42  0.011 5.07  -0.014 -0.73  0.022 9.38  0.022 15.26 
p-value (diff) 0.00   0.00   0.00   0.02    0.00    0.00   0.00 
Sur                     
RD 0.497 1.02  0.279 1.76  1.196 1.12  -0.051 -0.68  12.881 4.97  0.066 0.16  -0.029 -0.25 
VIX 0.006 2.83  0.002 1.97  0.001 0.14  0.001 1.40  0.001 0.15  0.012 6.41  0.003 3.31 
p-value (diff) 0.32     0.08     0.26     0.49     0.00     0.90     0.79 
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Table 3-15 Return Dispersion, Implied Volatility and Uncertainties 
Panel A of table 3-15 reports the results of the regression: 𝑅𝐷𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐵𝐶_𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐵𝐶_𝑔𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡_𝑊𝐶𝐼𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔_𝑊𝐶𝐼𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐸𝑛𝑑_𝑊𝐶𝐼𝑡 +
𝛽6𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑑𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦_𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑡 + 𝛽8ln (𝐸𝑃𝑈_𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙)𝑡  +𝛽9ln (𝐸𝑃𝑈_𝑔𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙)𝑡 + 𝛽10𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 . I use return dispersion ( 𝑅𝐷𝑡 ) regress on the global 
business cycle dummy (𝐵𝐶_𝑔𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑡), international political crisis starting in a month (𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡_𝑊𝐶𝐼𝑡), during a month (𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔_𝑊𝐶𝐼𝑡), ending in a month 
(𝐸𝑛𝑑_𝑊𝐶𝐼𝑡), log value of the word count uncertainty (𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑑𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑡), ICRG country risk (𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦_𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑡), log value of the local (𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙_𝐸𝑃𝑈𝑡) and global 
economic policy uncertainty (𝑔𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙_𝐸𝑃𝑈𝑡) and implied volatility (𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡). Coefficients are in percentage. In panel B I use implied volatility (𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡) regress 
on the above mentioned uncertainties and return dispersion. System shows the results of pooled OLS and Sur shows the results of seemingly unrelated 
regression. 
 
Panel A: Return dispersion and uncertainties with the control of implied volatility         


















EPU) VIX N 
System            
Coeff -13.75 0.23 2.12 0.12 0.32 0.05 0.74 0.12 0.21 0.01 0.16 600 
t-stat -3.63 0.67 5.80 1.44 7.99 0.68 1.69 3.79 0.57 0.01 9.06  
Sur             
Coeff -11.84 0.11 2.17 0.14 0.34 0.05 0.19 0.10 0.42 0.62 0.14 600 
t-stat -2.72 0.40 4.72 1.25 6.10 0.53 0.30 4.05 1.42 0.72 7.29  
             
Panel B: Implied volatility and uncertainties with the control of return dispersion     


















EPU) RD N 
System            
Coeff -42.57 -0.13 0.79 0.03 0.26 -0.21 -6.02 0.07 0.50 21.86 76.50 600 
t-stat -5.20 -0.18 0.96 0.18 2.83 -1.43 -6.48 1.10 0.63 16.64 9.06  
Sur             
Coeff -49.53 0.04 1.78 0.21 0.55 -0.09 -6.28 0.13 0.21 23.68 27.59 600 





The goal of this chapter is a simple one. Can I find a measure that might 
capture uncertainty and which can also be easily calculated in real time? 
Preferably one that is simple to measure and easy to understand and that 
would give, academics, investors, financial regulators and other stake holders 
a feel in real time for the level of uncertainty as implied by perception of 
financial markets.  
This study links cross sectional return dispersion with different aspects of 
uncertainties in 18 countries. I show that return dispersion is large during local 
and global recessions, international political crisis, high economic policy 
uncertain periods and high general market uncertain periods in most countries. 
Contrary to implied volatility cross sectional return dispersion also seems 
strongly linked to the cross section of returns. It also captures different aspect 
than implied volatility does, with a stronger link to political risk. All in all, the 
evidence suggests that investors are able to gauge at least some of the macro 
economic and political uncertainty in real time by closely monitoring cross 
sectional return dispersion.   
It would be interesting to see whether cross sectional return dispersion is 
linked to financial or aggregate firm level specific uncertainty. For the US, I 
have data on financial risk available from the study by Jurado, Ludvigson, and 
Ng (2015) and I find a strong relation. However, gathering those data 
internationally is beyond the scope of this study.  
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Moreover, what I cannot explain is why both implied volatility and cross 
sectional return dispersion seem both intuitively appealing risk measures, and 
are correlated – although not to the extreme) one has a strong link to the cross 
section of returns (cross sectional return dispersion) whereas the other 




Appendix A 1 Correlations of Uncertainty Variables in Each Country 
This table shows the correlations across all variables in each country (shown in separate panels).  
Panel A: Australia                     


















EPU)   
RD 1.00           
Local BC 0.37 1.00          
Global BC 0.47 0.63 1.00         
Start WCI 0.05 -0.13 -0.10 1.00        
During WCI -0.03 -0.01 -0.10 0.04 1.00       
End WCI 0.09 -0.04 -0.04 0.09 0.01 1.00      
Word Count 0.28 0.28 0.35 -0.14 -0.15 -0.15 1.00     
Country Risk -0.27 -0.20 -0.36 -0.10 -0.18 0.04 -0.04 1.00    
ln(local EPU) 0.51 0.23 0.36 0.12 0.15 0.02 0.41 -0.42 1.00   
ln(global EPU) 0.42 0.30 0.36 0.11 0.02 0.04 0.47 -0.44 0.84 1.00   
 
 
Panel B: Austria           
















EPU)     
RD 1.00           
Local BC 0.49 1.00          
Global BC 0.43 0.60 1.00         
161 
 
Start WCI -0.01 -0.04 -0.08 1.00        
During WCI 0.10 -0.02 -0.07 0.05 1.00       
End WCI 0.12 -0.01 -0.03 0.09 0.02 1.00      
Word Count 0.35 0.25 0.35 -0.06 0.01 -0.08 1.00     
Country Risk -0.19 -0.37 -0.24 0.07 -0.21 0.02 -0.30 1.00    
ln(global EPU) 0.48 0.29 0.36 0.13 0.05 0.04 0.42 0.12 1.00     
  
 
         
Panel C: Belgium           
















EPU)     
RD 1.00           
Local BC 0.34 1.00          
Global BC 0.50 0.40 1.00         
Start WCI 0.04 -0.19 -0.08 1.00        
During WCI 0.15 0.15 -0.07 0.05 1.00       
End WCI 0.11 -0.10 -0.03 0.09 0.02 1.00      
Word Count 0.30 0.11 0.35 -0.06 0.01 -0.08 1.00     
Country Risk -0.40 -0.51 -0.27 0.02 -0.46 -0.02 -0.04 1.00    
ln(global EPU) 0.55 0.12 0.36 0.13 0.05 0.04 0.42 -0.05 1.00     
            
Panel D: Denmark           
















EPU)     
RD 1.00           
Local BC 0.29 1.00          
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Global BC 0.46 0.38 1.00         
Start WCI -0.01 -0.14 -0.08 1.00        
During WCI 0.17 -0.27 -0.07 0.05 1.00       
End WCI -0.07 -0.06 -0.03 0.09 0.02 1.00      
Word Count 0.29 0.24 0.35 -0.06 0.01 -0.08 1.00     
Country Risk -0.10 0.01 -0.09 0.06 -0.02 -0.01 -0.17 1.00    
ln(global EPU) 0.44 0.28 0.36 0.13 0.05 0.04 0.42 0.07 1.00     
            
Panel E: Finland           
















EPU)     
RD 1.00           
Local BC 0.29 1.00          
Global BC 0.41 0.56 1.00         
Start WCI 0.03 -0.02 -0.08 1.00        
During WCI 0.35 -0.12 -0.07 0.05 1.00       
End WCI -0.04 0.00 -0.03 0.09 0.02 1.00      
Word Count 0.28 0.26 0.35 -0.06 0.01 -0.08 1.00     
Country Risk 0.14 0.16 -0.03 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.13 1.00    
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Panel F: France           



















RD 1.00           
Local BC 0.41 1.00          
Global BC 0.32 0.53 1.00         
Start WCI 0.14 -0.02 -0.08 1.00        
During WCI 0.42 0.32 0.00 -0.06 1.00       
End WCI 0.03 0.01 -0.02 0.20 -0.09 1.00      
Word Count 0.27 0.36 0.33 -0.07 0.17 -0.10 1.00     
Country Risk 0.40 0.46 -0.02 0.01 0.32 0.04 0.19 1.00    
ln(local EPU) 0.04 -0.33 0.01 0.12 -0.32 0.01 0.23 -0.20 1.00   
ln(global EPU) 0.55 0.31 0.38 0.10 0.08 0.05 0.61 0.26 0.54 1.00  
VIX 0.77 0.18 0.24 0.15 0.29 0.06 0.32 0.30 0.37 0.77 1.00 
            
Panel G: Germany           



















RD 1.00           
Local BC 0.38 1.00          
Global BC 0.46 0.60 1.00         
Start WCI 0.02 -0.01 -0.08 1.00        
During WCI 0.22 -0.13 -0.07 0.05 1.00       
End WCI 0.02 0.04 -0.03 0.09 0.02 1.00      
Word Count 0.31 0.16 0.35 -0.06 0.01 -0.08 1.00     
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Country Risk 0.16 0.41 0.30 0.04 0.14 0.04 -0.02 1.00    
ln(local EPU) 0.46 0.22 0.21 0.11 0.16 0.02 0.40 0.14 1.00   
ln(global EPU) 0.60 0.31 0.36 0.13 0.05 0.04 0.42 0.09 0.67 1.00  
VIX 0.66 0.24 0.15 0.14 0.26 0.05 0.16 -0.01 0.52 0.73 1.00 
            
Panel H: Ireland           


















EPU)   
RD 1.00           
Local BC 0.38 1.00          
Global BC 0.40 0.37 1.00         
Start WCI 0.07 -0.02 -0.08 1.00        
During WCI 0.02 -0.06 -0.07 0.05 1.00       
End WCI 0.01 0.03 -0.03 0.09 0.02 1.00      
Word Count 0.33 0.27 0.35 -0.06 0.01 -0.08 1.00     
Country Risk -0.24 -0.21 -0.24 0.09 0.11 0.09 -0.28 1.00    
ln(local EPU) 0.31 0.17 0.18 -0.16 -0.08 0.06 0.18 -0.24 1.00   
ln(global EPU) 0.43 0.26 0.36 0.13 0.05 0.04 0.42 -0.06 0.42 1.00   
 
Panel I: Italy           


















EPU)   
RD 1.00           
Local BC 0.14 1.00          
Global BC 0.14 0.63 1.00         
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Start WCI 0.00 -0.03 -0.08 1.00        
During WCI 0.13 -0.14 -0.07 0.05 1.00       
End WCI 0.04 0.02 -0.03 0.09 0.02 1.00      
Word Count 0.03 0.18 0.35 -0.06 0.01 -0.08 1.00     
Country Risk 0.08 -0.21 -0.17 0.11 0.02 0.03 -0.33 1.00    
ln(local EPU) 0.24 -0.05 -0.03 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.06 0.41 1.00   
ln(global EPU) 0.27 0.35 0.36 0.13 0.05 0.04 0.42 0.18 0.55 1.00   
            
Panel J: Japan           



















RD 1.00           
Local BC 0.08 1.00          
Global BC 0.22 0.58 1.00         
Start WCI -0.01 0.07 -0.10 1.00        
During WCI 0.40 -0.15 -0.10 0.04 1.00       
End WCI -0.03 0.00 -0.04 0.09 0.01 1.00      
Word Count 0.15 0.11 0.35 -0.14 -0.15 -0.15 1.00     
Country Risk -0.17 -0.12 -0.21 -0.05 -0.30 -0.03 -0.05 1.00    
ln(local EPU) 0.21 0.31 0.18 0.06 0.11 0.08 0.18 -0.39 1.00   
ln(global EPU) 0.16 0.38 0.36 0.11 0.02 0.04 0.47 -0.16 0.63 1.00  
VIX 0.31 0.42 0.45 0.04 0.02 -0.03 0.26 -0.23 0.45 0.73 1.00 
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Panel K: Netherlands 


















EPU)   
RD 1.00           
Local BC 0.65 1.00          
Global BC 0.60 0.77 1.00         
Start WCI -0.03 0.02 0.04 1.00        
During WCI 0.03 -0.07 0.00 -0.07 1.00       
End WCI -0.11 0.04 0.01 0.09 -0.06 1.00      
Word Count 0.31 0.31 0.27 -0.11 0.08 -0.11 1.00     
Country Risk -0.05 0.01 0.11 0.04 -0.31 -0.03 -0.22 1.00    
ln(local EPU) 0.52 0.60 0.43 -0.03 -0.05 -0.08 0.52 -0.32 1.00   
ln(global EPU) 0.67 0.61 0.58 -0.04 0.03 -0.05 0.65 -0.08 0.73 1.00   
            
Panel L: Norway           
















EPU)     
RD 1.00           
Local BC 0.26 1.00          
Global BC 0.29 0.20 1.00         
Start WCI 0.12 0.06 -0.08 1.00        
During WCI 0.29 0.02 -0.07 0.05 1.00       
End WCI 0.05 0.07 -0.03 0.09 0.02 1.00      
Word Count 0.41 0.24 0.35 -0.06 0.01 -0.08 1.00     
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Country Risk -0.13 -0.09 -0.13 0.06 -0.54 0.02 -0.03 1.00    
ln(global EPU) 0.61 0.44 0.36 0.13 0.05 0.04 0.42 -0.04 1.00     
          
Panel M: New Zealand          
















EPU)     
RD 1.00           
Local BC -0.02 1.00          
Global BC 0.26 -0.01 1.00         
Start WCI 0.08 -0.11 -0.08 1.00        
During WCI 0.26 -0.02 -0.07 0.05 1.00       
End WCI 0.01 -0.11 -0.03 0.09 0.02 1.00      
Word Count 0.25 -0.24 0.35 -0.06 0.01 -0.08 1.00     
Country Risk -0.32 0.21 -0.40 -0.15 -0.39 -0.07 -0.38 1.00    
ln(global EPU) 0.34 -0.14 0.36 0.13 0.05 0.04 0.42 -0.30 1.00     
            
Panel N: Spain           


















EPU)   
RD 1.00           
Local BC 0.49 1.00          
Global BC 0.47 0.66 1.00         
Start WCI 0.11 0.01 -0.06 1.00        
During WCI 0.20 -0.11 -0.06 0.04 1.00       
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End WCI 0.11 0.01 -0.06 0.21 -0.03 1.00      
Word Count 0.25 0.20 0.32 -0.06 0.17 -0.12 1.00     
Country Risk -0.36 -0.49 -0.35 0.08 0.06 0.10 -0.19 1.00    
ln(local EPU) 0.17 0.09 0.02 0.11 0.18 0.06 0.40 0.24 1.00   
ln(global EPU) 0.50 0.40 0.41 0.08 0.25 0.01 0.64 -0.12 0.71 1.00   
            
Panel O: Sweden           


















EPU)   
RD 1.00           
Local BC 0.02 1.00          
Global BC 0.41 0.21 1.00         
Start WCI 0.07 -0.05 -0.08 1.00        
During WCI 0.32 -0.05 -0.07 0.05 1.00       
End WCI 0.10 0.01 -0.03 0.09 0.02 1.00      
Word Count 0.26 0.22 0.35 -0.06 0.01 -0.08 1.00     
Country Risk -0.35 0.11 -0.03 -0.03 -0.42 -0.07 0.28 1.00    
ln(local EPU) 0.24 -0.04 -0.02 0.20 0.28 0.08 -0.37 -0.43 1.00   
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Panel P: Switzerland           
















EPU)     
RD 1.00           
Local BC 0.46 1.00          
Global BC 0.27 0.79 1.00         
Start WCI 0.04 -0.01 -0.08 1.00        
During WCI 0.22 -0.06 -0.07 0.05 1.00       
End WCI 0.08 0.04 -0.03 0.09 0.02 1.00      
Word Count 0.36 0.45 0.35 -0.06 0.01 -0.08 1.00     
Country Risk 0.21 0.05 -0.15 0.03 -0.17 0.08 0.24 1.00    
ln(global EPU) 0.65 0.49 0.36 0.13 0.05 0.04 0.42 0.04 1.00     
            
Panel Q: UK           



















RD 1.00           
Local BC 0.24 1.00          
Global BC 0.48 0.54 1.00         
Start WCI 0.09 -0.07 -0.08 1.00        
During WCI 0.29 -0.03 0.00 -0.06 1.00       
End WCI -0.09 0.00 -0.02 0.20 -0.09 1.00      
Word Count 0.45 0.23 0.33 -0.07 0.17 -0.10 1.00     
Country Risk -0.07 -0.14 -0.25 0.01 0.16 -0.02 -0.13 1.00    
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ln(local EPU) 0.30 0.09 0.27 0.02 -0.14 0.03 0.44 -0.39 1.00   
ln(global EPU) 0.60 0.16 0.38 0.10 0.08 0.05 0.61 -0.16 0.75 1.00  
VIX 0.69 0.10 0.36 0.10 0.29 0.02 0.38 -0.23 0.54 0.78 1.00 
            
Panel R: US           



















RD 1.00           
Local BC 0.43 1.00          
Global BC 0.44 0.82 1.00         
Start WCI 0.01 -0.07 -0.08 1.00        
During WCI 0.39 -0.04 -0.07 0.05 1.00       
End WCI 0.05 -0.03 -0.03 0.09 0.02 1.00      
Word Count 0.25 0.42 0.35 -0.06 0.01 -0.08 1.00     
Country Risk 0.35 -0.04 0.01 0.02 0.40 0.02 -0.39 1.00    
ln(local EPU) 0.41 0.41 0.42 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.57 -0.23 1.00   
ln(global EPU) 0.42 0.33 0.36 0.13 0.05 0.04 0.42 -0.07 0.90 1.00  









Appendix A 2 Return Dispersion and Number of Crisis Starting in a Month (Crisis start), during a Month (Crisis during), and Ending in a 
Month (Crisis end) 
This table shows the results of return dispersion regress on international political crisis with the control of business cycle in each country (𝑅𝐷𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐵𝐶_𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑡 +
𝛽2𝐵𝐶_𝑔𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠_𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠_𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠_𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡). 𝑅𝐷𝑡 is the return dispersion of the largest 50 market capitalization stocks in each country at 
time t. 𝐵𝐶_𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑡 and 𝐵𝐶_𝑔𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑡 are the dummy variables for business cycle (1= recession, 0 = expansion) in local country and global respectively. 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠_𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑡, 
𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠_𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑡 and 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠_𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑡 are numbers of crisis starting at month t, during month t and ending at month t. System shows the results of pooled OLS and Sur shows 
the results of seemingly unrelated regression. I use robust standard errors. Coefficients are in percentage.  
  Constant t-value Local BC t-value Global BC t-value Crisis start t-value Crisis during t-value Crisis End t-value Adjusted R2 
Australia 6.45 20.68 0.43 0.65 4.24 4.20 0.40 1.33 0.17 0.84 0.54 1.59 0.10 
Austria 8.04 20.04 1.97 2.68 5.11 4.06 -0.26 -0.84 -0.03 -0.21 0.59 1.00 0.18 
Belgium  6.17 16.71 0.21 0.48 5.77 5.55 -0.02 -0.06 0.02 0.13 0.30 0.96 0.21 
Denmark 7.28 27.31 0.10 0.22 6.76 4.35 0.06 0.19 0.31 2.39 -0.44 -1.69 0.22 
Finland 7.38 20.56 2.14 3.24 3.57 3.36 0.39 1.33 0.72 4.30 0.22 0.80 0.17 
France  5.91 25.39 1.37 3.80 2.16 3.27 0.11 0.38 0.22 1.70 0.08 0.25 0.13 
Germany 6.76 25.13 -0.11 -0.12 5.78 6.07 0.07 0.23 -0.06 -0.47 -0.03 -0.09 0.23 
Ireland 7.59 15.15 3.85 4.81 5.71 3.58 0.68 1.21 0.94 3.54 -0.07 -0.15 0.22 
Italy 7.37 16.06 1.27 2.13 1.33 2.26 -0.36 -1.17 -0.08 -0.39 0.18 0.53 0.02 
Japan 6.88 18.57 -0.05 -0.10 3.23 4.71 0.53 1.44 0.21 1.20 -0.09 -0.29 0.05 
NL 6.74 18.10 3.72 3.46 1.56 1.39 0.32 0.73 0.12 0.70 -0.20 -0.47 0.16 
Norway 9.58 16.41 2.06 2.27 3.50 3.46 0.20 0.46 0.20 0.86 -0.25 -0.64 0.06 
NZ 7.92 15.97 0.00 0.00 1.12 1.58 1.09 1.76 0.76 3.50 -0.06 -0.16 0.04 
Spain 6.07 20.76 1.06 1.93 2.55 2.89 0.99 2.57 0.48 2.89 0.82 2.42 0.13 
Sweden 6.22 23.83 -0.77 -2.24 4.05 6.65 0.51 1.47 0.74 5.17 0.42 1.29 0.19 
Switzerland 6.23 25.01 3.08 2.00 1.03 0.62 -0.08 -0.33 0.13 1.07 0.29 0.96 0.15 
UK 6.29 22.04 -0.61 -1.94 5.49 6.14 0.57 2.23 0.13 1.18 -0.54 -2.20 0.23 
US 5.88 28.03 0.93 1.85 4.27 4.97 -0.11 -0.54 0.20 1.99 -0.03 -0.15 0.24 
 
             
System 6.92 68.85 0.84 5.86 4.01 19.89 0.28 3.07 0.30 6.59 0.11 1.26  





Appendix A 3 Return Dispersion and Word Count Uncertainty for Word “Risk” 
This table shows the regression of return dispersion on word count uncertainty around the world. I count the number of Bloomberg reports in every month that contains 
the word “risk” and take a log of it (Word Count Risk). I run the regression in the form of 𝑅𝐷𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙_𝐵𝐶𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑔𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙_𝐵𝐶𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡 +
𝛽5𝐸𝑛𝑑 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽6 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑑 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑣𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 where BC is the business cycle dummy, Start Crisis is crisis starting in month t, During Crisis is the ongoing crisis in month 
t and End Crisis is the crisis ending in month t. System shows the results of pooled OLS and Sur shows the results of seemingly unrelated regression. I use robust 
standard errors. Coefficients are in percentage.  





























Australia 10.79 6.62 -0.03 -0.04 5.10 4.85 0.11 1.07 0.03 0.55 0.01 0.16 -0.52 -2.72 0.13 
Austria 4.63 3.27 1.95 2.71 4.50 3.54 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.03 0.18 1.18 0.43 2.53 0.20 
Belgium  0.92 0.57 0.75 1.61 4.85 4.72 0.15 1.78 0.07 1.67 0.14 1.59 0.61 3.56 0.26 
Denmark 1.75 1.75 0.60 1.29 5.89 3.84 0.14 1.66 0.18 4.40 -0.08 -1.27 0.63 5.35 0.27 
Finland 8.60 5.59 2.02 2.87 3.99 3.53 0.12 1.40 0.28 5.83 -0.03 -0.37 -0.19 -1.08 0.23 
France  3.31 3.29 1.32 3.73 1.95 2.75 0.14 1.46 0.14 3.78 0.05 0.51 0.28 2.30 0.18 
Germany 1.18 1.23 0.46 0.47 4.85 5.12 0.17 2.08 0.08 2.61 0.04 0.43 0.63 5.36 0.30 
Ireland 5.18 2.77 3.72 4.65 5.29 3.17 0.29 1.52 0.24 3.33 -0.07 -0.59 0.35 1.49 0.22 
Italy 4.57 4.38 1.21 2.06 1.13 1.66 -0.01 -0.06 0.09 1.61 0.08 0.80 0.27 1.80 0.03 
Japan 3.30 2.47 0.10 0.20 2.80 3.97 0.19 1.86 0.18 3.36 0.04 0.47 0.37 2.47 0.10 
Netherlands 1.09 0.82 3.63 3.51 0.87 0.73 0.23 1.91 0.15 3.24 -0.05 -0.42 0.65 3.87 0.22 
Norway 8.31 4.71 1.98 2.19 3.57 3.44 0.12 0.80 0.17 2.46 -0.08 -0.73 0.09 0.45 0.08 
New Zealand 18.94 10.20 0.01 0.02 3.02 4.10 0.13 0.75 0.17 3.26 -0.17 -1.62 -1.36 -6.28 0.20 
Spain 10.68 9.02 1.24 2.17 3.33 3.77 0.31 3.03 0.15 3.33 0.16 1.34 -0.59 -4.26 0.21 
Sweden 6.06 6.05 -0.52 -1.56 4.09 6.57 0.22 1.93 0.24 6.38 0.11 1.10 -0.01 -0.04 0.22 
Switzerland 1.92 1.75 2.82 1.94 0.69 0.42 0.08 1.12 0.12 2.63 0.14 1.65 0.49 4.00 0.20 
UK 1.78 1.91 -0.08 -0.25 4.66 5.15 0.26 3.31 0.14 4.53 -0.13 -2.02 0.49 4.44 0.30 
US -0.11 -0.13 1.11 3.03 3.35 4.17 0.08 1.54 0.18 5.66 0.09 1.19 0.67 6.53 0.36 
                
System 5.08 15.04 0.88 6.19 3.83 18.41 0.16 6.01 0.15 11.72 0.03 1.04 0.19 4.85  








I report all results using the changes in return dispersion. I measure the changes in return dispersion as the residuals from 
an AR(1) process estimated for the levels. I re-estimate the main results by using changes of return dispersion as dependent 
variables.  
Appendix B 1 Changes in Return Dispersion and Local Business Cycles 
This table reports the results of the univariate regressions of 𝑅𝐷𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐵𝐶_𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡, where 𝑅𝐷𝑡 is the change in return dispersion. Local BC is a dummy variable 
that equals one if the country is in recession and zero otherwise. System shows the results of pooled OLS and Sur shows the results of seemingly unrelated regression. 
I use robust standard errors. Coefficients are in percentage.  
  constant t-value local BC t-value Adjusted R2 
Australia 0.04 0.19 0.71 1.07 0.00 
Austria -0.12 -0.59 1.82 2.49 0.03 
Belgium  -0.12 -0.74 0.43 0.87 0.00 
Denmark -0.08 -0.42 0.37 0.70 0.00 
Finland -0.04 -0.21 1.75 2.85 0.02 
France  -0.19 -1.43 0.71 2.56 0.02 
Germany -0.03 -0.21 1.09 1.01 0.01 
Ireland -0.56 -1.98 2.41 3.32 0.04 
Italy -0.14 -0.70 1.33 2.43 0.01 
Japan 0.00 0.03 0.30 0.83 0.00 
Netherlands -0.25 -1.61 1.63 2.14 0.03 
Norway 0.06 0.25 1.39 1.62 0.01 
New Zealand 0.23 0.97 -0.17 -0.24 0.00 
Spain -0.14 -0.86 1.32 2.01 0.02 
Sweden 0.22 1.20 -0.27 -0.81 0.00 
Switzerland -0.15 -1.22 1.71 2.26 0.05 
UK -0.04 -0.26 0.34 0.90 0.00 
US -0.06 -0.54 0.82 1.78 0.02 
      
System -0.07 -1.57 0.85 7.56  
Sur 0.03 0.39 0.24 2.65   
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Appendix B 2 Changes in Return Dispersion and Global Business Cycles 
This table reports the coefficients estimates and t-statistics of the regression in the form of 𝑅𝐷𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝐵𝐶𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑔l𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙 𝐵𝐶𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡, where 𝑅𝐷𝑡 is the change in return 
dispersion at time t, 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝐵𝐶𝑡 and 𝑔𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙 𝐵𝐶𝑡 are the contemporaneous dummy variable for business cycle (1= recession, 0 = expansion) in local country and global 
respectively. System shows the results of pooled OLS and Sur shows the results of seemingly unrelated regression. I use robust standard errors. Coefficients are in 
percentage.  
 
  constant t-value local BC t-value global BC t-value Adjusted R2 
Australia -0.05 -0.28 0.22 0.41 1.78 1.95 0.02 
Austria -0.23 -1.10 0.90 1.42 2.92 2.82 0.07 
Belgium  -0.26 -1.53 -0.02 -0.04 2.90 3.26 0.07 
Denmark -0.27 -1.34 0.00 0.00 3.81 2.65 0.09 
Finland -0.13 -0.71 1.22 1.75 1.85 1.88 0.04 
France  -0.21 -1.54 0.55 1.88 0.85 1.39 0.03 
Germany -0.13 -1.05 0.28 0.34 2.02 2.31 0.05 
Ireland -0.64 -2.21 1.69 2.41 2.86 2.52 0.06 
Italy -0.20 -0.93 0.94 1.73 1.06 2.23 0.01 
Japan -0.02 -0.13 0.02 0.05 1.01 1.69 0.00 
Netherlands -0.27 -1.72 1.33 1.55 0.98 0.88 0.04 
Norway -0.05 -0.21 1.10 1.39 1.75 1.87 0.02 
New Zealand 0.21 0.82 -0.18 -0.25 0.34 0.47 -0.01 
Spain -0.17 -1.01 0.88 1.33 1.13 1.26 0.03 
Sweden 0.13 0.69 -0.50 -1.53 1.82 3.46 0.03 
Switzerland -0.15 -1.22 1.35 0.94 0.69 0.45 0.05 
UK -0.09 -0.61 -0.18 -0.72 2.21 2.36 0.05 
US -0.06 -0.53 0.18 0.47 1.21 1.44 0.03 
 
      
 
System -0.14 -3.05 0.40 3.40 1.85 11.12  
Sur -0.09 -1.18 0.12 1.31 1.71 6.20   
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Appendix B 3 Changes in Return Dispersion and International Political Crisis 
 
This table provides the results of changes in return dispersion regress on world crisis index with the control of business cycle in each country (𝑅𝐷𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝐵𝐶𝑡 +
𝛽2𝑔𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙 𝐵𝐶𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡_𝑊𝐶𝐼𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔_𝑊𝐶𝐼𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐸𝑛𝑑_𝑊𝐶𝐼𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡). 𝑅𝐷𝑡 is the change in return dispersion at time t. 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝐵𝐶𝑡 and 𝑔𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙 𝐵𝐶𝑡 are the dummy variables 
for business cycle (1= recession, 0 = expansion) in local country and global respectively. 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡_𝑊𝐶𝐼𝑡, 𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔_𝑊𝐶𝐼𝑡 and 𝐸𝑛𝑑_𝑊𝐶𝐼𝑡 are ongoing crisis starting at month 
t, during month t and ending at month t. System shows the results of pooled OLS and Sur shows the results of seemingly unrelated regression. I use robust standard 
errors. Coefficients are in percentage.  
  Constant t-value Local BC t-value Global BC t-value Start WCI t-value During WCI t-value End WCI t-value Adjusted R2 
Australia -0.29 -1.01 0.16 0.28 1.93 2.14 0.12 1.24 0.01 0.16 0.06 0.79 0.02 
Austria -0.31 -0.95 0.83 1.27 2.98 2.85 -0.10 -1.18 -0.01 -0.15 0.22 1.43 0.08 
Belgium  -0.40 -1.12 -0.01 -0.02 2.94 3.29 -0.02 -0.24 0.01 0.29 0.09 1.22 0.07 
Denmark -0.61 -2.56 0.02 0.05 3.90 2.75 0.12 1.41 0.08 1.92 -0.18 -2.51 0.10 
Finland -1.00 -2.92 1.05 1.51 2.18 2.22 0.13 1.72 0.16 3.40 -0.08 -1.05 0.08 
France  -0.43 -2.59 0.47 1.57 0.97 1.56 0.04 0.53 0.04 1.42 -0.03 -0.48 0.03 
Germany -0.22 -1.08 0.27 0.30 2.07 2.40 0.07 1.04 0.01 0.32 -0.03 -0.53 0.05 
Ireland -1.08 -2.65 1.74 2.48 3.00 2.61 0.19 1.17 0.07 1.08 -0.13 -0.91 0.07 
Italy -0.50 -1.16 0.80 1.46 1.19 2.30 -0.03 -0.32 0.06 1.04 0.04 0.44 0.01 
Japan -0.41 -1.44 -0.02 -0.05 1.18 1.94 0.11 1.01 0.06 1.33 -0.02 -0.26 0.01 
Netherlands -0.38 -1.31 1.30 1.49 1.03 0.94 0.07 0.58 0.04 0.99 -0.15 -1.70 0.04 
Norway -0.59 -1.13 1.02 1.25 1.95 2.03 0.18 1.49 0.09 1.43 -0.10 -0.93 0.02 
New Zealand -0.51 -1.12 -0.10 -0.14 0.59 0.80 0.20 1.40 0.11 1.91 -0.06 -0.55 0.00 
Spain -0.85 -3.76 0.74 1.17 1.53 1.70 0.25 2.07 0.06 1.48 0.12 1.29 0.06 
Sweden -0.71 -2.67 -0.39 -1.24 2.06 3.80 0.11 0.73 0.12 3.50 0.08 1.01 0.06 
Switzerland -0.47 -2.03 1.37 0.95 0.77 0.50 -0.02 -0.27 0.04 1.08 0.11 1.59 0.05 
UK -0.18 -0.82 -0.21 -0.81 2.28 2.48 0.19 3.11 0.02 0.71 -0.21 -3.60 0.10 
US -0.30 -1.69 0.14 0.37 1.30 1.55 -0.02 -0.31 0.05 1.78 0.00 0.04 0.03 
 
             
System -0.53 -6.63 0.39 3.28 1.99 11.89 0.09 4.18 0.06 5.45 -0.01 -0.65  





Appendix B 4 Changes in Return Dispersion and Word Count Uncertainty 
This table reports the regression of changes in return dispersion on word count uncertainty around the world. I run the regression in the form of 𝑅𝐷𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙_𝐵𝐶𝑡 +
𝛽2𝑔𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙_𝐵𝐶𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐸𝑛𝑑 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽6 𝑙𝑛(𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑦)𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 where 𝑅𝐷𝑡 is the change in return dispersion. Local BC and 
global BC are business cycle dummies, Start Crisis is crisis starting in month t, During Crisis is the ongoing crisis in month t and End Crisis is the crisis ending in month 
t. Word count uncertainty is the number of Bloomberg reports in every month that contains the word “uncertainty” and take a log of it. System shows the results of 


































Australia 0.95 0.79 0.02 0.03 2.26 2.41 0.10 1.03 0.00 0.03 0.04 0.48 -0.19 -1.07 0.02 
Austria -2.33 -2.13 0.80 1.23 2.55 2.40 -0.06 -0.78 0.00 0.04 0.25 1.68 0.31 1.89 0.09 
Belgium  -2.26 -1.69 0.21 0.46 2.46 2.75 0.02 0.19 0.02 0.45 0.12 1.57 0.28 1.67 0.08 
Denmark -3.11 -3.61 0.25 0.59 3.29 2.33 0.16 1.89 0.09 2.19 -0.14 -1.85 0.37 2.92 0.11 
Finland -0.86 -0.64 1.03 1.40 2.22 2.16 0.12 1.60 0.16 3.27 -0.08 -1.00 -0.02 -0.12 0.08 
France  -1.38 -1.81 0.51 1.67 0.73 1.11 0.06 0.70 0.05 1.47 -0.01 -0.21 0.14 1.33 0.03 
Germany -2.26 -3.18 0.62 0.68 1.49 1.73 0.10 1.51 0.02 0.60 -0.01 -0.09 0.31 2.88 0.07 
Ireland -1.49 -0.95 1.71 2.38 2.92 2.42 0.20 1.15 0.07 1.08 -0.12 -0.84 0.06 0.27 0.06 
Italy -2.37 -3.30 1.01 1.89 0.68 1.10 0.01 0.08 0.06 1.17 0.07 0.73 0.28 2.12 0.02 
Japan -1.83 -1.94 0.02 0.06 0.83 1.31 0.13 1.24 0.06 1.43 0.00 0.05 0.21 1.66 0.02 
NL -2.63 -2.47 1.25 1.48 0.56 0.47 0.11 0.90 0.05 1.25 -0.11 -1.35 0.34 2.05 0.05 
Norway -1.90 -1.23 0.98 1.20 1.67 1.73 0.20 1.56 0.09 1.48 -0.08 -0.71 0.20 1.01 0.02 
NZ 4.15 2.59 0.07 0.10 1.64 2.15 0.11 0.81 0.09 1.63 -0.14 -1.22 -0.71 -3.18 0.05 
Spain 0.75 0.86 0.78 1.22 1.86 2.06 0.22 1.84 0.05 1.29 0.09 0.99 -0.24 -1.87 0.07 
Sweden -1.12 -1.52 -0.42 -1.33 1.98 3.41 0.12 0.79 0.12 3.54 0.09 1.07 0.06 0.55 0.06 
Switzerla
nd -2.60 -2.59 1.15 0.84 0.48 0.31 0.02 0.28 0.05 1.22 0.14 2.15 0.33 2.42 0.07 
UK -1.80 -2.51 -0.02 -0.07 1.82 1.95 0.22 3.54 0.03 1.00 -0.18 -3.17 0.24 2.33 0.11 
US -1.74 -2.77 0.20 0.55 0.92 1.09 0.01 0.20 0.06 1.95 0.03 0.43 0.22 2.40 0.05 
                
System -1.36 -5.70 0.41 3.49 1.79 10.20 0.10 4.79 0.06 5.75 0.00 -0.01 0.13 3.71  




Appendix B 5 Changes in Return Dispersion and Country Risk 
This table reports the relation between changes in return dispersion and international country risk. I run the regression in the form of 𝑅𝐷𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝐵𝐶𝑡 +
𝛽2𝑔𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙 𝐵𝐶𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡_𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔_𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐸𝑛𝑑_𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑑𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 where 𝑅𝐷𝑡 is the change in return dispersion. 𝐵𝐶_𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑡 
and 𝐵𝐶_𝑔𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑡 are the dummy variables for business cycle (1= recession, 0 = expansion) in local country and global respectively. 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡_𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡, 𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔_𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡 and 
𝐸𝑛𝑑_𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡 are ongoing crisis starting at month t, during month t and ending at month t. 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑑𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑡 is the log number of the counts of Bloomberg reports in every 
month that contains the word “uncertainty”. 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑡 is the country-level uncertainty obtained from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) composite index. 
System shows the results of pooled OLS and Sur shows the results of seemingly unrelated regression. I use robust standard errors. Coefficients are in percentage.  

































Australia 16.45 1.99 0.17 0.28 1.70 1.94 0.07 0.73 -0.01 -0.27 0.03 0.36 -0.04 -0.21 -0.20 -2.01 0.03 
Austria -8.07 -0.90 0.84 1.28 2.60 2.45 -0.06 -0.74 0.00 0.01 0.25 1.69 0.34 2.00 0.06 0.65 0.08 
Belgium  13.78 1.56 -0.02 -0.04 2.11 2.50 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.35 0.11 1.43 0.34 2.26 -0.20 -1.99 0.09 
Denmark 3.76 0.59 0.27 0.62 3.18 2.27 0.16 1.92 0.09 2.14 -0.14 -1.85 0.47 2.76 -0.09 -1.07 0.11 
Finland 0.44 0.06 1.03 1.40 2.21 2.14 0.13 1.59 0.16 3.18 -0.08 -0.98 0.01 0.03 -0.02 -0.20 0.07 
France  -9.42 -1.65 0.45 1.43 0.84 1.28 0.07 0.80 0.04 1.26 -0.01 -0.13 0.19 1.54 0.10 1.51 0.04 
Germany -11.32 -1.42 1.18 1.11 0.96 1.14 0.06 0.59 0.07 2.02 -0.01 -0.07 0.69 3.32 0.07 0.83 0.09 
Ireland 6.45 0.90 1.61 2.28 2.64 2.22 0.20 1.16 0.06 0.82 -0.11 -0.81 0.29 1.21 -0.11 -1.24 0.07 
Italy -2.87 -0.60 1.03 1.81 0.68 1.10 0.01 0.07 0.06 1.14 0.07 0.72 0.28 2.11 0.01 0.11 0.01 
Japan -3.71 -0.61 0.04 0.10 0.85 1.32 0.13 1.22 0.07 1.47 0.00 0.07 0.24 1.56 0.02 0.31 0.01 
Netherlands -20.17 -1.95 0.84 1.06 0.59 0.50 0.09 0.75 0.05 1.25 -0.12 -1.42 0.49 2.35 0.19 1.76 0.06 
Norway -3.97 -0.43 0.97 1.19 1.69 1.75 0.20 1.54 0.10 1.61 -0.08 -0.70 0.16 0.62 0.03 0.22 0.02 
New 
Zealand 21.01 1.87 0.25 0.35 1.16 1.50 0.09 0.57 0.07 1.27 -0.14 -1.26 -0.90 -3.31 -0.19 -1.56 0.06 
Spain 6.58 0.96 0.70 1.08 1.70 2.04 0.22 1.80 0.04 1.14 0.09 1.00 -0.15 -0.86 -0.08 -0.85 0.07 
Sweden 5.36 1.10 -0.45 -1.40 1.98 3.44 0.12 0.80 0.10 2.92 0.09 1.06 0.09 0.83 -0.08 -1.37 0.06 
Switzerland -24.74 -1.83 0.96 0.76 0.73 0.50 0.01 0.11 0.07 1.40 0.13 2.12 0.55 2.37 0.23 1.71 0.09 
UK -8.34 -1.86 -0.10 -0.32 2.00 2.09 0.22 3.63 0.03 1.07 -0.18 -3.22 0.27 2.55 0.08 1.48 0.12 
US -8.24 -2.22 0.27 0.72 0.79 0.91 0.01 0.13 0.04 1.48 0.02 0.41 0.36 2.78 0.07 1.84 0.05 
                  
System -1.39 -1.62 0.42 3.48 1.79 10.14 0.10 4.70 0.06 5.83 0.00 0.03 0.13 3.70 0.00 0.01  





Appendix B 6 Changes in Return Dispersion and Economic Policy Uncertainty 
This table reports the results of changes in return dispersion regress on both local and global economic policy uncertainty. Regressions are in the form of𝑅𝐷𝑡 = 𝛼 +
𝛽1𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝐵𝐶𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐺𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙 𝐵𝐶𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐸𝑛𝑑 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑑𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑡 + 𝛽8 ln(𝐸𝑃𝑈𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙)𝑡 +𝛽9 ln(𝐸𝑃𝑈𝑔𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙)𝑡
+ 𝜀𝑡 
where  𝑅𝐷𝑡  is the change in return dispersion. I include two economic policy index, one is the country specific index (𝐸𝑃𝑈_𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙)  and the other is the global 
index (𝐸𝑃𝑈_𝑔𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙). System shows the results of pooled OLS and Sur shows the results of seemingly unrelated regression. I use robust standard errors. Coefficients 























Australia Coeff. (%) -1.16 1.04 0.95 0.17 -0.08 0.31 0.56 0.00 2.93 -3.60 144 0.13 
 t-Stat -0.08 0.52 1.04 1.09 -1.00 1.94 1.09 0.02 3.41 -2.44   
France Coeff. (%) -11.34 0.29 0.26 -0.05 0.10 -0.10 -0.24 0.03 -0.26 2.64 156 0.09 
 t-Stat -0.93 0.38 0.33 -0.25 1.24 -1.18 -0.50 0.25 -0.54 2.52   
Germany Coeff. (%) -15.04 1.40 0.54 0.03 0.09 -0.02 0.06 0.06 0.43 1.74 156 0.07 
 t-Stat -1.04 0.63 0.54 0.21 1.58 -0.15 0.16 0.41 0.66 1.41   
Ireland Coeff. (%) -9.76 1.37 2.41 0.26 0.04 -0.15 -0.10 -0.01 0.92 1.60 156 0.05 
 t-Stat -0.55 1.52 1.91 0.63 0.37 -0.44 -0.15 -0.11 0.94 0.85   
Italy Coeff. (%) -6.09 1.14 0.70 -0.04 0.10 0.07 -0.50 -0.07 2.06 1.21 156 0.02 
 t-Stat -0.63 1.45 1.44 -0.28 0.95 0.33 -1.17 -0.69 2.73 1.30   
Japan Coeff. (%) -5.94 0.19 0.80 0.16 0.13 0.00 0.43 0.04 0.99 -1.26 156 0.00 
 t-Stat -0.54 0.30 1.05 1.18 1.77 -0.04 0.69 0.45 1.05 -1.01   
Netherland Coeff. (%) 10.02 1.71 1.36 -0.18 -0.06 -0.23 -0.99 -0.09 -0.67 1.72 82 0.06 
 t-Stat 0.61 0.71 1.11 -1.02 -0.49 -1.57 -1.05 -0.50 -0.55 0.71   
Spain Coeff. (%) 0.14 1.29 0.95 0.04 0.11 0.13 -0.74 -0.05 -0.28 2.08 108 0.08 
 t-Stat 0.01 1.48 0.90 0.13 1.11 0.62 -0.83 -0.27 -0.39 1.28   
Sweden Coeff. (%) -2.49 -0.38 1.41 -0.02 0.07 0.13 0.88 -0.16 1.94 0.18 156 0.11 
 t-Stat -0.23 -0.84 2.16 -0.15 1.41 0.94 1.44 -1.64 1.39 0.16   
UK Coeff. (%) -12.50 -0.04 1.19 0.16 0.04 -0.24 0.21 0.01 -1.50 3.80 156 0.13 
 t-Stat -1.58 -0.08 1.23 1.25 0.76 -2.32 0.49 0.13 -2.03 2.91   
US Coeff. (%) -14.13 0.18 0.45 -0.03 0.08 0.00 -0.10 0.09 1.60 0.18 156 0.04 
 t-Stat -1.91 0.31 0.51 -0.29 1.33 -0.01 -0.23 1.59 0.96 0.13   
System Coeff. (%) -8.37 0.43 1.20 0.06 0.09 0.00 -0.14 0.02 0.47 1.25   
 t-Stat -3.42 1.90 4.48 1.13 4.18 0.08 -0.74 0.76 2.10 3.36   
Sur Coeff. (%) -6.24 0.18 1.25 0.06 0.09 0.05 -0.05 0.01 0.20 1.08   
  t-Stat -2.43 1.06 3.70 0.84 2.96 0.89 -0.18 0.33 1.19 2.44     
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Appendix B 7 Changes in Return Dispersion and Cross Section of Returns 
 
This table reports the four factor alphas of portfolios sorted by their sensitivity to changes in return dispersion. The four factors are market, size, value 
and momentum factors. I report the monthly value-weighted portfolio returns in panel A and equal-weighted portfolio returns in panel B. The coefficients 
are in percentage. 
Panel A: value weighted portfolio four-factor alphas  
 Low Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 High High - Low 
  Mean t-value Mean t-value Mean t-value Mean t-value Mean t-value Mean t-value 
Australia -3.77 -10.55 -0.85 -3.80 0.07 0.42 1.04 5.18 1.94 5.88 5.70 11.74 
Belgium -2.56 -5.22 -0.33 -0.97 0.34 1.35 0.20 0.72 2.05 5.31 4.61 7.38 
France -2.65 -7.57 -0.94 -3.94 -0.14 -0.68 0.57 2.57 2.24 7.38 4.90 10.56 
Germany -2.88 -6.31 -0.73 -2.82 -0.10 -0.39 0.59 2.25 1.87 4.75 4.76 7.89 
Italy -2.88 -7.19 -1.01 -3.09 -0.65 -2.08 0.11 0.33 1.80 4.77 4.67 8.50 
Japan -2.89 -10.08 -1.54 -7.69 -0.87 -4.90 0.12 0.65 1.86 7.33 4.75 12.41 
Netherland -3.35 -8.16 -0.80 -2.43 0.03 0.11 0.53 1.74 2.58 6.72 5.93 10.55 
Norway -4.05 -7.44 -1.02 -2.98 -0.15 -0.40 0.52 1.46 2.49 5.05 6.54 8.91 
Spain -3.30 -6.44 -0.76 -2.52 -0.17 -0.59 0.58 1.78 2.24 6.20 5.54 8.84 
Sweden -3.25 -7.18 -0.37 -1.03 0.19 0.55 1.52 4.52 3.46 8.03 6.71 10.74 
Switzerland -2.68 -6.97 -0.33 -1.28 0.08 0.33 0.44 1.35 2.77 7.24 5.45 10.05 
UK -3.22 -9.27 -0.63 -2.80 0.14 0.74 0.66 3.22 2.21 8.89 5.43 12.71 
US -1.94 -11.81 -0.58 -7.06 0.06 0.98 0.52 8.41 1.67 9.31 3.61 14.83 
             
average -3.03  -0.76  -0.09  0.57  2.25  5.28  
min -4.05  -1.54  -0.87  0.11  1.67  3.61  
max -1.94  -0.33  0.34  1.52  3.46  6.71  
median -2.89   -0.76   0.03   0.53   2.21   5.43   




(Appendix B7 Continued) 
Panel B: equally weighted portfolio four-factor alphas 
 Low Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 High High - Low 
  Mean t-value Mean t-value Mean t-value Mean t-value Mean t-value Mean t-value 
Australia -1.54 -3.88 -0.89 -4.15 -0.38 -2.17 -0.15 -0.75 0.28 0.80 1.81 3.46 
Belgium -0.72 -2.44 -0.13 -0.60 -0.01 -0.06 0.22 0.98 1.33 4.26 2.05 4.77 
France -0.76 -2.63 -0.47 -2.28 -0.26 -1.59 -0.09 -0.46 0.72 2.67 1.48 3.75 
Germany -1.04 -3.39 -0.69 -3.56 -0.52 -3.30 -0.59 -3.11 -0.45 -1.51 0.58 1.36 
Italy -1.32 -3.82 -1.24 -4.29 -0.90 -3.61 -0.65 -2.29 0.78 2.10 2.10 4.14 
Japan -1.01 -3.86 -1.15 -6.26 -0.96 -5.94 -0.57 -3.39 0.76 3.15 1.77 4.98 
Netherland -1.04 -3.48 -0.29 -1.39 -0.03 -0.16 -0.08 -0.39 0.92 2.84 1.97 4.45 
Norway -1.94 -3.75 -0.96 -2.51 -0.19 -0.55 0.47 1.36 1.56 3.15 3.50 4.88 
Spain -1.75 -4.71 -0.93 -3.56 -0.50 -2.18 0.12 0.45 1.10 3.31 2.85 5.72 
Sweden -1.11 -2.64 -0.32 -0.97 0.08 0.27 0.39 1.23 1.46 3.18 2.57 4.13 
Switzerland -1.09 -3.54 -0.04 -0.20 -0.01 -0.05 0.10 0.41 1.39 4.59 2.48 5.74 
UK -0.77 -2.54 -0.31 -1.46 -0.20 -1.05 -0.10 -0.48 0.51 1.60 1.28 2.91 
US 0.51 2.66 -0.24 -2.27 -0.16 -1.69 -0.04 -0.48 1.02 4.20 0.51 1.63 
             
average -1.04  -0.59  -0.31  -0.08  0.87  1.92  
min -1.94  -1.24  -0.96  -0.65  -0.45  0.51  
max 0.51  -0.04  0.08  0.47  1.56  3.50  






Appendix B 8 Changes in Implied Volatility and Uncertainties 
 
This table shows the results of implied volatility regress on uncertainties in G5 countries. Regressions are in the form of 𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡 = 𝛼 +
𝛽1𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝐵𝐶𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑔𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙 𝐵𝐶𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡_𝑊𝐶𝐼𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔_𝑊𝐶𝐼𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐸𝑛𝑑_𝑊𝐶𝐼𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑑𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦_𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑡 +
𝛽8ln (𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑃𝑈)𝑡  +𝛽9ln (𝑔𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑃𝑈)𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 . 𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡  is the changes in implied volatilities at time t in each country. 𝐵𝐶_𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑡  and 
𝐵𝐶_𝑔𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑡 are the dummy variables for business cycle (1= recession, 0 = expansion) in local country and global respectively. 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡_𝑊𝐶𝐼𝑡, 
𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔_𝑊𝐶𝐼𝑡 and 𝐸𝑛𝑑_𝑊𝐶𝐼𝑡 are ongoing crisis starting at month t, during month t and ending at month t. 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑑𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑡 is the log number 
of the counts of Bloomberg reports in every month that contains the word “uncertainty”. 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦_𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑡 represents the ICRG composite 
risk index for each country. I include two economic policy index, one is the country specific index (𝐸𝑃𝑈_𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙) and the other is the global 
index (𝐸𝑃𝑈_𝑔𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙). System shows the results of pooled OLS and Sur shows the results of seemingly unrelated regression. 
 





















France Coeff. (%) -39.73 -0.31 0.97 0.62 0.19 -0.28 -0.94 0.32 1.25 3.49 119.00 0.08 
 t-Stat -1.50 -0.16 0.69 1.38 1.00 -0.74 -0.60 0.99 1.04 1.32   
Germany Coeff. (%) -29.13 3.31 -1.75 0.03 0.06 -0.17 -0.78 0.12 1.03 4.61 156.00 0.05 
 t-Stat -1.19 0.92 -1.38 0.09 0.49 -0.63 -0.86 0.53 0.77 1.93   
Japan Coeff. (%) -18.48 1.74 -0.18 -0.27 -0.05 0.04 -0.45 -0.12 -1.62 8.84 143.00 0.11 
 t-Stat -0.85 1.03 -0.09 -0.98 -0.39 0.18 -0.30 -0.68 -1.12 2.40   
UK Coeff. (%) -6.79 -0.59 0.61 0.41 0.00 -0.14 -0.37 -0.12 -1.85 6.25 119.00 0.06 
 t-Stat -0.44 -0.78 0.52 1.03 -0.01 -0.59 -0.26 -0.90 -1.18 2.25   
US Coeff. (%) -24.14 -0.38 1.48 0.09 0.01 -0.19 -0.65 0.11 3.54 0.96 156.00 0.04 
 t-Stat -2.07 -0.31 0.87 0.34 0.09 -1.04 -0.87 1.15 1.32 0.31   
              
System Coeff. (%) -22.03 0.58 0.23 0.12 0.03 -0.14 -0.75 0.04 0.27 5.24   
 t-Stat -3.46 0.96 0.34 0.93 0.49 -1.20 -1.45 0.69 0.41 5.35   
Sur Coeff. (%) -11.86 0.19 1.17 -0.07 0.02 -0.09 -0.72 0.01 0.13 3.64   
  t-Stat -1.90 0.64 1.20 -0.37 0.31 -0.54 -1.17 0.28 0.34 3.08     
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Appendix B 9 Changes in Implied Volatility and Cross Section of Returns 
 
This table shows the factor alphas for the portfolios sorted by implied volatility loadings. I run the time-series regression using individual 
stock return regress on market return and changes in implied volatility: 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖,𝑅𝑀𝑅𝐹𝑅𝑀𝑅𝐹𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖,𝑣𝑖𝑥𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡, where 𝑅𝑀𝑅𝐹𝑡 is the 
market return and 𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡 is the change in implied volatility. Then I sort all stocks into quintile portfolios based on their loadings on 𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡. 
“Low” and “High” represent the portfolios that contains stocks that are most and least sensitive to implied volatility loadings. The results 
for the four factor alphas are in percentage. 
Panel A: value weighted portfolio four-factor alphas  
 Low Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 High High - Low 
  Mean t-value Mean t-value Mean t-value Mean t-value Mean t-value Mean t-value 
Australia -2.75 -3.64 -0.60 -1.63 -0.62 -1.81 -0.27 -0.64 -0.86 -1.44 1.89 1.95 
France -0.18 -0.46 -0.37 -1.15 -0.34 -1.22 -0.35 -1.27 -0.55 -1.27 -0.37 -0.64 
Germany -0.43 -0.78 -0.03 -0.10 -0.12 -0.45 -0.34 -1.11 -1.05 -2.09 -0.63 -0.84 
Japan -0.50 -1.60 -0.84 -3.53 -0.93 -3.88 -0.57 -2.28 -0.24 -0.68 0.26 0.56 
Netherland -1.21 -1.83 -0.06 -0.14 -0.27 -0.77 0.19 0.39 -1.23 -1.90 -0.03 -0.03 
Sweden -0.49 -0.90 -0.08 -0.20 0.31 0.85 0.28 0.65 -0.91 -1.53 -0.42 -0.52 
Switzerland 0.06 0.17 -0.14 -0.54 -0.01 -0.05 0.06 0.18 -0.12 -0.23 -0.18 -0.28 
UK -1.14 -2.59 -0.33 -1.21 0.02 0.10 0.04 0.18 -0.40 -1.04 0.75 1.29 
US -0.12 -0.75 0.08 0.84 0.08 1.05 0.00 -0.03 -0.04 -0.40 0.08 0.41 
             
average -0.75  -0.26  -0.21  -0.11  -0.60  0.15  
min -2.75  -0.84  -0.93  -0.57  -1.23  -0.63  
max 0.06  0.08  0.31  0.28  -0.04  1.89  
median -0.49   -0.14   -0.12   0.00   -0.55   -0.03   




(Appendix B9 Continued) 
 
Panel B: equally weighted portfolio four-factor alphas 
 Low Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 High High - Low 
  Mean t-value Mean t-value Mean t-value Mean t-value Mean t-value Mean t-value 
Australia -2.39 -4.00 -2.40 -5.55 -1.75 -4.86 -1.73 -4.37 -0.91 -1.40 1.48 1.67 
France -0.46 -1.14 -0.69 -2.72 -0.59 -2.55 -0.63 -2.64 0.08 0.19 0.53 0.95 
Germany -1.30 -3.39 -0.81 -3.70 -0.65 -3.79 -0.66 -3.03 -0.59 -1.63 0.71 1.35 
Japan -0.27 -0.91 -1.00 -4.77 -0.98 -4.99 -0.80 -3.64 0.21 0.64 0.47 1.09 
Netherland -1.03 -2.40 -0.60 -1.80 -0.25 -0.96 -0.68 -2.29 -1.01 -1.95 0.02 0.03 
Sweden -1.50 -3.70 -0.98 -3.23 -0.32 -1.05 -0.60 -1.85 -0.45 -0.99 1.05 1.72 
Switzerland -0.42 -1.33 -0.14 -0.69 -0.09 -0.53 0.09 0.44 0.07 0.21 -0.28 1.04 
UK -1.21 -3.96 -0.75 -3.64 -0.57 -3.10 -0.51 -2.68 -2.68 -1.64 0.71 1.65 
US 0.14 0.88 -0.06 -0.64 -0.05 -0.71 -0.03 -0.34 0.24 2.27 0.10 0.53 
             
average -0.94  -0.83  -0.58  -0.62  -0.56  0.53  
min -2.39  -2.40  -1.75  -1.73  -2.68  -0.28  
max 0.14  -0.06  -0.05  0.09  0.24  1.48  











This appendix contains the robustness results of return dispersion made by market index constituents. For Australia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Japan, Switzerland and the US, I construct return dispersion series using all constituents of their major market indices.   
 
Appendix C 1 Local Business Cycle 
This table shows the results of the regressions estimated in Table 3-2 using return dispersion made by market index constituents as the 
dependent variable. Local BC is a dummy variable that equals one if the country is in recession and zero otherwise. System shows the 
results of pooled OLS and Sur shows the results of seemingly unrelated regression. I use robust standard errors. Coefficients are in 
percentage.  
 
  constant t-value local BC t-value 
Adjusted 
R2 
Australia 10.97 53.96 2.33 1.77 0.03 
Finland 8.78 25.21 1.80 1.81 0.01 
France  6.25 32.34 1.89 4.94 0.10 
Germany 6.45 34.54 2.16 1.41 0.03 
Japan 7.58 42.91 1.60 3.80 0.06 
Switzerland 6.27 34.92 2.30 4.12 0.09 
US 8.30 49.30 3.78 7.01 0.23 
      
System   1.72 7.44  




Appendix C 2 Local and Global Business Cycles 
 
This table shows the results of regressions estimated in Table 3-3 using return dispersion made by market index constituents as 
dependent variable. Local BC and global BC are dummy variables that equal one if the country and global are in recession respectively, 
and zero otherwise. System shows the results of pooled OLS and Sur shows the results of seemingly unrelated regression. I use robust 
standard errors. Coefficients are in percentage.  
 





Australia 10.60 56.52 0.16 0.16 6.32 5.77 0.25 
Finland 8.46 25.12 0.06 0.06 5.57 4.29 0.09 
France  6.20 33.36 1.28 3.12 2.68 3.83 0.16 
Germany 6.15 32.08 0.24 0.24 4.93 5.64 0.18 
Japan 7.50 43.29 0.97 2.10 2.33 4.20 0.11 
Switzerland 6.27 34.85 1.17 1.36 2.17 2.12 0.11 
US 8.30 49.20 2.06 3.60 3.22 3.65 0.27 
        
System   0.24 0.96 4.38 13.54  






Appendix C 3 Business Cycles and International Political Crisis 
 
This table shows the results of regressions estimated in Table 3-5 using return dispersion made by market index constituents as the 
dependent variable. 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝐵𝐶𝑡 and 𝑔𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙 𝐵𝐶𝑡 are the dummy variables for business cycle (1= recession, 0 = expansion) in local country 
and global respectively. 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡_𝑊𝐶𝐼𝑡, 𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔_𝑊𝐶𝐼𝑡 and 𝐸𝑛𝑑_𝑊𝐶𝐼𝑡 are ongoing crisis starting at month t, during month t and ending at 
month t. System shows the results of pooled OLS and Sur shows the results of seemingly unrelated regression. I use robust standard 




























Australia 11.40 37.25 0.04 0.04 6.17 5.78 0.08 0.62 -0.13 -3.38 -0.18 -1.98 0.27 
Finland 7.17 9.19 -0.25 -0.24 6.04 4.53 0.09 0.48 0.24 2.61 -0.02 -0.15 0.11 
France  5.46 24.50 0.89 2.02 3.17 4.43 0.12 0.89 0.14 3.16 0.00 0.04 0.18 
Germany 5.92 20.54 0.23 0.20 5.01 5.88 0.08 0.55 0.04 0.99 -0.05 -0.33 0.17 
Japan 7.34 30.38 0.98 2.11 2.37 4.24 0.04 0.52 0.05 1.30 -0.17 -2.09 0.12 
Switzerland 5.41 21.01 1.21 1.42 2.41 2.36 0.19 1.55 0.11 2.69 0.11 1.14 0.14 
US 7.16 38.07 1.90 3.71 3.67 4.32 -0.01 -0.15 0.22 6.15 0.05 0.47 0.35 
 
             
System 7.15 47.25 0.14 0.58 4.61 14.18 0.10 2.29 0.10 4.93 -0.03 -0.68 
 






Appendix C 4 Business Cycles, International Political Crisis and Word Count Uncertainty 
 
This table reports the results of regressions estimated in Table 3-6 using return dispersion made by market index constituents as the 
dependent variable. Local BC and global BC are business cycle dummies, Start Crisis is crisis starting in month t, During Crisis is the 
ongoing crisis in month t and End Crisis is the crisis ending in month t. Word count uncertainty is the number of Bloomberg reports in 
every month that contains the word “uncertainty” and take a log of it. System shows the results of pooled OLS and Sur shows the results 
of seemingly unrelated regression. I use robust standard errors. Coefficients are in percentage.  
 





























Australia 9.45 7.70 0.24 0.24 5.73 5.33 0.10 0.83 -0.12 -3.14 -0.17 -1.79 0.28 1.61 0.28 
Finland 5.02 1.24 0.15 0.12 5.49 3.70 0.11 0.55 0.25 2.48 0.00 -0.01 0.32 0.63 0.11 
France  0.74 0.75 0.93 2.33 2.25 3.06 0.18 1.38 0.16 3.66 0.05 0.38 0.70 5.06 0.26 
Germany -1.97 -1.65 1.93 1.77 2.91 3.83 0.14 1.10 0.07 1.89 -0.02 -0.16 1.17 6.75 0.31 
Japan 3.37 3.60 1.27 2.84 1.46 2.47 0.08 0.95 0.07 1.73 -0.14 -1.83 0.58 4.51 0.18 
Switzerland 1.28 1.21 0.96 1.28 1.85 1.87 0.23 2.10 0.13 3.13 0.15 1.58 0.61 4.01 0.19 
US 2.15 2.74 2.31 4.98 2.35 2.73 0.04 0.64 0.24 7.37 0.09 1.01 0.74 6.34 0.42 
                
System 3.74 8.00 0.33 1.35 3.79 11.24 0.15 3.30 0.11 5.52 0.01 0.35 0.51 7.69  







Appendix C 5 Business Cycles, International Political Crisis, Word Count Uncertainty and Country Risk 
This table reports the results of regressions estimated in Table 3-7 using return dispersion made by market index constituents as the dependent 
variable. Local BC and global BC are business cycle dummies, Start Crisis is crisis starting in month t, During Crisis is the ongoing crisis in month t 
and End Crisis is the crisis ending in month t. Word count uncertainty is the number of Bloomberg reports in every month that contains the word 
“uncertainty” and take a log of it. Country Risk is the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) composite index. System shows the results of pooled 
OLS and Sur shows the results of seemingly unrelated regression. I use robust standard errors. Coefficients are in percentage.  


































Australia 76.08 9.01 0.52 0.67 3.68 4.13 -0.03 -0.36 -0.18 -4.66 -0.17 -1.95 0.69 4.34 -0.85 -8.01 0.43 
Finland -7.78 -0.84 0.03 0.02 5.68 3.74 0.11 0.53 0.27 2.92 -0.01 -0.04 -0.04 -0.06 0.18 1.30 0.11 
France  -23.81 -3.16 0.70 1.69 2.55 3.28 0.19 1.58 0.13 3.10 0.05 0.47 0.91 5.48 0.29 3.46 0.30 
Germany -14.68 -1.77 3.06 2.71 1.97 2.73 0.14 1.07 0.17 4.05 -0.03 -0.22 1.88 7.88 0.09 0.90 0.37 
Japan 14.56 2.56 1.23 2.74 1.29 2.20 0.06 0.63 0.04 1.03 -0.15 -1.97 0.44 3.02 -0.12 -1.97 0.19 
Switzerland -17.78 -1.85 0.77 1.14 2.13 2.27 0.23 2.17 0.14 3.51 0.14 1.59 0.76 4.22 0.20 2.05 0.20 
US -9.78 -2.09 2.44 5.42 2.08 2.34 0.04 0.63 0.20 6.33 0.09 0.93 1.00 6.74 0.13 2.57 0.44 
                  
System 10.95 6.20 0.25 1.02 3.83 11.33 0.15 3.20 0.11 5.16 0.01 0.34 0.44 6.39 -0.08 -4.12  












Appendix C 6 Business Cycles, International Political Crisis, Word Count Uncertainty, Country Risk and Economic Policy Uncertainty 
This table reports the results of regressions estimated in Table 3-8 using return dispersion made by market index constituents as the dependent variable. Local BC 
and global BC are business cycle dummies, Start Crisis is crisis starting in month t, During Crisis is the ongoing crisis in month t and End Crisis is the crisis ending in 
month t. Word count uncertainty is the number of Bloomberg reports in every month that contains the word “uncertainty” and take a log of it. Country Risk is the 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) composite index. I include two economic policy index, one is the country specific index (𝐸𝑃𝑈_𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙) and the other is the global 
index (𝐸𝑃𝑈_𝑔𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙). System shows the results of pooled OLS and Sur shows the results of seemingly unrelated regression. I use robust standard errors. Coefficients 
are in percentage.  





















Australia            
Coeff. (%) 28.54 1.85 2.20 0.04 -0.19 -0.22 0.46 -0.42 2.57 0.78 0.51 
t-Statistic 1.77 1.01 2.24 0.35 -3.12 -2.23 0.80 -2.19 3.44 0.57  
France            
Coeff. (%) -31.74 0.11 1.53 0.10 0.27 -0.03 0.20 0.19 -0.38 5.23 0.45 
t-Statistic -2.36 0.13 2.01 0.60 3.39 -0.16 0.38 1.40 -0.79 5.01  
Germany            
Coeff. (%) -18.88 3.84 0.59 -0.02 0.20 -0.08 -0.07 -0.04 0.46 6.19 0.47 
t-Statistic -1.52 2.10 0.85 -0.15 3.43 -0.41 -0.18 -0.33 0.69 5.26  
Japan            
Coeff. (%) -2.73 0.82 1.07 -0.03 0.18 -0.15 -0.46 0.00 1.45 1.71 0.26 
t-Statistic -0.32 1.48 1.78 -0.29 3.41 -1.77 -1.07 -0.02 2.08 1.92  
US            
Coeff. (%) -36.46 1.30 1.61 -0.05 0.30 0.09 0.74 0.24 4.30 0.22 0.55 
t-Statistic -6.09 2.41 1.86 -0.58 5.60 0.69 1.70 4.10 2.26 0.13  
            
System            
Coeff. (%) -17.97 0.32 2.24 0.02 0.20 -0.08 0.22 0.04 -0.27 4.98  
t-Statistic -4.75 0.91 5.58 0.23 6.38 -1.15 0.82 1.24 -0.83 9.10  
Sur            
Coeff. (%) -18.94 0.92 1.87 0.02 0.20 -0.08 0.13 0.08 0.42 3.93  






























Chapter 4 The Performance of Asset Allocation 





Asset allocation determines the investment outcomes by identifying 
investable assets and assigning appropriate weights for them in the portfolio. 
Markowitz (1952) derives a theoretically (ex-post) optimal asset allocation 
strategy, which produces the mean variance portfolio with maximum return in 
excess of the risk-free rate per unit of risk. However, when the true parameters 
are unknown and are estimated using historical parameters (ex-ante), the 
mean variance weighting rule generates unsatisfactory reward to variability 
ratios. Its poor performance in reality leads to the focus on alternative asset 
allocation methods, especially the naïve diversification rule that assigns 
weights equally to each asset, which is easy to implement and hard to 
outperform.18 Recently, risk-based approaches that determine the weighting of 
each asset based only on assets’ risk characteristics become attractive, as 
they are expected to sufficiently improve portfolio mean-variance efficiency by 
increasing the accuracy during the weighting process. How do different asset 
                                                          
18 For instance, Jobson and Korkie (1980), Duchin and Levy (2009) and DeMiguel, Garlappi, and 
Uppal (2009) show that neither the Markowitz rule, nor its extensions, are able to consistently 
outperform the equal weighting method. Jacobs, Müller, and Weber (2014) extend this conclusion to 
international and asset class diversification. Plyakha, Uppal, and Vilkov (2012) illustrate that the 
equally weighted portfolio substantially outperforms the value- and price-weighted portfolios.  
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allocation strategies influence the portfolio performance? Is there a strategy 
that could consistently produce the highest risk-adjusted returns across any 
assets and over time? What is the impact of these portfolio construction rules 
on portfolios’ risk exposures?  
This chapter addresses these questions by constructing portfolios using 
seven popular asset allocation strategies and evaluating their ex-ante 
performance: (i) with regards to different measurements; (ii) across investment 
universes (countries, industries, stocks only, and a more general portfolio of 
assets that mixes bonds with stocks); (iii) with respect to changes in risk 
exposures; and (iv) over time. In terms of risk-adjusted returns, the results 
show that there are no significant differences between portfolio construction 
methods for country- and industry-based portfolios. For individual stock and 
multi-asset class portfolios, the differences between strategies are large, but 
none of the strategies are able to remain superior over time. These results are 
robust to changes in the estimation window, using different rebalancing 
periods and adjusting the transaction costs. In terms of the risk factor loadings 
associated with these asset allocation strategies, this chapter identifies that 
the implementation of the mean variance approach leads to fluctuating 
exposures in size, value and momentum factors for all four datasets. It is risker 
than all the other strategies in the sense of risk exposure shifting.  
How far are these strategies from mean variance efficient? By comparing 
them with the ex-post optimal portfolio, I discover that none of the strategies 
are close to efficient irrespective of any dataset. In fact, for the portfolios made 
up using country indices, industries and stocks, the highest Sharpe ratios 
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generated from the current construction methods are approximately two-thirds 
of the corresponding optimal Sharpe ratios. For the multi-asset case, strategy-
constructed portfolios are even further from the optimal portfolio.   
This study selects seven asset allocation approaches for several reasons. 
Firstly, as DeMiguel, Garlappi, and Uppal (2009) show that none of the 
extensions of the Markowitz models are able to consistently outperform the 
naïve diversification rule, I only use the classic mean variance rule as a 
representative for all Markowitz-based models. Secondly, this chapter focuses 
on several risk-based methods, as they are relatively new and their 
performance in the previous literature is inconsistent. In other words, different 
research supports different methods and a systematic comparison is required. 
A well-known risk-based method is the minimum variance method, which 
determines the weighting of each asset in order to minimise the portfolio’s total 
risk. Moreover, I apply two naïve risk parity strategies; one of them assigns 
weights based on the assets’ inverse volatility, and the other assigns weights 
based on the assets’ inverse variance. I also use the equal risk contribution 
approach developed by Qian (2006). The method aims to assign weights in 
order to equalise each asset’s risk contribution by using their full covariance 
matrix. 19  Additionally, I include the maximum diversification approach 
proposed by Choueifaty and Coignard (2008). In this method the proportion of 
each asset is designed to maximise an overall portfolio diversification ratio, 
which is the weighted average volatility divided by the portfolio volatility. Lastly, 
                                                          
19 The equal risk contribution approach sometimes refers to the real risk parity in other studies. By 
using the full assets’ covariance matrix, Qian (2006) assigns Weights to equalise their risk 
contribution, hence also taking correlations between assets into account. 
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as a benchmark I use the equally weighted portfolio (also known as the naïve 
1/N diversification) following DeMiguel, Garlappi, and Uppal (2009) because it 
is extensively used in both academic and real world applications.20 Thus, I 
compare the performance of the other portfolio construction methods against 
this equally weighted benchmark.  
I construct long only portfolios, as short sales often lead to extreme 
weightings and are hard to implement in practice.21 In the baseline study, I 
assume investors determine the proportions for each asset according to the 
past five years’ performance of these assets. I use an estimation window of 60 
months. Portfolios are rebalanced monthly by rolling the estimation window 
one month forward.  
This chapter uses two measures to evaluate the risk-adjusted returns of 
asset allocation methods. Firstly, I compare the Sharpe ratios between 
strategy made portfolios and their statistical significance. The results 
demonstrate that the differences between strategy performances are 
negligible for country- and industry-based portfolios, but relatively large for 
stock- and multi-asset portfolios. I report a summary of the highest Sharpe ratio, 
the lowest Sharpe ratio and the p-value of the difference in Table 4-1. To be 
precise, all of the strategies result in similar Sharpe ratios, especially if I invest 
                                                          
20 The equally weighted portfolio is widely used in empirical asset pricing. In practice, equal 
weighting is the common way for investors to allocate their assets. Even in defined contribution 
pension plans, Benartzi and Thaler (2001) and Huberman and Jiang (2006) indicate that some 
investors divide contribution evenly across the funds. 
21 Short-selling often leads to extreme values in assets’ Weighting, which cause serious estimation 
errors. Jagannathan and Ma (2003) find that short sales constraints improve portfolio performance 
by decreasing estimation error. Also, Huij, Lansdorp, Blitz, and Van Vliet (2014) indicate that short-




in industries where the highest Sharpe ratio of 0.54 (for the minimum variance 
portfolio) is not much higher than the lowest Sharpe ratio of 0.46 (for the mean 
variance portfolio). The full sample period Sharpe ratio difference is 0.11 for 
country diversification and 0.08 for industries. For the stock portfolio, the 
Sharpe ratios of the equal risk contribution (0.59) and maximum diversification 
(0.63) portfolios are statistically higher than for the equally weighted portfolio 
(0.54) at the 5% level. In the multi-asset case, the differences in outcomes are 
even larger. The minimum variance and maximum diversification portfolios 
underperform the others with Sharpe ratios of 0.04 and 0.07, respectively, 
compared with a Sharpe ratio for the equally weighting portfolio of 0.31. 
Secondly, I use alphas from the usual asset pricing models as another 
measure. I regress the different portfolios on risk factors stated in the usual 
asset pricing models. The alphas obtained from these regressions are the 
adjusted returns against the specific risk factors. For the country indices I use 
Jensen’s alpha, the Fama and French (1993) three factor alpha and the 
Carhart (1997) four factor alpha. For the other three datasets I also consider 
the Fama and French (2014) five factor alpha. I find that all the portfolio 
construction methods produce statistically indistinguishable alphas with the 
equally weighting approach for every asset pricing model tested. Those results 
hold for country indices, industry indices and individual stocks, but not for multi-
asset classes. For instance, Table 4-1 shows that, for the industry-based 
portfolios, the highest Carhart alpha of 0.10 is slightly and insignificantly higher 
than the lowest one of 0.02. In contrast, for the multi-asset class case, the 
minimum variance, the equal risk contribution and the maximum diversification 
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approaches produce significantly less negative alphas than the naïve 1/N rule 
with respect to all four different alphas I consider. 
In order to compare the risk exposures associated with the strategies, this 
study uses market, size, value and momentum factor exposures as the 
measurements. These are the betas in the Carhart (1997) four factor model. I 
apply the rolling window analysis with an estimation window of five-years to 
obtain a series of betas over time. I then compute the average and the 
standard deviation of those betas. By identifying the risk exposures, investors 
are able to understand what drives the performance of each allocation 
approach. Also, the higher the standard deviation of betas, the more risk 
exposures fluctuate, which might by itself be a deterrent to a strategy being 
used as it may imply risk shifting over time.  
The results show that strategy risk loadings are dependent on the assets 
invested in and the mean variance weighting method has the most fluctuation 
in risk loadings. To be precise, the mean variance rule is associated with 
highly shifting risk towards all factors in almost all datasets. For instance, for 
the country indices, the standard deviations of the size and value betas for 
the mean variance portfolio are 0.14 and 0.33, compared with those of the 
equal-weighted portfolio, which are 0.10 and 0.14, respectively. For the 
industries, both the mean variance and minimum variance approaches have 
relatively higher variation in all four factor loadings. As shown in Table 4-1, 
the highest standard deviation of the momentum beta is generated by the 
mean variance portfolio of 0.18, followed by the one in the minimum variance 
portfolio of 0.12, which are both much higher than that of the equal-weighted 
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portfolio of 0.04. For the individual stocks, the performance of the equally 
weighted portfolio is driven by a small-cap effect, as its size beta is high at 
0.75. All the strategies result in relatively similar variation in betas. For the 
multi-asset class dataset, again the mean variance rule is the only strategy, 
with highly shifting risk towards all factors.   
I further compare the ex-ante strategies made portfolios with the real (ex-
post) optimal portfolio. For all four datasets, the Sharpe ratios of the optimal 
portfolios are exceedingly higher than any of the strategies, and are all 
significant (p-values less than 5%). For country indices, the highest Sharpe 
ratio generated from the equally weighted portfolio is 0.4, compared with the 
optimal Sharpe ratio of 0.6. For the multi-asset case, the smallest Sharpe 
ratio produced by the minimum variance portfolio of 0.04 is even less than 











Table 4-1 An Overview of the Differences Between Asset Allocation Strategies 
This table shows the highest figures and the lowest figures of the strategy made 
portfolios with respect to each criterion. The Sharpe ratios are calculated during the 
full sample (August 1931 to April 2013), contraction and expansion periods. I use a 
bootstrap approach established by Ledoit and Wolf (2008) to test the statistical 
differences between strategies’ Sharpe ratios. For each asset allocation strategy, I 
run the rolling sample regression (with an estimation window of five-years) to obtain 
a series of risk loadings. Then I calculate the average and the standard deviation of 
the risk loadings for each strategy.  
 country indices industries stocks multi-assets 
 High Low High Low High Low High Low 
Sharpe ratio  
full period 0.40 0.29 0.54 0.46 0.63 0.44 0.31 0.04 
p-value (high-low) (0.15) (0.32) (0.01) (0.05) 
during recession -0.47 -0.70 -0.16 -0.31 0.05 -0.18 0.03 -0.60 
p-value (high-low) (0.26) (0.18) (0.30) (0.07) 
during expansion 0.68 0.53 0.83 0.77 0.84 0.60 0.61 0.05 
p-value (high-low) (0.22) (0.41) (0.01) (0.00) 
 
Alphas (%) 
Jensen's alpha 0.00 -0.20 0.18 0.09 0.82 0.26 -0.01 -0.10 
p-value(high-low) (0.23) (0.97) (0.06) (0.60) 
3 factor alpha 0.08 -0.19 0.18 0.05 0.66 0.22 0.08 -0.09 
p-value(high-low) (0.23) (0.63) (0.06) (0.60) 
Carhart alpha 0.15 -0.18 0.10 0.02 0.71 0.13 -0.03 -0.10 
p-value(high-low) (0.23) (0.97) (0.12) (0.59) 
5 factor alpha - - 0.11 -0.02 0.58 0.12 0.05 -0.11 
p-value(high-low) - (0.62) (0.06) (0.60) 
 
Average risk loadings every five-year (%) 
βmkt 0.93 0.81 0.96 0.78 0.86 0.76 0.42 0.03 
βsmb 0.04 -0.20 0.00 -0.20 0.75 0.22 -0.03 -0.10 
βhml 0.08 -0.13 0.26 -0.05 0.30 0.04 -0.01 -0.06 
βumd 0.04 0.01 0.23 -0.04 0.13 -0.23 0.09 0.02 
 
Standard deviation (SD) of risk loadings (%) 
SD(βmkt) 0.20 0.06 0.12 0.03 0.20 0.14 0.27 0.04 
SD(βsmb) 0.15 0.09 0.22 0.05 0.31 0.22 0.13 0.03 
SD(βhml) 0.33 0.13 0.29 0.11 0.30 0.16 0.15 0.04 





As the performance of asset allocation strategies may vary over time, this 
study explores whether one strategy could dominate the others during certain 
periods. For the country- and industry-based portfolios, none of the strategies 
perform significantly differently from the naïve diversification rule, whether we 
separate returns during contractions from returns during expansions, or we 
plot the variation of performance of the different strategies over time. For the 
stocks and multi-asset classes, the differences between strategies are large, 
but the superiority is inconsistent. For example, during the expansion period, 
the risk-based approaches generally show better performance than the equal 
weighting method in the stock dataset. However, during the same period, the 
risk-based strategies are substantially inferior to the equal weighting rule for 
multi-asset classes. Additionally, when I rank the strategies over non 
overlapping ten-year periods, the results show that no single method stays in 
the first place for more than two periods. This holds for all four datasets. 
Motived by the increasing interest in risk-based strategies, this study aims 
to provide a guideline for both practitioners and academics. On the one hand, 
companies start to promote risk parity funds following the instructions on the 
Wall Street Journal that “risk parity funds held up relatively well during the 
financial crisis” (Eleanor, 2010). There seems to be a tendency to move from 
the cornerstone mean variance approach to the new wave of risk-based 
approaches. The evaluation of allocation methods is essential for both the fund 
managers and private investors as they are looking forward to reversing their 
failure during the crisis. On the other hand, to identify a superior strategy is 
expected to address the inefficiency in commonly used benchmarks. Most of 
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the commonly used market benchmarks are value-weighted, which is 
suggested to be substantially inefficient than the equal weight market 
benchmark (Plyakha, Uppal, and Vilkov, 2014). Seeking a better construction 
method that could improve the benchmark mean-variance efficiency is crucial 
for investors who track it, and academics who use it to measure the systematic 
risk.  
To conclude, this study contributes to the literature in several ways. Firstly, 
this chapter demonstrates that the asset allocation strategies do not have a 
strong impact on portfolio performance if we invest in country and industry 
indices. Investors can just use simple naïve diversification, as sophisticated 
methods do not improve the outcomes. Secondly, this chapter reveals how the 
performance of asset allocation techniques depend on datasets and the time 
periods under consideration. Previous studies never reach consensus on 
which portfolio construction method is the best. I illustrate that any superiority 
is relative. Moreover, to the best of my knowledge, this chapter is the first to 
demonstrate the variation of risk exposures associated with each strategy over 
time. This is interesting, as we are able to understand not only which risk 
factors lead to the performance of the construction methods, but also how 
stable those factors are. I identify that the implementation of the mean variance 
rule leads to highly fluctuating risk shifting, which is undesirable for investors. 
Last but not least, I document that all the strategies tested in this study are far 
from optimal. New available methods do not seem to improve investment 
outcomes markedly or consistently. There is still a long way to go in improving 
the portfolio mean variance efficiency.  
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4.2 Description of asset allocation strategies 
This study focuses on several well-known asset allocation strategies 
including equal weighting, mean variance, naïve risk parity, minimum variance, 
equal risk contribution and maximum diversification. For each one, I present 
the theoretical background and illustrate the basic characteristics. I also 
present a short discussion of the previous studies of strategy comparison in 
the last part of this section.  
4.2.1 Equal weighting 
The equal weighting approach (also called the 1/N portfolio strategy, or 
naïve diversification) assigns weights equally to each asset without 
incorporating any information from the asset. It is acknowledged as the 
simplest method and is widely used in both empirical finance (for instance, 
Jensen, Black, and Scholes, 1972; Fama and MacBeth, 1973) and in practice 
(documented by Benartzi and Thaler, 2001) for a long time. Previous studies 
tend to compare different portfolio construction methods with the equal 
weighting strategy, and most of them favour the latter. For example, Plyakha 
et al. (2014) discover that the equal-weighted portfolio outperforms the value- 
and price-weighted portfolios in terms of returns, the four-factor alpha and the 
Sharpe ratio. Jacobs et al. (2014) suggest simple heuristic allocation 
approaches (including the naïve 1/N rule) to private investors, as simple 
methods perform indifferently from the optimisation methods.  
To take this a step further, many studies analyse the characteristics of the 
naïve diversification that attribute to the superiority of equal-weighted portfolio. 
For instance, Plyakha et al. (2012) firstly find that the returns of the equal-
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weighted portfolio relative to the value- and price-weighted portfolios are 
monotonically decreasing with size and price, but monotonically increasing 
with idiosyncratic volatility. Secondly, Plyakha et al. (2012) use the Carhart 
four-factor model to explore the relations between the outperformance of the 
equal-weighted portfolio and factor exposures. Their results show that 42% of 
the returns of the equal-weighted portfolio in excess of the value-weighted 
portfolio come from the differences in alphas and the remaining 58% comes 
from the systematic components. Compared with the value- and price-
weighted portfolios, the equal-weighted portfolio bears more risk exposure to 
market, size and value factors and more negative exposure to the momentum 
factor. Thirdly, the frequently rebalancing is another reason for the higher 
alphas produced by equal-weighted portfolios compared with value- and price-
weighted portfolios. If the rebalancing frequency decreases from one month to 
twelve months, there will be no difference in alpha between all three strategies. 
Similarly, Hsu, Chow, Kalesnik, and Little (2011) review several investment 
strategies and discover the outperformance of an equal-weighted portfolio over 
a value-weighted index, owing to market, value and size factors. Moreover, in 
the out-of-sample analysis, Brown, Hwang, and In (2013) indicate that the 
inconsistent outperformance of the naïve 1/N rule over the optimal 
diversification is due to the compensation for the increased tail risk in the naïve 
diversification.  
4.2.2 Mean variance weighting 
Markowitz (1952) derived the famous mean variance weighting method, 
which is the optimal rule theoretically. It determines weightings to each asset 
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in order to maximise the total portfolio’s Sharpe ratio, as shown in equation 
(4.1). However, this Markowitz rule performs poorly in the out-of-sample test. 
Many empirical studies suggest that the failure of the ex-ante mean-variance 
weighted portfolio is due to the large errors produced in estimating the returns 
and covariance matrix (see for instance, Chopra and Ziemba, 1993; Michaud, 
1989). Thus, in practice, mean-variance weighting can sometimes also be 
regarded as error maximising, rather than Sharpe ratio maximising. A vast 
body of literature deals with the estimation error in order to improve the 
performance of the Markowitz model. A practical suggestion is to use 
“shrinkage estimators”, which basically means that each asset mean should 
be “shrunk” toward a common value for predicting expected returns (Jobson 
and Korkie, 1980; Jorion, 1985; Stein, 1956). Recently, Pástor (2000) and 
Pástor and Stambaugh (2000) propose using an asset pricing model to form a 
prior. Ledoit and Wolf (2003) concentrate on reducing the estimation error in 
the covariance matrix. Kan and Zhou (2007) suggest diversifying across 
markets and estimation risk. Also, Chopra (1993) and Jagannathan and Ma 





                                                                                   (4.1)  
DeMiguel, Garlappi, and Uppal (2009) evaluate the out-of-sample 
performance of 14 Markowitz based mean variance models and their 
extensions using eight datasets. They also use industries and country indices 
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to construct portfolios, which is similar to the datasets used in this study22. 
They find that none of the 14 mean variance extensions are able to perform 
consistently better than equal Weighting in terms of the Sharpe ratio, certainty-
equivalent return, or turnover for all data sets. On the other hand, Kirby and 
Ostdiek (2012) claim that the 14 mean variance extensions used by DeMiguel, 
Garlappi, and Uppal (2009) could outperform the naïve 1/N model if the mean 
variance rules are targeting the conditional expected returns of the naïve 
diversification. In another out-of-sample study, Kritzman, Page, and Turkington 
(2010) show that optimised portfolios often outperform the naïve 1/N portfolio 
when the estimations of the expected returns are reliant on long-term samples.  
4.2.3 Naïve risk parity 
The naïve risk parity approach only considers the volatility or variance of 
each asset and ignores the correlation between assets (equation 4.2). A 
portfolio is said to be in “parity” when weights are proportional to the inverse 
volatility of assets (Clarke, De Silva, and Thorley, 2013). This study considers 
both risk parity based on variance and risk parity based on volatility as they 
have been used separately in the literature and in practice. The original risk 
parity method is proposed by Qian (2005) based on variance, however, there 
are advocators for weighting on volatilities (e.g. Martellini, 2008; Choueifaty 
and Coignard, 2008). Moreover, Ang (2012) runs a horserace between several 
strategies and he distinguishes those two strategies. He forms portfolios using 
                                                          
22DeMiguel, Garlappi, and Uppal (2009) use ten industries and the US equity market indices as one 
dataset. In contrast, our study only uses the ten industry portfolios. Also, DeMiguel, Garlappi, and 
Uppal (2009) include eight MSCI country indices and the World Index in one dataset. However, this 




US government bond, US corporate bonds, US stocks and international stocks 
during 1978 to 2011. He finds that portfolio made of risk parity (variance) 
results in Sharpe ratio of 0.59 while portfolio made of risk parity volatility results 
in Sharpe ratio of 0.65. Thus, those two methods do not always have similar 
performance. Furthermore, Hallerbach (2013) points out that risk parity 
techniques are popularly used in recent practice. For instance, the S&P Low 
Volatility Index uses weighting based on inverse volatility while the MSCI Risk 













                                                      (4.2)                                                    
4.2.4 Minimum variance weighting 
Minimum variance weighting is also a Markowitz-based optimisation 
method. As shown in equation (4.3), the weighting for each asset is allocated 
in order to minimise the portfolio total risk and Ω is the covariance matrix. Thus, 
the minimum variance technique often assigns larger weights to assets with 
low volatility and low correlations in the portfolio. It ensures that each asset 
has the same marginal risk contribution to the portfolio. Since Blitz and Van 
Vliet (2007) provide empirical evidence that lower volatility stocks earn higher 
risk-adjusted returns, the minimum variance portfolio is expected to benefit 
from the low volatility anomaly.  
{𝑤}𝑝𝜎𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 𝑤
𝑇Ω𝑤                                                                                                    (4.3)                                                      
Several previous studies report the superiority of the minimum variance 
strategy especially in back-testing. For instance, Clarke, De Silva, and Thorley 
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(2006) illustrate that the minimum variance portfolio generates higher returns 
and lower risk compared with the value-weighted portfolio. Additionally, 
Hallerbach (2013) finds that the minimum variance portfolio is the closest to 
the optimal portfolio and dominates all other portfolios they test (including 
equal-weighted, maximum diversification and risk parity, among others).  
4.2.5 Equal risk contribution 
Qian (2006) improves the naïve risk parity approach by also considering 
the correlation between assets when equalising assets’ risk. I call this new 
method equal risk contribution. Hallerbach (2013) points out that the weight of 
each asset multiplied with its marginal contribution to the portfolio is equal. In 
other words, the beta of each asset multiplied by its weight is the same as 
shown in equation (4.4). Thus, the weight of an asset is the inversed proportion 
of its beta. The asset with larger volatility, or higher correlation with other 
assets, will be assigned a smaller weight. Compared with the mean variance 
rule, Merton (1980) suggests that the only required input for equal risk 
contribution is the covariance matrix, which can be estimated more accurately 















4.2.6 Maximum diversification 
Choueifaty and Coignard (2008) first document a diversification ratio to 
measure how diversified a portfolio is. Consider a portfolio P with 
asset𝑋1, 𝑋2, … , 𝑋𝑁, where each has a weighting of 𝑊𝑝1, 𝑊𝑝2, … , 𝑊𝑝𝑁 (∑ 𝑊𝑝𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1 =
1). The covariance matrix is denoted as V and the vector of asset volatilities 
is∑. 





]                                                              (4.6)  
The diversification ratio D(P) is the weighted average volatility divided by 




                                                                                                              (4.7)                                                                                                                                                                               
The weights of the maximum diversification portfolio are obtained by 




                                                                                                                   (4.8)                                                                                                                      
Choueifaty and Coignard (2008) point out that if each asset has the same 
volatility, the maximum diversification is the same as the minimum-variance 
portfolio. They also find that the changes in data frequency or the estimation 
period have little effect on the performance of the maximum diversification 
strategy. Hallerbach (2013) shows the maximum diversification portfolio is the 




In the back-testing, Choueifaty and Coignard (2008) use daily data from 
the S&P 500 Index during December 1990 to February 2008, and find that the 
maximum diversification portfolio has the highest excess return and Sharpe 
ratio among value-weighted, minimum-variance and equally weighted 
portfolios. However, in the sub-periods testing, the superiority of maximum 
diversification does not hold in the first sub-period (1992-2000), where it 
performs the worst among all four strategies. Furthermore, Choueifaty and 
Coignard (2008) find that the maximum diversification portfolio has the highest, 
and a statistically significant, Fama-French three factor alpha of 3.1%. Again, 
the result does not hold during the period of 1992 to 2000. 
4.2.7 Strategy performance comparison 
Each portfolio construction strategy has its merits. The previous literature 
never reaches a consensus regarding which is the best. Even in the ex-post 
testing, the performance of allocation approaches differs across studies; not to 
mention their performance in the ex-ante evaluations, each study has its own 
insights. None of the approaches is able to consistently outperform the others. 
To better illustrate, I list several representative studies that are recently 
published. 
For the historical performance analysis, Clarke et al. (2013) construct 
portfolios using the largest 1,000 common stocks in the CRSP database at the 
end of each month from 1968 to 2012. They find that the minimum variance 
portfolio results in the highest Sharpe ratio and lowest market beta compared 
with the others (equal risk contribution, maximum diversification and minimum 
variance, market-capitalisation weighting and equal weighting). In another 
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study, Hallerbach (2013) also evaluates those asset allocation policies listed 
above, but using 4 asset classes; equities, aggregate treasuries, corporate 
investment grade, and corporate high yield. Hallerbach (2013) indicates that 
the minimum variance portfolio performs best with a Sharpe ratio of 1.11, which 
is quite close to the optimal portfolio, with the maximum Sharpe ratio being 
1.19.  
In contrast, the studies on the out-of-sample strategy performance 
produce quite different results. Similar to this study regarding the datasets 
used, Jacobs et al. (2014) conduct ex-ante analysis on the international stock 
market and different asset classes. The portfolio construction methods 
compared by Jacobs et al. (2014) are similar to those used by DeMiguel, 
Garlappi, and Uppal (2009), which include the mean-variance based methods 
as well as simple heuristic approaches. Both studies indicate that none of the 
Markowitz rules are able to significantly outperform the naïve diversification. 
By taking a further look into the results shown by Jacobs et al. (2014), it is clear 
that there is no difference between asset allocation strategies for international 
equity indices.23   
In another ex-ante performance analysis, Ang (2012) runs a horse race 
between several portfolio formation techniques. Ang (2012) also uses multi-
asset classes, which include the US government bond (Barcap US Treasury), 
US corporate bonds (Barcap US Credit), US stocks (S&P 500) and 
international stocks (MSCI EAFE). He constructs ex-ante portfolio returns 
                                                          
23 As shown in Jacobs et al. (2014) Table 3, the p-values for the Sharpe ratios are almost all 
insignificant, which indicates that all the models they tested result in statistically the same Sharpe 
ratio using the GDP-Weighting method.   
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based on assets’ previous five-year performance. Ang (2012) aims to illustrate 
that the investment outcomes will alter as various portfolio construction 
methods are applied and, because short selling is allowed, the Sharpe ratios 
produced by different strategies do have large differences. Ang (2012) shows 
that the naïve risk parity portfolios, equally weighted portfolio and minimum 
variance portfolio strategies are outperformed. In contrast, the mean variance 
portfolio results in an extremely low Sharpe ratio. 
Moreover, Chaves, Hsu, Li, and Shakernia (2011) compare the ex-ante 
performance of portfolios formed by the US treasury, US bond, Global bond, 
US equities, international equities, emerging market equities, commodities and 
real estate. They estimate the covariance matrix based on assets’ previous 
five-year returns and they use the shrinkage technique rather than simple 
covariance. All techniques are rebalanced annually and a short selling 
constraint is applied. In the full sample period (January 1980 to June 2010), 
optimisation approaches (mean variance and minimum variance weighting) 
tend to underperform simple methods (60/40, equal weighting and equal risk 
contribution). In the sub-period analysis, no one strategy can consistently 
outperform the others. Chaves et al. (2011) show that the performance of all 
approaches is highly time dependent. For example, the Sharpe ratio of the first 
60/40 equity/bond portfolio is very high, at 0.99, in the 1990s, but is only 0.04 
during the 2000s. On the contrary, the minimum variance portfolio produces a 
negative Sharpe ratio of -0.02 in the 1980s, but a high Sharpe ratio of 0.49 in 
the 2000s.  
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Furthermore, the strategy performance is dependent on the asset classes 
included in the portfolio. In a similar article regarding the characteristics of the 
equal risk contribution portfolio, Maillard, Roncalli, and TeÏLetche (2010) find 
totally different results from those of Chaves et al. (2011). Maillard et al. (2010) 
show that the minimum variance portfolio beats both the equal weighted and 
equal risk contribution portfolios, in terms of risk, return and Sharpe ratio. The 
major difference between the studies conducted by Chaves et al. (2011) and 
Maillard et al. (2010) is that Maillard et al. (2010) use a historical simulation on 
agricultural commodities during the period of January 1979 to March 2008 to 
construct the portfolios.  
All in all, the previous literature shows mixed evidence on the performance 
of the asset allocation strategies. It is hard to say whether one strategy is better 
than the others. Previous studies lack a comprehensive comparison on the 
portfolio construction methods. This study fills this gap by covering different 
levels of datasets and analysing performance over time.  
4.3 Data and methodology 
This study includes four datasets as representatives of different levels of 
diversification. I incorporate five country indices with regards to the raising 
trend of global diversification. I consider industry level investment and include 
ten US industries. Then I choose individual stocks as the third dataset to take 
into account the perspective of equity investors. Lastly, I choose four asset 
classes since investors tend to include fixed income assets for risk 
diversification. All four datasets contain monthly data from August 1926 to April 
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2013. For each dataset, I employ the rolling-sample approach to construct 
portfolios according to asset allocation rules.  
4.3.1 Description of datasets 
For global diversification, I select the five most commonly used 
international equity indices, which are the S&P 500 composite price index, 
Nikkei 225 composite index, UK FTSE all-share index, CAC all-tradable index 
and CDAX composite index. Returns are obtained from the Global Financial 
Data database. I compute monthly excess returns for each index by using 
index returns minus the corresponding country T-bill index returns.  
In the second dataset, I use the monthly return of ten value-weighted 
industry portfolios obtained from Kenneth French’s website. These ten 
industries are consumer nondurables (Nodur), consumer durables (Durbl), 
manufacturing (Manuf), energy (Enrgy), high technologies (Hitec), telephone 
and television transmission (Telcm), wholesale and retail shops (Shops), 
healthcare (Hlth), utilities (Utils), and others (Other). I calculate the excess 
return of each industry portfolio over the one-month Treasury bill rate. 
In the third dataset, I dig into the individual stock level. I consider private 
investors who normally hold only a few stocks in their portfolios. I generate ten 
stock portfolios by randomly selecting ten stocks from the Centre for Research 
in Security Prices (CRSP) all stock universe. The process involves randomly 
selecting ten stocks that contain full returns for the previous 60 months, 
calculating the weightings using those 60 returns, computing the out-of-sample 
return for the next period according to those weightings, and rebalancing it 
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every month until the end of the data period. In total, I have 981 months during 
the testing period, which means that I have conducted the random selection 
981 times.  
Lastly, in the fourth dataset I incorporate bonds with equities as fixed-
income assets are one of the main asset classes in the investment field. This 
multi-asset class dataset contains the US government bond (US ten-year 
government bond total return index), US corporate bond (Moody’s Corporate 
AAA yield), US equity (S&P 500) and world equity (Global Financial Data world 
composites stock index). These four indices are obtained from the Global 
Financial Data database.   
Table 4-2 demonstrates the returns, volatilities, Sharpe ratios and 
correlations for each asset in the four data sets. Country indices have slightly 
lower volatility, but much smaller returns on average compared with industries. 
Thus, the average Sharpe ratio of the country indices is lower than that of the 
industries. Ten industries are the closest integrated assets among all of the 
datasets. The highest correlation of 0.91 comes from Manufacturing industry 
and Other industry. The average return of the individual stocks is a bit higher 
than that of the industries, but is associated with much larger volatility. 
Therefore, the average Sharpe ratio of a ten-stock dataset (0.29) is lower than 
that of the industry dataset (0.41). The stocks have less correlation with each 
other compared with industries and countries. The multi-asset class dataset is 
a special case, as the corporate bond is negatively correlated with all the other 
three assets. The corporate bond has correlations of -0.73 with the 
government bond, -0.17 with US equity and -0.2 with world equity. The 
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corporate bond has an extremely low excess return of -3.37 and, thus, a low 
Sharpe ratio of -0.35. This particular feature of the four-asset class dataset 





Table 4-2 Descriptive Statistics for Four Datasets 
This table shows the excess returns, volatilities, Sharpe ratios and correlations of each asset within four datasets. All data are monthly from August 
1926 to April 2013. Five country indices returns are taken from Global Financial Data. Ten industry portfolios are obtained from the Kenneth French 
Ib website. Ten stocks are randomly selected every month from CRSP all stocks. Multi-asset classes are obtained from Global Financial Data.   
 
(Continued on next page) 







Correlation Matrix      
US Japan UK Germany France      
US 7.74 19.32 0.40 1.00          
Japan 5.65 22.59 0.25 0.16 1.00         
UK 1.68 16.67 0.10 0.40 0.22 1.00        
Germany 3.94 21.80 0.18 0.32 0.13 0.30 1.00       
France 4.29 21.58 0.20 0.33 0.18 0.39 0.31 1.00           








Nodur Durbl Manuf Enrgy Hitec Telcm Shops Hlth Utils Other 
Nodur 8.37 16.16 0.52 1.00          
Durbl 9.48 27.10 0.35 0.75 1.00         
Manuf 8.68 22.08 0.39 0.85 0.87 1.00        
Enrgy 9.26 20.87 0.44 0.62 0.61 0.73 1.00       
Hitec 9.46 25.61 0.37 0.74 0.78 0.86 0.62 1.00      
Telcm 6.85 16.07 0.43 0.68 0.63 0.69 0.51 0.68 1.00     
Shops 8.64 20.53 0.42 0.87 0.80 0.85 0.59 0.79 0.68 1.00    
Hlth 9.49 19.62 0.48 0.80 0.64 0.76 0.57 0.72 0.61 0.75 1.00   
Utils 7.16 19.37 0.37 0.71 0.62 0.70 0.62 0.63 0.64 0.66 0.63 1.00  
Other 7.31 22.63 0.32 0.85 0.81 0.91 0.70 0.80 0.70 0.83 0.74 0.73 1.00 
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 (Table 4-2 Continued) 
 








1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 12.61 46.97 0.27 1.00          
2 11.15 46.62 0.24 0.20 1.00         
3 10.88 44.22 0.25 0.21 0.24 1.00        
4 13.31 43.71 0.30 0.16 0.22 0.24 1.00       
5 20.25 53.47 0.38 0.15 0.31 0.24 0.19 1.00      
6 9.47 44.68 0.21 0.20 0.29 0.26 0.26 0.24 1.00     
7 9.18 44.02 0.21 0.22 0.25 0.25 0.23 0.22 0.27 1.00    
8 22.68 63.11 0.36 0.21 0.18 0.21 0.17 0.21 0.29 0.13 1.00   
9 19.23 45.94 0.42 0.19 0.35 0.28 0.21 0.27 0.24 0.26 0.15 1.00  
10 14.05 50.08 0.28 0.22 0.28 0.21 0.14 0.24 0.26 0.21 0.22 0.23 1.00 















equity       
govt bond 1.92 6.47 0.30 1.00          
corp bond -3.37 9.72 -0.35 -0.73 1.00         
us equity 7.84 19.30 0.41 0.07 -0.17 1.00        
world 
equity 
2.13 13.40 0.16 0.09 -0.20 0.76 1.00             
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4.3.2 Out-of-sample portfolio construction 
For each dataset, I generate out-of-sample expected returns for strategy-
based portfolios in order to evaluate and compare their performance in Section 
4.4. I adopt the rolling sample analysis, which contains the process of 
computing the weighting matrix based on a certain estimation window and 
rolling it down one month forward until the end of the observation. To be 
precise, the first step is to analyse the assets’ characteristics (return, variance, 
covariance, etc.) within the estimation window. In the baseline study, I choose 
an estimation window of 60 months (M=60) based on the assumption that 
investors construct portfolios according to assets’ previous five-year 
performance. I also analyse the situation when the estimation window is three 
years (M=36) and ten years (M=120). The strategy performance does not 
exhibit significant change when the estimation window changes. Based on the 
parameters obtained within the estimation window, the second step is to 
decide on the weighting matrix for the following month (the first observation 
starts at time t=M+1) according to each asset allocation rule. I apply a short 
sale constraint when applying allocation methods, so the sum of the weights 
equals to one. I then use the weights multiplied by each asset return at time 
t=M+1 in order to obtain the out-of-sample portfolio return. The final step is to 
roll down the process by removing the first return and adding the next month 




4.4 Strategy performance evaluation 
In this section, I report the ex-ante performance of seven asset allocation 
strategies with regard to three measurement categories; Sharpe ratios (Table 
4-3), risk-adjusted returns (Table 4-4), and risk factor loadings (Table 4-5). I 
then compare their performance with the ex-post optimal portfolio (Table 4-6). 
In each table, I report the results for the four datasets in separate panels.  
4.4.1 Sharpe ratios 
Within each dataset, I construct seven portfolios using each asset 
allocation strategy. I calculate the portfolios’ out-of-sample returns over the full 
sample period, August 1931 to April 2013. Table 4-3 provides the annualised 
risk and return characteristics of the portfolios. I compare the economic and 
statistical differences in the portfolios’ Sharpe ratios. I use the equally weighted 
portfolios as benchmarks in each dataset and compute the p-values of the 
differences between each strategy and the equally weighted portfolio. I adopt 
the circular block bootstrap method developed by Ledoit and Wolf (2008), 
which improves the validity of the time series sample hypothesis test in 
previous studies (Jobson and Korkie, 1981; Memmel, 2003). The null 
hypothesis I test is that the strategy Sharpe ratio has no statistical difference 
to the Sharpe ratio of the equally weighted portfolio, 
𝐻0 : 𝜇𝑖 𝜎𝑖⁄ = 𝜇𝐸𝑊 𝜎𝐸𝑊⁄  where i stands for each strategy. Following 
DeMiguel, Garlappi, Nogales, and Uppal (2009), I employ a block size b=5 and 




Panel A of Table 4-3 shows the performance of the strategy constructed 
portfolios using five country indices. The equally-weighted portfolio (EW) gets 
the highest excess return (5.25%), lowest volatility (13.22%) and highest 
Sharpe ratio (0.4) among all seven portfolios. However, the Sharpe ratio of the 
best strategy, equal weighting (0.4), is not significantly different from the worst 
strategy, which is mean variance (0.29), with a p-value of 0.16. The Sharpe 
ratios of the other six strategies are even closer.  
For industry-based portfolios, the asset allocation strategies also perform 
indistinguishably from each other. Panel B shows that the differences in 
Sharpe ratios produced by strategies are quite small in economic terms. The 
minimum variance strategy (Min V) performs the best, with a Sharpe ratio of 
0.54. This is only 0.08 higher than the lowest Sharpe ratio in the mean variance 
method (Mean V). They (minimum variance and mean variance approaches) 
both lack statistical difference from the naïve diversification rule (EW).  
Although the equal risk contribution approach (ERC) produces statistically 
higher Sharpe ratio than the naïve 1/N rule, the difference is only 0.01.  
In panel C, I report the characteristics of the stock-based portfolios. The 
equal risk contribution method (ERC) and the maximum diversification method 
(MD) perform better than the other strategies, with Sharpe ratios of 0.63 and 
0.59, respectively. They both perform significantly better than the equal 
weighting method, which has a Sharpe ratio of 0.54. In particular, the maximum 
diversification portfolio produces a higher return (15.7%) and lower risk 
(24.79%) than the equally weighted portfolio.  
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Panel D reveals the performance of portfolios made by the four asset 
classes. Three risk-based approaches, minimum variance, equal risk 
contribution and maximum diversification generate extremely low annual 
excess returns of 0.12%, 0.47% and 0.18%, respectively. The reason for this 
is that they allocate large weights to low volatility assets (the corporate bond), 
which has a negative average return. Therefore, the Sharpe ratio of the 
minimum variance (0.04) and maximum diversification (0.07) is significantly 
different from that of naïve diversification (0.31).  
It is worth mentioning that none of the equally weighted portfolios is 
significantly different from either the mean variance or risk parity portfolios for 
all of the datasets I test. Although the Sharpe ratios of the mean variance rule 
are less than for all of the other methods in every dataset except the four 
assets class, none of them is statistically different from the naïve diversification. 
The result indicates that the choice of naïve diversification, mean variance, or 
risk parity strategies does not have a strong impact on the investment 
outcomes irrespective of the assets invested in. Also, if investors allocate 
funds on highly correlated assets, such as countries and industries, all the 








Table 4-3 Out-of-sample Performance of Strategy Constructed Portfolios 
This table reports the out-of-sample performance of each strategy constructed 
portfolio from August 1931 to April 2013. The excess returns and volatility are in 
percentages. All the parameters are annualised. The p-value is the probability that 
each strategy is the same as the equal-weighting (EW) strategy. P-values are 
calculated using Oliver Ledoit and Wolf (2008) method. Mean V denotes the mean 
variance approach; RP Var, the risk parity based on variance; RP Vol, the risk parity 
based on volatility; Min V, the minimum variance; ERC, the equal risk contribution; 
and MD, the maximum diversification.  
 
Strategy Excess Return Volatility Sharpe Ratio P-value  
Panel A: G5 country indices       
EW 5.25 13.22 0.40 - 
Mean V 4.33 14.93 0.29 0.16 
RP Var 4.98 15.28 0.33 0.10 
RP Vol 5.09 14.25 0.36 0.15 
Min V 5.16 15.33 0.34 0.29 
ERC 5.03 14.09 0.36 0.13 
MD 5.02 13.85 0.36 0.29 
Panel B: Ten industry portfolios   
EW 8.69 17.90 0.49 - 
Mean V 8.33 18.05 0.46 0.67 
RP Var 8.35 16.39 0.51 0.22 
RP Vol 8.54 17.13 0.50 0.20 
Min V 7.42 13.85 0.54 0.37 
ERC 8.51 16.96 0.50 0.08 
MD 8.28 15.78 0.52 0.19 
Panel C: Random selected ten stocks 
EW 14.28 26.61 0.54 - 
Mean V 10.70 24.19 0.44 0.25 
RP Var 12.44 21.23 0.59 0.26 
RP Vol 13.25 23.17 0.57 0.12 
Min V 11.41 20.32 0.56 0.74 
ERC 13.71 23.08 0.59 0.03 
MD 15.70 24.79 0.63 0.03 
Panel D: Four asset classes 
EW 2.29 7.45 0.31 - 
Mean V 2.55 8.85 0.29 0.85 
RP Var 1.19 3.89 0.31 0.99 
RP Vol 1.48 4.72 0.31 0.91 
Min V 0.12 2.56 0.04 0.05 
ERC 0.47 2.86 0.16 0.15 




4.4.2 Alphas from factor models 
In this section, I evaluate the risk-adjusted performance of asset allocation 
strategies by regressing strategy made portfolios on the risk factors that are 
stated in several commonly used asset pricing models. The alphas generated 
from the models are the returns that a portfolio produces in excess of what 
should be earned based on the risk taken. Within the dataset, if one strategy 
makes the portfolio produce a larger alpha than the others, this particular 
strategy is shown to be superior in terms of the risk-adjusted return. For 
comparison, I also compute the p-values to explore whether the alphas 
generated from the strategies are significantly different from the alphas 
produced by equal weighting.  
I consider alphas from the four usual asset pricing models. The first one is 
the Jensen’s alpha from the Single Index Model (Jensen et al., 1972; Lintner, 
1965; Sharpe, 1964), which links portfolio returns with the market risk (RMRF), 
as shown in equation (4.9). The second model is the widely used Fama and 
French (1993) three factor model that includes market risk, size (SMB) and 
value (HML) factors as explanatory variables (equation 4.10). The third one is 
the Carhart (1997) four factor model, which aims to capture the momentum 
effect. As shown in equation (4.11), the four factor model adds a momentum 
factor (UMD) to the existing three factor model. Additionally, I include the 
recently developed Fama and French (2014) five factor model in our tests. 
Equation 4.12 illustrates that Fama and French (2014) introduce profitability 
(RMW) and investment (CMA) factors into their original three factor model 
(equation 4.10) as based on the valuation theory; the expected return is 
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positively correlated with the firm’s profitability and negatively correlated with 
the firm’s investment.  
 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹𝑡 = 𝑎𝑖 + 𝛽𝑚𝑘𝑡𝑅𝑀𝑅𝐹𝑡  +  𝑒𝑖𝑡                                                                             (4.9) 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹𝑡 = 𝑎𝑖 + 𝛽𝑚𝑘𝑡𝑅𝑀𝑅𝐹𝑡  + 𝛽𝑠𝑚𝑏𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽ℎ𝑚𝑙𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 +  𝑒𝑖𝑡                         (4.10) 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹𝑡 = 𝑎𝑖 + 𝛽𝑚𝑘𝑡𝑅𝑀𝑅𝐹𝑡  + 𝛽𝑠𝑚𝑏𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽ℎ𝑚𝑙𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽𝑢𝑚𝑑𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡
+  𝑒𝑖𝑡                                                                                                          (4.11) 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹𝑡
= 𝑎𝑖 + 𝛽𝑚𝑘𝑡𝑅𝑀𝑅𝐹𝑡  + 𝛽𝑠𝑚𝑏𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽ℎ𝑚𝑙𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽𝑟𝑚𝑤𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡 + 𝛽𝑐𝑚𝑎𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡
+  𝑒𝑖𝑡                                                                                                                                     (4.12) 
Table 4-4 demonstrates the alphas from all four asset pricing models. In 
panel A, the dependent variables are the portfolios constructed using five 
country indices. I use the global factors from the Kenneth French website for 
the period from November 1990 to April 2013. As the profitability and 
investment factors are not available on international data, I only run the CAPM, 
three factor model and the Carhart four factor model.24 The results show that 
all the strategies generate negative alphas for all three models except for the 
mean variance rule, which produces a positive three factor alpha of 0.08 and 
a Carhart alpha of 0.15. Those negative alphas indicate that the strategy 
makes portfolios underperform the world index in general. Also, no strategy 
                                                          
24 The global factors on the Kenneth French website include 23 countries. As G5 countries are in the 
leading position and are included in these 23 countries, I use global factors in this study. The 
momentum factor is denoted as WML in the global factor, while it is denoted as Mom in the US 
factor.   
224 
 
performs statistically differently from the naïve diversification on a risk-adjusted 
basis.  
For portfolios constructed using industries, stocks and asset classes, I 
regress them on US factors, which are available from the Kenneth French 
website from July 1963 to April 2013. Panel B reports the alphas for the 
industry dataset. The mean variance approach bears high momentum 
exposure, as it generates a Carhart alpha of 0.02 compared with its five-factor 
alpha of 0.11. Except for the mean variance approach, the minimum variance 
strategy performs the best with a CAPM alpha of 0.18, a three-factor alpha of 
0.09, a Carhart alpha of 0.10 and a five factor alpha of 0.06, which are all 
higher than those of the other strategies. These results on alphas are in line 
with the previous test using the Sharpe ratio, where the minimum variance 
approach produces the highest Sharpe ratio in the industry dataset. On the 
other hand, the investment and profitability factors has added an explanatory 
poIr to the variation of portfolio returns as the five factor model alphas are much 
smaller than three factor alphas for all of the strategies except the mean 
variance rule. The equal weighting, risk parity and equal risk contribution 
approaches even result in negative five factor alphas, while the other alphas 
they produce are positive.  
For the stock-based portfolios shown in panel C, all the alphas are positive 
and much higher than the alphas in the other datasets. The maximum 
diversification portfolio generates the three highest alphas, with a CAPM alpha 
of 0.82, a three factor alpha of 0.66 and a five factor alpha of 0.58. This is also 
in line with the previous section that finds that maximum diversification obtains 
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the highest Sharpe ratio among all strategies in the stock dataset. Moreover, 
none of the strategies are statistically different to the equally weighted portfolio 
for all four models I test.  
In panel D of Table 4-4 I report the alphas for the multi-asset class 
portfolios. Including bonds in the portfolio greatly reduces the risk-adjusted 
returns. Almost all of the alphas in the multi-asset portfolios are negative, 
except for the mean variance portfolio, which produces a three-factor alpha of 
0.08 and a five factor alpha of 0.05. These positive alphas are, however, not 
statistically significantly different from the negative alphas produced by the 
equally weighted portfolios. However, the three risk-based portfolios; the 
minimum variance, the equal risk contribution, and the maximum 
diversification portfolios; result in statistically smaller negative alphas (with p-












Table 4-4 Alphas from Asset Pricing Models 
This table compares the alphas generated by strategy made portfolios regressed on 
the risk factors, as stated in asset pricing models. For the country indices dataset, I 
test CAPM, the Fama-French three factor model and the Carhart four factor model. I 
use global factors on the Kenneth French website from November 1990 to April 2013. 
For the remaining three datasets I also use the Fama-French five factor model. I 
obtain the US factors on the Kenneth French website from July 1963 to April 2013. 
The p-value is tested for the hypothesis that the intercept from each regression is the 






















Panel A: G5 country indices (Nov 1990 - Apr 2013) 
EW -0.20 1.00 -0.19 1.00 -0.18 1.00   
Mean V 0.00 0.23 0.08 0.23 0.15 0.23   
RP Var -0.14 0.74 -0.13 0.74 -0.11 0.74   
RP Vol -0.16 0.86 -0.16 0.86 -0.15 0.86   
Min V -0.06 0.51 -0.05 0.51 -0.04 0.51   
ERC -0.17 0.91 -0.17 0.91 -0.16 0.91   
MD -0.15 0.77 -0.15 0.78 -0.15 0.78   
Panel B: Ten industry portfolios (Jul 1963 - Apr 2013) 
EW 0.11 1.00 0.05 1.00 0.08 1.00 -0.02 1.00 
Mean V 0.09 0.63 0.18 0.63 0.02 0.63 0.11 0.62 
RP Var 0.14 0.96 0.07 0.95 0.09 0.95 -0.01 0.95 
RP Vol 0.13 0.95 0.06 0.94 0.08 0.94 -0.02 0.94 
Min V 0.18 0.57 0.09 0.54 0.10 0.54 0.06 0.54 
ERC 0.13 0.97 0.07 0.97 0.08 0.97 -0.01 0.97 
MD 0.12 0.48 0.07 0.45 0.08 0.45 0.05 0.44 
Panel C: Random selected ten stocks (Jul 1963 - Apr 2013) 
EW 0.62 1.00 0.45 1.00 0.71 1.00 0.47 1.00 
Mean V 0.26 0.13 0.22 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.12 
RP Var 0.55 0.56 0.35 0.53 0.46 0.53 0.21 0.53 
RP Vol 0.57 0.74 0.38 0.72 0.54 0.71 0.29 0.72 
Min V 0.52 0.39 0.35 0.37 0.38 0.36 0.23 0.37 
ERC 0.63 0.86 0.44 0.86 0.57 0.85 0.37 0.86 
MD 0.82 0.72 0.66 0.71 0.70 0.71 0.58 0.71 
Panel D: Four asset classes (Jul 1963 - Apr 2013) 
EW -0.10 1.00 -0.09 1.00 -0.10 1.00 -0.11 1.00 
Mean V -0.01 0.60 0.08 0.60 -0.03 0.59 0.05 0.60 
RP Var -0.03 0.61 -0.01 0.60 -0.03 0.60 -0.05 0.60 
RP Vol -0.07 0.68 -0.05 0.67 -0.06 0.67 -0.08 0.66 
Min V -0.06 0.04 -0.04 0.04 -0.06 0.04 -0.08 0.04 
ERC -0.07 0.06 -0.04 0.06 -0.06 0.06 -0.09 0.06 
MD -0.07 0.04 -0.05 0.03 -0.06 0.03 -0.09 0.03 
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4.4.3 Risk factor loadings 
In this section, I further evaluate the risk exposures associated with each 
asset allocation strategy. As illustrated in equation (4.11), I regress strategy-
made portfolios on the Carhart four factors; market (βmkt), size (βsmb), value 
(βhml), and momentum (βumd). The betas (βmkt, βsmb, βhml, βumd) of each 
risk factor in the regression are the corresponding risk loadings. I aim to 
compare the risk loadings in order to understand what drives the performance 
of each asset allocation strategy and how stable the risk shifting is. I employ 
the rolling sample regression in order to explore the variation of risk exposures 
in every five-year period. At each time t, I get the betas by using the data from 
time t-60 to t. I then compute the average and the standard deviation of these 
time series betas.  
Panel A of Table 4-5 reports the factor loadings for the portfolio 
construction methods in country diversification. All of the strategies bear 
negative exposures to small-cap countries except for the maximum 
diversification approach, which has a positive size beta of 0.04. Also, all of the 
methods are positively related to the value effect except for the mean variance 
rule, which has a negative value factor loading of -0.13. Among all the 
strategies, the mean variance rule is associated with larger risk shifting with 
respect to all four factors. For instance, the standard deviations of the market 
and value betas generated from the mean variance approach are more than 
twice those generated from the other strategies.  
For the industry diversification shown in panel B, the results are similar to 
the country-based portfolios. Again, the mean variance approach has the 
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highest variation with respect to all the risk factors. The standard deviations of 
the market, size and momentum risk loadings in the mean variance portfolio 
are more than four times those for the equally weighted portfolio. Moreover, it 
seems that the performance of mean variance is driven by the momentum 
effect, as a relatively high momentum beta of 0.23 is obtained in the mean 
variance portfolio, while the other techniques have momentum betas of 
approximately zero. 
The risk loadings for strategies in the individual stock dataset are shown 
in panel C. The equal weighting method is associated with high small-cap 
stocks exposure, with a size beta of 0.75 as well as a relatively large negative 
momentum risk loading of -0.23. The mean variance rule is positively related 
to the momentum factor, while the other strategies are negatively related. The 
naïve diversification rule and the mean variance method lead to slightly higher 
fluctuations in risk exposures. The variation in betas for the other techniques 
is similar. 
Panel D reveals the risk exposures for portfolios made up of multi-asset 
classes. The four risk factors provide little explanation for the variation in the 
portfolios, as all the risk loadings are quite small. The mean variance approach 
still implies higher risk shifting for all the factors. The standard deviations of all 
the factor loadings generated by the mean variance rule are approximately 





Table 4-5 Risk Factor Loadings of the Carhart Four Factor Model 
This table reveals the strategies’ risk loadings for the market (βmkt), size (βsmb), 
value (βhml) and momentum (βumd) factors. I run a five-year regression on the four 
factors from the beginning of the portfolio returns, keep the five-year estimation 
window and rolling one month forward until the end of the observation. This table 
reports the average and standard deviation of the betas. EW demotes the equal 
weighting; Mean V, the mean variance rule; RP Var, the risk parity based on variance; 
RP Vol, the risk parity based on volatility; Min V, the minimum variance; ERC, the 
equal risk contribution; and MD, the maximum diversification. 
Portfolios       βmkt   SD(βmkt)     βsmb        SD(βsmb)   βhml     
SD(βhml) βumd SD(βumd) 
Panel A: G5 country indices (Nov 1990 - Apr 2013) 
EW 0.90 0.09 -0.07 0.10 0.08 0.14 0.03 0.09 
Mean V 0.93 0.20 -0.20 0.14 -0.13 0.33 0.04 0.16 
RP Var 0.86 0.11 -0.10 0.09 0.07 0.16 0.04 0.12 
RP Vol 0.88 0.10 -0.08 0.10 0.08 0.15 0.04 0.11 
Min V 0.81 0.10 -0.12 0.11 0.03 0.23 0.03 0.10 
ERC 0.88 0.09 -0.07 0.10 0.07 0.14 0.03 0.10 
MD 0.88 0.06 0.04 0.15 0.02 0.13 0.01 0.08 
Panel B: Ten industry portfolios  (Jul 1963 - Apr 2013) 
EW 0.96 0.03 0.00 0.05 0.06 0.11 -0.04 0.04 
Mean V 0.90 0.12 -0.20 0.22 -0.05 0.29 0.23 0.18 
RP Var 0.91 0.04 -0.04 0.07 0.12 0.13 -0.03 0.06 
RP Vol 0.93 0.03 -0.02 0.06 0.09 0.12 -0.03 0.05 
Min V 0.78 0.12 -0.17 0.17 0.26 0.20 0.00 0.12 
ERC 0.92 0.03 -0.04 0.06 0.10 0.12 -0.03 0.05 
MD 0.87 0.07 -0.12 0.12 0.15 0.15 -0.02 0.07 
Panel C: Random selected ten stocks (Jul 1963 - Apr 2013) 
EW 0.86 0.20 0.75 0.31 0.18 0.30 -0.23 0.26 
Mean V 0.76 0.16 0.29 0.25 0.04 0.30 0.13 0.26 
RP Var 0.83 0.14 0.39 0.22 0.27 0.18 -0.15 0.13 
RP Vol 0.86 0.15 0.56 0.27 0.25 0.16 -0.17 0.15 
Min V 0.77 0.15 0.22 0.23 0.30 0.22 -0.10 0.20 
ERC 0.84 0.14 0.52 0.23 0.27 0.16 -0.15 0.15 
MD 0.80 0.15 0.46 0.24 0.28 0.18 -0.10 0.24 
Panel D: Four asset classes (Jul 1963 - Apr 2013) 
EW 0.42 0.04 -0.07 0.04 -0.01 0.04 0.02 0.03 
Mean V 0.37 0.27 -0.10 0.13 -0.01 0.15 0.09 0.10 
RP Var 0.23 0.09 -0.07 0.05 -0.03 0.05 0.02 0.03 
RP Vol 0.32 0.06 -0.07 0.04 -0.02 0.04 0.02 0.03 
Min V 0.03 0.04 -0.03 0.04 -0.06 0.06 0.02 0.03 
ERC 0.10 0.04 -0.03 0.03 -0.06 0.06 0.02 0.03 
MD 0.04 0.05 -0.03 0.03 -0.06 0.06 0.02 0.03 
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To better demonstrate the risk exposures associated with the portfolio 
construction methods over time, I plot the risk loadings for every five-year 
period in Figure 4-1. I use portfolios made by industries as an illustration. The 
plots for the other three datasets are similar. The four factors are calculated 
using rolling sample regression with an estimation window of five-years. Figure 
4-1 only plots the risk exposures associated with the equal-weighted, mean 
variance weighted, minimum variance weighted and equal risk contribution 
portfolios. The risk variations within the other three methods are similar to that 
of the equal risk contribution technique. 
The equal weighting and equal risk contribution strategies lead to relatively 
stable risk exposures with regards to market, size, value and momentum 
factors. The market betas of these two strategies are approximately one over 
time. In contrast, the minimum variance method produces smaller market 
betas and more fluctuation. Moreover, the naïve diversification and equal risk 
contribution methods result in size, value and momentum risk loadings of 
around zero over time. However, the mean variance and minimum variance 
portfolios imply risk shifting throughout the study period in regard to these three 
factors. For the momentum factor in particular, it is obvious that the 
performance of the mean variance portfolio is driven by the momentum factor 
since the risk loadings are relatively large throughout time. 
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Figure 4-1 Strategy Made Portfolio Risk Exposures Over Time 
This figure illustrates the time varying risk exposures associated with the industry portfolios constructed according to different asset 
allocation strategies. The strategies shown here are equal weighting (EW), mean variance weighting (Mean V), minimum variance 
weighting (Min V) and equal risk contribution (ERC). I evaluate the risk loadings with respect to the market (βRMRF), size (βSMB), value 
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4.4.4 How far are they from the real optimal?  
Since all of the asset allocation strategies I test are indistinguishable from 
each other most of the time, it is worth asking; are they all approaching optimal? 
If not, how far are they from ex-post mean variance efficient? In order to 
answer these questions, I apply the in sample (ex-post) mean variance method 
to construct the real optimal portfolio for comparison purposes. In the out-of-
sample testing, I use an estimation window of 60 months (M=60) and calculate 
the return at time t by evaluating the assets’ characteristics from time t-M to t-
1. For the in-sample optimal portfolio construction, I assume that the investors 
have perfect foresight so that they know the returns at time t. Therefore, I get 
the ex-post optimal return at time t by evaluating the assets’ characteristics 
from time t-M+1 to t (and the estimation window is still 60 months). Figure 4-2 
illustrates the process of ex-ante and ex-post portfolio construction. For the 
return at the same month, there is only one month return difference between 
these two portfolios during the estimation process. The ex-ante portfolio uses 









Figure 4-2 Portfolio Returns Construction 
Figure 4-2a illustrates the process of the ex-ante portfolio return construction. I 
estimate the assets’ return and risk characteristics during month t-M to t-1 in order to 
determine the weighting matrix. Then I calculate the return at time t by using the 
weighting matrix multiplied by the return matrix of assets at time t. The portfolio returns 
are obtained by rolling the window one month down.  
Figure 4-2a. Ex-ante portfolio returns construction 
 
Month t-M                                                     t-1     t 
                        (weighting matrix)  multiply  (return matrix)  
                                                               Ex-ante portfolio returns 
Figure 4-2b illustrates the process of the ex-post optimal portfolio return construction. 
I assume that investors already know the return at time t. I first estimate the assets’ 
characteristics during month t-M+1 to t in order to determine the optimal weighting 
matrix using the mean variance method. Then I calculate the return at time t by using 
the weighting matrix multiplied by the return matrix of assets at time t. I get the optimal 
portfolio returns by rolling the window one month forward. 
Figure 4-2b. Ex-post portfolio returns construction 
 
  Month t-M+1                                                        t 
                             (weighting matrix)  multiply (return matrix) 
                                                               Ex-post portfolio returns 
 
Table 4-6 compares the performance of strategy made portfolios with the 
optimal one. The p-value is the probability that the strategy is optimal. For all 
the data sets, the Sharpe ratios for the optimal portfolios are exceedingly 
higher than for any of the strategies and are all significant at the 5% level. For 
portfolios made using country indices, the ten industries and individual stocks, 
the highest Sharpe ratios generated by the strategies are approximately two-
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thirds of the corresponding optimal Sharpe ratios. The difference is even larger 
for portfolios made using the four asset classes. The optimal portfolio has a 
Sharpe ratio of 0.58, while the highest Sharpe ratio generated by the strategies 
(equal weighting and risk parity) is around half (0.31) that and the lowest one 
generated by the minimum variance rule is less than one-tenth that, at only 
0.04.  
In particular, the out-of-sample mean variance portfolio shares the same 
methodology with the in sample optimal portfolio, but results in extremely 
inferior performance to the latter portfolio. By observing the difference between 
them I gain a sense of the magnitude of estimation errors in practice. For 
instance, the out-of-sample mean variance Sharpe ratio (0.29) is only half of 
the optimal Sharpe ratio (0.6) for the country indices portfolio (panel A of Table 
4-6). 
Although the choice among the current strategies does not significantly 
affect portfolio performance, asset allocation methods still have a strong 
impact on investment, as I illustrate how the performance would be better if 
optimal construction could be approached. After all the new methods proposed 
in the literature, the portfolios are still far from optimal. In other words, the 







Table 4-6 Performance of Ex-ante Strategy-based Portfolios Compared with 
the Ex-post Optimal Portfolio 
This table reports the performance of each strategy constructed portfolio compared 
with the in-sample optimal portfolio. The p-value is the probability that each strategy 
made portfolio is the same as the in-sample optimal portfolio. All the parameters are 
annualised; the excess return and volatility are expressed in percentages.  
Rules Excess Return Volatility Sharpe Ratio P-value  
Panel A: G5 country indices      
Optimal (in sample) 9.29 15.60 0.60 - 
EW 5.25 13.22 0.40 0.003 
Mean V 4.33 14.93 0.29 0.001 
RP Var 4.98 15.28 0.33 0.002 
RP Vol 5.09 14.25 0.36 0.001 
Min V 5.16 15.33 0.34 0.004 
ERC 5.03 14.09 0.36 0.001 
MD 5.02 13.85 0.36 0.003 
Panel B: Ten industry portfolios   
Optimal (in sample) 14.23 18.56 0.77 - 
EW 8.69 17.90 0.49 0.001 
Mean V 8.33 18.05 0.46 0.001 
RP Var 8.35 16.39 0.51 0.001 
RP Vol 8.54 17.13 0.50 0.001 
Min V 7.42 13.85 0.54 0.006 
ERC 8.51 16.96 0.50 0.001 
MD 8.28 15.78 0.52 0.001 
Panel C: Random selected ten stocks       
Optimal (in sample) 22.68 23.43 0.97 - 
EW 14.28 26.61 0.54 0.001 
Mean V 10.70 24.19 0.44 0.001 
RP Var 12.44 21.23 0.59 0.001 
RP Vol 13.25 23.17 0.57 0.001 
Min V 11.41 20.32 0.56 0.001 
ERC 13.71 23.08 0.59 0.001 
MD 15.70 24.79 0.63 0.001 
Panel D: Four asset classes       
Optimal (in sample) 5.06 8.69 0.58 - 
EW 2.29 7.45 0.31 0.013 
Mean V 2.55 8.85 0.29 0.001 
RP Var 1.19 3.89 0.31 0.049 
RP Vol 1.48 4.72 0.31 0.035 
Min V 0.12 2.56 0.04 0.002 
ERC 0.47 2.86 0.16 0.006 
MD 0.18 2.63 0.07 0.002 
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4.5 Strategy performance over time 
This chapter illustrates the performance of asset allocation strategies 
across different datasets in Section 4.4 above. None of the strategies 
examined is able to significantly outperform the others in all four datasets. In 
this section, I examine their performance over time. The objective is to check 
the consistency of strategy performance over different time periods.   
4.5.1 Business cycle 
Firstly, this study analyses strategy performance during different states 
within business cycles. According to the separation date from the National 
Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), I obtain 14 business cycles in total 
from August 1931 to June 2009 (where the NBER dates end). I separate the 
ex-ante strategy returns during recession from the returns during expansion. 
In Table 4-7, I report the annualised average excess returns, volatilities 
and Sharpe ratios of each of the strategies in both periods. For the country and 
industry portfolios, the differences between strategies are still small 
irrespective of the economic status. Panel A shows that none of the strategies 
are significantly different from the naïve diversification rule when investing in 
country indices. For the industry dataset exhibits in panel B, although during 
contraction the Sharpe ratios of the risk parity (-0.29) and equal risk 
contribution (-0.28) portfolios are statistically significantly higher than that of 
the equally weighted portfolio (-0.31), the magnitude is negligible.  
For the equity portfolio, asset allocation methods perform differently during 
expansion but not during periods of contraction. Panel C shows that even 
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though the equally weighted portfolio obtains the lowest Sharpe ratio during 
contraction, it is not statistically different to the other portfolios. However, when 
in the bull market, the Sharpe ratios of the equal risk contribution (0.84) and 
risk parity based on volatility (0.81) strategies are statistically higher than those 
of the naïve diversification rule (0.76).   
Panel D of Table 4-7 shows that the performance of strategies produce 
even larger differences in the multi-asset class dataset. During the recession 
period, the minimum variance method obtains the only positive Sharpe ratio of 
0.03, which is substantially higher than the other strategies. Also, the risk parity 
strategy based on variance produces a Sharpe ratio of -0.12, which is 
significantly higher than the equal weighting rule (-0.6). However, during 
expansion, the strategy performances completely change. The naïve 
diversification rule becomes the best one and it significantly outperforms the 
minimum variance, equal risk contribution and maximum diversification rules 
at the 1% level. In this case, the minimum variance portfolio generates an 
extremely low Sharpe ratio of 0.05 which is even less than the 10% Sharpe 








Table 4-7 Asset Allocation Strategy Performance over Business Cycle 
This table reports the annualised strategy performance metrics during contraction and 
expansion. I separate all the contraction and expansion returns according to the 
NBER business cycle reference dates during the period from August 1931 to June 
2009.The return and volatility are in percentages. The p-value is the probability that 
the strategy is the same as the equal-weighting (EW). P-values are calculated using 
the Ledoit and Wolf (2008) method. The mean V denotes the mean variance approach; 
RP Var, the risk parity based on variance; RP Vol, the risk parity based on volatility; 
Min V, the minimum variance; ERC, the equal risk contribution; and MD, the maximum 
diversification. 














Panel A: G5 country indices 
EW -8.81 18.66 -0.47 - 7.98 11.73 0.68 - 
Mean V -14.51 20.84 -0.70 0.26 7.98 13.25 0.60 0.40 
RP Var -9.93 16.38 -0.61 0.23 7.87 14.92 0.53 0.22 
RP Vol -9.49 17.10 -0.55 0.27 7.91 13.49 0.59 0.26 
Min V -9.41 16.13 -0.58 0.42 7.99 15.05 0.53 0.27 
ERC -9.09 17.24 -0.53 0.44 7.77 13.26 0.59 0.20 
MD -8.52 18.13 -0.47 0.99 7.64 12.73 0.60 0.12 
Panel B: Ten industry portfolios 
EW -8.68 27.71 -0.31 - 12.16 15.03 0.81 - 
Mean V -8.21 28.11 -0.29 0.81 11.63 15.12 0.77 0.58 
RP Var -6.81 25.58 -0.27 0.10 11.37 13.71 0.83 0.34 
RP Vol -7.68 26.65 -0.29 0.09 11.77 14.34 0.82 0.27 
Min V -3.30 20.93 -0.16 0.18 9.56 11.87 0.81 0.96 
ERC -7.44 26.41 -0.28 0.07 11.69 14.19 0.82 0.15 
MD -5.60 23.77 -0.24 0.30 11.05 13.53 0.82 0.81 
Panel C: Random selected ten stocks 
EW -6.47 35.90 -0.18 - 18.42 24.19 0.76 - 
Mean V -3.45 30.92 -0.11 0.78 13.52 22.55 0.60 0.07 
RP Var -2.96 30.06 -0.10 0.37 15.50 18.89 0.82 0.27 
RP Vol -5.07 32.20 -0.16 0.62 16.91 20.78 0.81 0.09 
Min V 1.42 27.38 0.05 0.30 13.40 18.56 0.72 0.61 
ERC -3.93 32.37 -0.12 0.34 17.22 20.62 0.84 0.03 
MD 0.82 34.99 0.02 0.17 18.67 22.13 0.84 0.13 
Panel D: Four asset classes  
EW -6.35 10.52 -0.60 - 4.01 6.56 0.61 - 
Mean V -6.09 10.68 -0.57 0.92 4.27 8.36 0.51 0.38 
RP Var -0.63 5.45 -0.12 0.10 1.56 3.50 0.45 0.10 
RP Vol -2.95 6.33 -0.47 0.47 2.37 4.29 0.55 0.24 
Min V 0.11 3.51 0.03 0.07 0.12 2.32 0.05 0.001 
ERC -1.28 3.84 -0.33 0.35 0.82 2.62 0.31 0.003 




4.5.2 Performance over time 
In this section, I test the consistency of strategy performance. I compute 
the Sharpe ratio for each strategy made portfolio during every non-overlapping 
10-year period and rank them from 1 (the highest) to 7 (the lowest). The 
rankings exhibit that none of the strategies stay in the 1st place for more than 
two periods for all four datasets. In other words, none of the portfolio 
construction methods consistently outperform the others over time. The 
performance of the strategies is highly dependent on the time period tested. 
To illustrate, I show the bar chart of the rankings for the industry dataset in 
Figure 4-3. The inconsistency of strategy performance is the same for the other 
three datasets. The bars shown in Figure 4-3 are the rankings for strategies 
every ten years. It is apparent that the rankings changes dramatically over time. 
For instance, the yellow bars show the ranking for the minimum variance 
approach, which holds the 1st place during the most recent period (2002 to 
2013). However, in the previous period (1992 to 2001), it ranks 6th among all 









Figure 4-3 Strategy Ranking Every Ten Years in the Industry Dataset 
This figure exhibits the ranking of strategies’ Sharpe ratios for the industry dataset. I 
calculate the Sharpe ratios of strategies during every non-overlapping ten-year period 
from August 1931 to April 2013. A ranking equalling one indicates the highest Sharpe 
ratio and a ranking of seven is the lowest.  
 
 
Furthermore, I narrow the observation by exploring the rolling variation of 
strategy performance in every five-year period. I adopt the rolling window 
analysis; every month I calculate the strategy Sharpe ratio during the previous 
five years. I plot the rolling Sharpe ratios over time (in Figure 4-4) in order to 
discover whether there is one strategy that can dominate the others during 
certain periods. I calculate the 95% confidence interval of the equally weighted 
portfolio’s Sharpe ratio over time as a benchmark and plot the results in dotted 
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lines, as shown in Figure 4-4. If the line of any strategy’s Sharpe ratios is 
outside the dotted lines this means that they have significantly outperform the 
naïve diversification rule. To clearly illustrate this, I only report the strategy 
performance after the year 2000.  
For the country indices and industries datasets, almost all the Sharpe 
ratios produced by strategies are located within the 95% confidence interval of 
the equal weighting. None of them is distinguishable from the naïve 
diversification. These results also hold for the whole period (Aug 1931 to Apr 
2013). For the stocks and multi-asset classes, the strategy superiority and 
inferiority over the naïve diversification rule does not persist. For instance, 
three risk-based approaches (the minimum variance, equal risk contribution 
and maximum diversification methods) significantly outperform the others after 
the 2008 financial crisis. Their superiority can explain the rise in the risk-based 
methods after the financial crisis. However, if we look at the full sample period, 
these three approaches show significantly lower Sharpe ratios most of the time.   
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Figure 4-4 Five-year Rolling Window on Sharpe Ratios 
This figure demonstrates the performance of asset allocation strategies over time after the year 2000. I plot the Sharpe ratios of each strategy in a 
rolling sample analysis with a five-year estimation window. The black dotted lines are the upper and lower 95% confidence interval of the equal 
weighting method (EW). The solid lines are the rolling Sharpe ratios for mean variance (Mean var), risk parity based on volatility (RP vol), minimum 







4.6 Implications for investors  
I conduct a comprehensive comparison on a range of commonly used 
asset allocation strategies and I find that no strategy could consistently 
outperform the others. This study has several practical implications for 
investors. First, if portfolios are made up with well-diversified and highly 
correlated indices such as country indices or industry indices, the techniques 
of constructing portfolio do not really have any influence on portfolio 
performance. In this case, investors could simply assign equal weights to the 
indices they invested in without utilizing any sophisticated or newly invented 
strategies.   
Second, the mean variance optimized portfolio does not result in better 
performance with its added complexity. Besides, I caution investors to pay 
attention to the risk shifting of mean-variance strategy. Third, for investors 
holding different types of assets with low correlations, using the minimum 
variance method would protect their portfolios during bear market. The 
minimum variance method would assign more weights on assets with lower 
risk and thus, reduces the likelihood of extreme loss. However, when the 
market is functioning well, using risk-based strategies will be catastrophic as 
they limit the upper gains. Overall, the choice of asset allocation strategies 
highly depends on the assets within the portfolio and market timing.  
4.7 Other robustness checks 
In this section, I undertake several sensitivity tests to check the robustness 
of the main results. I use different estimation periods when determining the 
weighting matrix, adjust the return after taking into account the transaction 
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costs, employ other rebalancing frequencies and apply other performance 
measures. The main results do not vary largely in these tests. With respect to 
all the robustness checks, the asset allocation strategies still perform 
indifferently in country- and industry-based portfolios, while there are relatively 
large differences in the stock- and multi-asset class portfolios.    
4.7.1 Estimation period 
In the baseline study, I estimate assets’ characteristics within the previous 
five-year period (M=60) in order to determine the weights for each asset. I also 
apply the estimation windows of three-years (M=36) and ten-years (M=120). 
Generally speaking, the implementation of a ten-year estimation window 
produces the highest Sharpe ratio for all the strategies across all four datasets. 
However, using different estimation periods does not influence the 
performance differences between strategies. The results are available from 
the author.  
4.7.2 Transaction costs 
In the baseline study, I do not consider the transaction costs as it is difficult 
to determine the value for different asset types. In this section, I test whether 
the strategies will perform differently net of costs, assuming the transaction 
cost is 50 basis points per transaction, as used in Balduzzi and Lynch (1999) 
and DeMiguel, Garlappi, and Uppal (2009). I first calculate the turnover, which 
is the average of the sum of assets’ weight changes during each rebalance, 
as shown in equation (4.15). M is the estimation window used to obtain 
parameters for determining asset weights. The portfolio returns start from time 
t = M+1 to T. 𝑤𝑖,𝑛,𝑡+1̂  is the weight of asset n at time t+1 under strategy i. I 
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calculate the absolute changes in asset weightings, sum them for N asset and 









                                                          (4.15) 
The results in Table 4-8 show that the equally weighted portfolios produce 
the smallest turnovers followed by the risk parity (volatility) and equal risk 
contribution portfolios. In contrast, the mean variance portfolios result in the 
largest turnovers. These results hold for all four datasets we test. For instance, 
compared to the equally weighted portfolios, the turnovers of the mean 
variance portfolios are over ten times higher under the industry dataset and 
five times higher under the multi-asset dataset. In general, the naïve 
diversification rule, the risk parity approach and the equal risk contribution 
method produce the smallest turnovers. The turnovers for the stock-based 
portfolios are much higher than for the other three datasets.  
In order to calculate the portfolio returns net of costs, I use the returns 
minus the bid and ask spread at each rebalance month. Then I use the returns 
after transaction costs to compute the annualised average return, volatility and 
Sharpe ratio for each strategy. For country-based portfolios, only the mean 
variance method shows significant worse results than the others due to the 
large costs incurred. For the industries, none of the strategies show significant 
differences. However, in the stock-based portfolios, all of the strategies are 
inferior to the equal weighting rule, as their returns have been largely negated 
by the large costs. For instance, before transaction costs, the annualised 
average return of the maximum diversification portfolio, at 15.7%, is higher 
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than that of the equally weighted portfolio of 14.28%. The return for the 
maximum diversification portfolio becomes 9.65% after deducting a huge 
turnover of 1195%, while the return of the equally weighted portfolio is 13.88% 
net of costs. For the multi-asset class portfolios, the differences between 
strategies are similar before costs and after costs.     
4.7.3 Rebalance frequency  
Using semi-annual rebalancing instead of monthly rebalancing does not 
change the result substantially. In fact, the performance of strategies becomes 
even closer with semi-annual rebalancing. The Sharpe ratio of all the 
strategies increases and the differences between them decrease. Even in the 
multi-asset class portfolio, there is no difference between all of the strategies. 
The Sharpe ratio of the minimum variance strategy is the same with the naïve 
diversification rule with semi-annual rebalancing, while it is only one-tenth of 











Table 4-8 Asset Allocation Strategy Performance Net of Transaction Costs 
This table reports the annualized strategy performance metrics net of transaction 
costs (50 basis points per transaction). The turnover of each strategy is calculated 
as the average of the sum of assets’ weight changes during each rebalance. The 
portfolio net of costs returns is computed by using excess returns minus bid and ask 
spread at each rebalance month.  Then I report the average net returns, standard 
deviations and Sharpe ratios. The p-value is the probability that each strategy 
performs no different from the equally weighted methods. 




value  Turnover 
Panel A: G5 country indices        
EW 5.07 13.22 0.38 - 35.12 
Mean V 3.48 14.95 0.23 0.04 168.58 
RP Var 4.77 15.28 0.31 0.10 41.47 
RP Vol 4.90 14.25 0.34 0.18 36.69 
Min V 4.80 15.34 0.31 0.18 73.75 
ERC 4.83 14.09 0.34 0.14 39.18 
MD 4.66 13.86 0.34 0.16 71.90 
Panel B: Ten industry portfolios     
EW 8.56 17.90 0.48 - 26.44 
Mean V 6.87 18.03 0.38 0.11 295.32 
RP Var 8.18 16.40 0.50 0.15 34.37 
RP Vol 8.40 17.13 0.49 0.09 28.62 
Min V 6.95 13.84 0.50 0.64 97.17 
ERC 8.36 16.96 0.49 0.07 30.42 
MD 7.78 15.79 0.49 0.65 95.29 
Panel C: Random selected ten stocks         
EW 13.88 26.61 0.52 - 85.43 
Mean V 1.78 24.21 0.07 0.00 1778.04 
RP Var 7.43 21.25 0.35 0.00 1003.72 
RP Vol 10.58 23.19 0.46 0.01 538.13 
Min V 2.65 20.34 0.13 0.00 1741.59 
ERC 10.86 23.10 0.47 0.03 570.36 
MD 9.65 24.80 0.39 0.01 1195.53 
Panel D: Four asset classes         
EW 2.16 7.45 0.29 - 25.80 
Mean V 1.66 8.97 0.18 0.33 185.94 
RP Var 1.04 3.90 0.27 0.81 29.28 
RP Vol 1.34 4.73 0.28 0.92 26.69 
Min V -0.04 2.56 -0.01 0.03 28.93 
ERC 0.34 2.87 0.12 0.06 26.03 




This study explores how the methods of allocating assets influence the 
portfolio return and risk characteristics. I comprehensively evaluate the ex-ante 
performance of seven asset allocation strategies; the equal weighting, mean 
variance, risk parity based on variance, risk parity based on volatility, minimum 
variance, equal risk contribution, and maximum diversification strategies. I 
compare the economical and statistical differences between strategies across 
four datasets and over time.  
The results show that, firstly, the differences between strategy risk-
adjusted returns are indistinguishable for country- and industry-based 
portfolios, but large for equity and multi-asset class portfolios. If investors 
invest purely in country and industry indices, the method of allocating assets 
does not matter within any reasonable time period. However, for equity and 
asset class portfolios, no strategy can consistently outperform the others for 
more than 20 years. Secondly, in terms of risk exposures, the implementation 
of the mean variance rule generates highly fluctuating market, size, value and 
momentum risk factor loadings. Thirdly, all the strategies we test here are far 
from mean-variance optimal. Those newly innovated strategies do not exhibit 
strong impacts on investment outcomes.  
This study indicates that there is a desire for improving the performance 
of portfolio construction strategies, as performance in the past does not 
guarantee performance in the future. It seems that the innovation of new 
construction approaches can be focused on other aspects instead of just 
assets’ characteristics. Moreover, the performance of strategies varies when I 
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utilize different datasets to construct portfolios, my conjecture is that 
correlations between assets played a role in the performance. Further tests 
are left for future studies. Also, checking the performance of practical indices 
that apply these strategies can be conducted. This research is also likely to 
add value in the area of other investable assets, such as derivatives, 






































Chapter 5 Conclusion 
 
This thesis investigates influential factors, characteristics, and trading 
behaviour affecting international financial markets. It contains three empirical 
studies that seek to enhance our understanding of financial markets by 
unfolding the relationships between them and informal institutions; the goal is 
also to understand the relationship between financial markets and 
macroeconomics.  
The first study aims to discover if corruption culture is a determinant of 
short-termism in the banking sector and whether it contributed to the 2007 
financial crisis. To accomplish this objective, I construct a comprehensive 
measure for short-termism in the banking sector by combining earnings 
management, tail risk-taking, and short-term debt taking which are signals for 
short-termism. I find that banks are more myopic if they are headquartered in 
countries with higher levels of corruption. This finding is robust to the use of 
an instrumental variable. Aside from that, European economic policy 
uncertainty serves to amplify the effect of corruption on myopia. As an 
alternative, I test if corruption culture imported through foreign shareholders is 
also a contributing factor for short-termism after controlling for domestic 
corruption. I find that having a larger percentage of shares held by institutions 
domiciled in countries with higher levels of corruption is associated with more 
short-termism for banks with lower-than-average domestic corruption level. 
Nevertheless, having larger percentages of shares held by institutions 
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domiciled in less corrupt countries does not reduce the level of short-termism 
for banks that already have a higher than average level of domestic corruption.  
This first study contributes to the literature by capturing bank myopia in 
every possible aspect. Previous literature has normally focused upon one 
aspect per study (e.g., Beatty, Ke, and Petroni, 2002; Kanagaretnam, Lim, and 
Lobo, 2011; Doyle, Jennings, and Soliman, 2013; Chen, Cheng, Lo, and Wang, 
2015), and this may have caused the omission of some pieces of evidence 
related to short-termism. More importantly, this study unveils how corruption 
culture could influence bank myopia. This finding contributes to the studies that 
link corruption to corporate behaviour (e.g., DeBacker, Heim, and Tran, 2015; 
Liu, 2016; Smith, 2016; Huang and Yuan, 2016).  
It is essential to monitor bank behaviour as bad functioning would trigger 
critical market fluctuation. This study has implications for bank regulators and 
policy makers. They should keep an eye on not only banks headquartered in 
corrupt countries but also banks with foreign shareholders from countries with 
higher levels of corruption. The findings in this study echo the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York speech (2018) that called for attention to be paid to a healthy 
banking culture.  
This study has a few limitations. First, the measure of myopia could be 
enhanced if I include managerial compensation as another dimension to 
capture the incentives for banks to be myopic. Shareholders employ bonus to 
align their interests with managers towards long-term. Previous literature 
suggests that compensation practices have strong influence on bank stability 
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(Bai and Elyasiani, 2013), risk-taking decisions during mergers and acquisition 
(Hagendorff and Vallascas, 2011), and default risk (Vallascas and Hagendorff, 
2013). Unfortunately, executive compensation information for European banks 
is largely insufficient. The commonly used compensation database, namely 
Execucomp, only provides information for banks listed on the S&P 1500. 
Additionally, Boardex provides board information but again data is limited. In 
total, I only obtain compensation details for 67 European banks. Thus, I could 
neither incorporate compensation related variables into the myopia index nor 
include them as control variables due to data limitation.  
Second, this chapter focuses only on how myopic behaviour is influenced 
by corruption from both domestic society and foreign shareholders. However, 
it is well recognized that bank governance is likely to be a determinant of bank 
behaviour and decision-making through overseeing, monitoring, and 
structuring compensation (Srivastav and Hagendorff, 2016). Previous studies 
in the banking literature have shown that boards play an essential role in risk-
taking decisions (e.g., Beltratti and Stulz, 2012; Kirkpatrick, 2009; Pathan, 
2009; Walker, 2009), constraining earnings management (Cornett, McNutt, 
and Tehranian, 2009), and performance (Adams and Mehran, 2012; Aebi et al. 
2012). If I am able to include bank governance variables as control variables, 
I would include board size and board independence. The problem is that data 
on board characteristics for European banks is very limited. Therefore, despite 
my attempts to control for a number of accounting and ownership variables, I 
cannot rule out the possible omitted variable bias. However, after I use the 
instrumental variable to mitigate potential endogeneity issue, the effect of 
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domestic corruption on myopia doubled. Thus, I believe that if I am able to 
control for corporate governance variables, the effect of corruption on myopia 
would be even stronger.   
Third, I could not maintain a causal relationship between foreign 
shareholders, from countries that have higher levels of corruption, and bank 
short-termism. Although the estimation model has controlled for many firm-
level and country fixed effects as indicated by the literature, I still cannot rule 
out the possible reverse causality issue for this part of results.  
Future research may build on this study in several ways. More research is 
needed to analyse the determinant on bank short-termism. For instance, one 
may look at the effect of other cultural dimensions (such as masculinity or 
harmony) on bank short-termism. Another interesting idea worth exploring is 
the effect of corruption through culture heritage on a firm’s decision-making.   
The second study proposes a measure of uncertainty, which is the cross-
sectional standard deviation of stocks, namely, return dispersion. I present that 
return dispersion has a significant association with business cycles, political 
crises, country risk, media uncertainty, and economic policy uncertainty. 
Stocks that are more sensitive to return dispersion are found to result in higher 
returns. Moreover, I compare return dispersion with implied volatility and find 
that return dispersion is good at capturing political crises while implied volatility 
does a good job in capturing economic policy uncertainty.  
This study contributes to the literature by linking return dispersion with all 
sorts of macroeconomic and political shocks that have not been considered 
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before. I focus on the international market which is vital as the interaction effect 
between markets is strong. For instance, Ehrmann, Fratzscher, and Rigobon 
(2011) show the transmission from US market shocks to Euro area financial 
markets. This study also has implications for investors to better track a 
market’s status and enhance their trading performance especially during 
market fluctuations. Investors could easily obtain real-time stock price data and 
compute return dispersion to monitor the market. They could also include 
stocks that are more sensitive to return dispersion in their portfolio, as we find 
a positive relationship exists between the sensitivity to return dispersion and 
stock returns.  
Nevertheless, there are some limitations in this study. One such limitation 
is that return dispersion contains both market average variance and 
correlations between stocks. This study does not distinguish which of these 
two aspects is related to uncertainty. Additionally, while this study covers 18 
countries, they are all developed countries. More research is needed in order 
to explore the emerging markets for future research. It would also be 
interesting for future studies to link the cross-sectional stock variation with firm-
level uncertainties.  
Finally, in the third study, I evaluate the out-of-sample performance of 
commonly used asset allocation strategies including equal weighting, mean-
variance weighting, risk parity weighting, minimum variance weighting, equal 
risk contribution weighting, and maximum diversification weighting. I 
comprehensively assess their performance according to different datasets and 
time periods, and in terms of risk-adjusted returns. I find no statistically 
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significant differences between those strategies if investors construct their 
portfolios using market indices or industry indices. Interestingly, large 
differences do exist between strategies if portfolios are constructed using 
equities or multi-assets, however, none of the strategies were found to be able 
to consistently out-perform the others over time. Overall, all the strategies are 
far from ex-post optimal.  
This study contributes to the literature by showing that commonly used 
asset allocation strategies do not have a significant impact on investment 
outcomes. I illustrate these results in several datasets and have used a long 
time period to ensure the results are robust. A key limitation is that I impose a 
short-sell constraint in this study as short-selling would largely alter portfolio 
investment outcomes which causes serious estimation errors.  
There are several directions for future studies on the basis of this chapter. 
First, one may include other assets such as commodities, derivatives, and 
cryptocurrencies in portfolios to test the performance of those strategies. This 
chapter does not conduct those tests due to data limitation. Second, it seems 
that the performance of asset allocation strategies is depending on the 
correlations between assets within portfolio. When assets are highly correlated, 
such as when investing in country or industry indices, strategies would have 
little influence on portfolio performance. However, when correlations between 
assets are relatively low, such as when investing in various types of assets, 
different strategies would produce different results. One could conduct a 
simulation on generated returns, volatilities, and correlations to analyse the 
sensitivity of strategy performance to correlations. Alternatively, one could sort 
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a bunch of stocks into different portfolios based on their correlations. Then 
compare the difference in asset allocation strategies’ performance between 
those portfolios. Overall, this study demonstrates that all strategies are far from 
ex-post optimal. This study leaves room for the development of new portfolio 
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